

ST THOMAS AQUINAS

SUMMA THEOLOGICÆ

Latin text and English translation,
Introductions, Notes, Appendices
and Glossaries



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ST THOMAS AQUINAS

SUMMA THEOLOGICÆ
VOLUME 16

PURPOSE AND HAPPINESS

(1a2æ. 1-5)

Latin text, English translation, Introduction,
Notes, Appendices & Glossary

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VITÆ ET DE BEATITUDINE']

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Foreword

MAN IS MADE TO GOD'S IMAGE,^a and since this implies, so Damascene tells us,^b that he is intelligent and free to judge and master of himself, so then, now that we have agreed that God is the exemplar cause^c of things and that they issue from his power through his will,^d we go on to look at this image, that is to say, at man as the source of actions which are his own and fall under his responsibility and control.^e

The first matter to come up is the destiny of human life, and next how it may be reached or missed:^f remember, all our plans get their meaning from their final purpose. Happiness is set down as being this,^g accordingly we shall start with human teleology in general (1), and then relate it to happiness (2-5).

anthropological theology: cf Ia. 1. Vol. 1, ed. T. Gilby. Ia. 13. Vol. 3, ed. H. McCabe. What he has done in the second half of the *Prima Pars* is to consider the human creature for what it is in itself, that is, wholly from God: cf Ia. 45, 3. Vol. 8. Now he considers the same thing, but as wholly to God, and so begins the second part, *Secunda Pars*, of the *Summa*. Yet his moral theology does not represent a switch to a field other than that of dogmatic theology: the separate treatment of the two disciplines calls for more safeguards than is customarily accorded. *Sacra doctrina* is centred on God, and loses nothing of its single-mindedness when it also extends to his friends and creatures: Ia. 1, 3 & 7.

Note, too, from the start, that man will be taken throughout as he really is within the economy of divine Providence, that is, compact of natural claims and of supernatural needs for grace and mercy, not in a hypothetical state of pure nature, though this may appear as a methodological abstract to furnish a point of reference. Hence the constant appeal will be to God's revelation transmitted by the Christian Church, though the discourse will quite easily gather in teachings from Plato and Aristotle, and St Augustine's meditations on Cicero, *De vita beata*.

The treatises onward from Ia. 6, on human acts, until the end of the *Secunda Secundæ*.

^aNamely by Aristotle. Happiness, *beatitudo*, *eudaimonia*. The author here declares his hand, though it will not be until Ia. 18, Vol. 18, ed. T. Gilby, that an explicit moral theory will enter into eudemonism.

INTRODUCTION

THE SECOND, and by far the longest,¹ main part of the *Summa*, which opens with this volume, considers the returning home of human creatures to God by their own proper activities in the life of their grace-uplifted nature. It composes St Thomas's moral theology. But having said that, the need to qualify at once arises. For he certainly does not treat it as a special subject to be isolated, either in practice or still less in theory, from the whole body of *sacra doctrina*. His treatises range at large and are very unlike the tidy enclosures made by some later authors, particularly by those whose plan is built on an arrangement of precepts and sins. He gives both these topics special treatment,² but for the rest relegates them to corollaries appended to his examination of the living and positive content of acting for God and happiness through the virtues. It may be noted here how curiously absent is the note of legalism from the general discourse of the *Summa*, though its author was such a key figure in circles which included the papal canonists, perhaps the most ambitious group of lawyer-statesmen in European history, and was himself, as he showed on occasion, extremely proficient in their medium.

Instead its temper is rather to be described as biological; the *Prima Secundæ* in particular is like a living thing with an organic unity which can ingest a variety of elements often regarded as of no concern to moral theology. Thus the opening treatise, contained in the present volume, is about the human drive to happiness; it does not raise specifically moral questions at all, nor does the following treatise, on the structure of human acts. Not until Question 18³ is morality considered as such, and then after four Questions the discourse shifts back to psychology with discussions on the human passions⁴ and active dispositions.⁵ Then not until Question 55⁶ does it broach the matter of living according to virtue, and even so the treatises will include those on original sin⁷ and grace⁸ which are commonly reckoned to come under dogmatic, not moral theology.

St Thomas drives no deep division between the two disciplines. And in

¹*Prima Secundæ*, 114 Questions; *Secunda Secundæ*, 189 Questions: a total of 303, compared with 119 for the *Prima Pars*, and 90 for the uncompleted *Tertia Pars*. In this series 32 vols out of 60.

²*1a2æ*. 71-80. Vol. 25 & *1a2æ*. 90-7. Vol. 28

³Vol. 18

⁴Vols 19-21

⁵Vol. 22

⁶Vol. 23

⁷*1a2æ*. 81-85. Vol. 26

⁸*1a2æ*. 106-114. Vol. 30

fact the singleness in variety of his thought might be more readily appreciated if, despite the exigencies of a curriculum, no separation were made at all, and the *Summa* read through from beginning to end. He makes clear at the beginning that Christian theology is one science⁹ because its medium is the light of divine revelation. It is all about God,¹⁰ yet human topics are not thereby excluded. For if creatures are to be seen as they really are, then it must be as true and good in themselves yet at the same time as wholly from and to God.¹¹

How is unity maintained in such diversity? Quite seriously it is all done by mirrors. Not in the manner of Maskelyne and Devant at the Egyptian Hall to produce illusions, but by showing the analogies that run through the whole of reality, from top to bottom and criss-cross. And sometimes it is very much to bottom, for St Thomas is not so high-minded as to disdain the lowlier levels of experience.

So then it is quite of a piece with his entire approach to look for the origins of right and wrong in the human desire for happiness, which comprehends the pleasurable, and even the sensuously pleasurable. First settle the 'can', he thinks, then afterwards the 'ought'. Accordingly the present treatise is less about our duties than our opportunities, for though moral questions are anticipated, notably when the rightness of will required in happiness is considered,¹² it is mainly about the pre-moral condition of being able to act for an end and the post-moral condition of being happy with it.

Moreover the treatise is written in his customary rather dead-pan manner; some may have the impression, from a hasty scanning of these pages, that it purveys somewhat sober stuff, doubtless improving, yet civic and Aristotelean and not very generous. Where the leap, the abandon, the fire in face of divinity? They will have missed the climax of each Question, which breaks out of the gates of the City of Reason, not in a desperate sortie, but at full strength and equipment, a theology with all of its philosophy intact.

The treatise was composed in 1269, when St Thomas was forty-four years old and at the height of his powers. He was beginning his second professorship at the University of Paris, and was soon to write the decisive tracts, *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas* and *De eternitate mundi contra murmurantes*. He had been summoned to Paris, partly to defend the academic status of the Dominicans, partly, and more importantly, to

⁹*1a*. 1, 3. Vol. 1

¹⁰*1a*. 1, 7

¹¹*1a*. 45, 3. Vol. 8

¹²*1a2æ*. 4, 4

counter a lay-minded Aristoteleanism which was attacking the entrenchments of clerical theology. With much of the contemporary movement he was in agreement, especially as regards the recovery of profane values, the hand-headed rationalism, and the appeal to earthy evidences. That was his strength, and it enabled him to defend so effectively the authentic truths and values of the theological tradition by using the very resources of those who were questioning it.

He had gone over the field of the present treatise in earlier works,¹³ but now he had mastered the new material provided by Robert Grosseteste, Albert of Cologne, and William of Moerbeke, and was completing his own careful analysis of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. His late office at the papal court gave him prestige, his collaboration with the Hellenists there gave him assurance.

The purpose of this treatise is to establish a basis for moral theory by an examination of the nature of human activity, or, as he will put it, of what belongs *ad genus naturae*, not *ad genus moris*.¹⁴ Thence moral theory can mainly proceed in accordance with the inner formation of man's being and acting by nature and grace, and not by his configuration to extrinsic and positive laws.

¹³ *Sent.* 1; IV, 49. *CG III.* 2-63

¹⁴ cf. *1222*. 18, 2 ad 1, 4; 20, 6

Prologus

QUA; SICUT DAMASCENUS DIXIT,¹ homo factus ad imaginem Dei dicitur, secundum quod per imaginem significatur intellectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se potestativum, postquam prædictum est de exemplari, scilicet de Deo, et de his quæ processerunt ex divina potestate secundum ejus voluntatem,² restat ut consideremus de ejus imagine, id est de homine secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum principium, quasi liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem.

Ubi primo considerandum occurrit de ultimo fine humane vitæ, et deinde de his per quæ homo ad hunc finem pervenire potest vel ab eo deviare: ex fine enim oportet accipere rationes eorum quæ ordinantur ad finem: Et quia ultimus finis humane vitæ ponitur esse beatitudo, oportet primo considerare de ultimo fine in communi, deinde de beatitudine.

¹ *De fide orthodoxa* II, 12. PG 94, 920

² *1222*. Introduction

³ God's image. The rich theological background here, largely filled by St. Augustine, relates to man's likeness to God, not only as a footprint, *vestigium*, but also as an image, *imago*, able to reflect him by knowledge and love: cf. *1222*. Vol. 13 of this series, ed. H. Hill. Man's relationship to God is then not purely causal, of creature to creator, of effect to cause, but also objectual, of knower to known, and lover to beloved: cf. *1222*. 7. Vol. 8, ed. T. Gilby. This theme, which will crop up frequently during the present treatise, shapes the doctrine that God's indwelling in his friends is a special mode of divine presence: cf. *1222*. 8, 3. Vol. 3, ed. T. McDermott. God is the final cause for moral action; how he is also the object will be developed when the theological virtues are considered: *1222*. 62 & 2222. 1-46. A gap still remains to be filled in the theological literature by a study of the meaning of *interitio* at full strength: cf. *1222*. 18, 7 & 19, 7, 8. Vol. 18, ed. T. Gilby, Appendices 13 & 14.

⁴ St. John of Damascus, d. 749. The last of the Greek Fathers: A twelfth-century Latin translation of his *De fide orthodoxa* had come out of Italian trade with the Levant, and was a prized theological text in the high Middle Ages.

⁵ Exemplar: the idea of a thing in the mind of its maker. For the divine Ideas, cf. *1222*. 1-3. Vol. 4, ed. T. Gornall. Also *1222*. 44, 3. Vol. 8.

⁶ Production through will, not natural emanation: cf. *1222*. 19, 4. Vol. 5, ed. T. Gilby.

⁷ Is such a course just theological anthropology? No matter. St. Thomas would be perturbed no more than if the first half of the *Prima Pars* were to be set down as

Quæstio 5. de adeptione beatitudinis

DEINDE CONSIDERANDUM EST de ipsa adeptione beatitudinis. Et circa hoc quærentur octo:

1. utrum homo possit consequi beatitudinem;
2. utrum unus homo possit esse alio beator;
3. utrum aliquis possit esse in hac vita beatus;
4. utrum beatitudo habita possit amitti;
5. utrum homo per sua naturalia possit acquirere beatitudinem;
6. utrum homo consequatur beatitudinem per actionem
aliqujus superioris creaturæ;
7. utrum requirantur opera hominis aliqua ad hoc quod homo
beatitudinem consequatur a Deo.
8. utrum omnis homo appetat beatitudinem.

articalus 1. utrum homo possit consequi beatitudinem

AD PRIMUM sic proceditur: 1. Videtur quod homo beatitudinem adipisci non possit. Sicut enim natura rationalis est supra sensibilem ita natura intellectualis est supra rationalem ut patet per Dionysium in multis locis.² Sed bruta animalia, quæ habent naturam sensibilem tantum, non possunt pervenire ad finem rationalis naturæ. Ergo nec homo, qui est rationalis naturæ, potest pervenire ad finem intellectualis naturæ, qui est beatitudo.

2. Præterea, beatitudo vera consistit in visione Dei, qui est veritas pura. Sed homini est connaturale ut veritatem intrineatur in rebus materialibus: unde species *intelligibiles in phantasmatibus intelligi*, ut dicitur in *De Anima*.³ Ergo non potest ad beatitudinem pervenire.

3. Præterea, beatitudo consistit in adeptione summi boni. Sed aliquis non potest pervenire ad summum, nisi transcendat media. Cum igitur inter Deum et naturam humanam media sit natura angelica, quam homo transcendere non potest; videtur quod non possit beatitudinem adipisci.

SED CONTRA est quod dicitur in *Psalmo*,⁴ *Beatus homo quem tu erudieris, Domine*.

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod beatitudo nominat adeptionem perfecti boni. Quicumque ergo est capax perfecti boni potest ad beatitudinem pervenire. Quod autem homo perfecti boni sit capax ex hoc apparet, quia et ejus intellectus apprehenderet potest universale et perfectum bonum, et ejus

²Piana: quæ, referring to the vision

³cf CG III, 25

⁴Piana: comprehendere, to comprehend

Question 5. gaining happiness

UNDER THIS HEADING there are eight points for inquiry:

1. whether a human being can attain happiness;
2. whether one can be happier than another;
3. whether anybody can be happy in this life;
4. whether happiness once gained can be lost;
5. whether a man can acquire happiness from his natural resources;
6. whether he reaches happiness from being acted on by some higher creature;
7. whether he must do something himself in order to gain happiness from God;
8. whether everybody desires happiness.

article 1. can a human being attain happiness?

THE FIRST POINT: 1. It seems that happiness is beyond us. For as rational is above sentient nature, so is intellectual above rational nature: Dionysius draws the analogy in many places.² The beasts with their sentient nature cannot reach the development of rational nature. No more can men, with their rational nature, reach the final stage of intellectual nature, which is beatitude.

2. Moreover, true happiness consists in seeing God who is pure truth. Now human nature is adapted to seeing truth embodied in material things: the *De Anima* says that we form intelligible meanings in images of sense.³ And so we cannot arrive at true happiness.

3. Further, happiness means scaling the peak of good, and this means climbing the intermediate stages. Since we cannot climb above angelic nature, which is midway between God and human nature, it would seem that we cannot gain the summit of happiness.

ON THE OTHER HAND there is the verse of the *Psalms*, *Happy the man whom thou, O Lord, shalt instruct*.⁴

REPLY: Happiness means gaining perfect good. Now whoever has the capacity for this good can be brought to bliss. That man has the capacity appears from the fact that his mind can apprehend good which is universal

²De div. nom. 4. PG 3. 693. cf 696, 856, 868

³De Anima III, 7. 431b2

⁴Psalms 93, 12

voluntas appetere illud. Et ideo homo potest beatitudinem adipisci. Apparet etiam idem ex hoc quod homo est capax visionis divinae essentiae, sicut in *Primo*⁵ habitum est; in qua quidem visione perfectam hominis beatitudinem consistere diximus.⁶

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliter excedit natura rationalis sensitivam; et aliter intellectualis rationalem. Natura enim rationalis excedit sensitivam quantum ad cognitionis objectum; quia sensus nullo modo potest cognoscere universale, cuius ratio est cognoscitiva. Sed intellectualis natura excedit rationalem quantum ad modum cognoscendi eandem intelligibilem veritatem.

Nam intellectualis natura statim apprehendit veritatem, ad quam rationalis natura per inquisitionem rationis pertingit, ut patet ex his quae in *Primo* dicta sunt.⁷ Et ideo ad id quod intellectus apprehendit, ratio per quandam motum pertingit. Unde rationalis natura consequi potest beatitudinem, quae est perfectio intellectualis naturae, tamen alio modo quam angeli. Nam angeli consecuti sunt eam statim post principium suae conditionis;⁸ homines autem per tempus ad ipsam perveniunt. Sed natura sensitiva ad hunc finem nullo modo pertingere potest.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod homini, secundum statum praesentis vitae, est connaturalis modus cognoscendi veritatem intelligibilem per phantasmatum. Sed post huius vitae statum, habet alium modum connaturalem, ut in *Primo* dictum est.⁹

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod homo non potest transcendere angelos gradu naturae, ut scilicet naturaliter sit eis superior. Potest tamen eos transcendere per operationem intellectus, dum intelligit aliquid super angelos, esse quod homines beatificat; quod cum perfecte consequetur perfecte beatus erit.

*Plana: *cognitionis*, of their knowledge

⁵1a. 12, 1

⁶1a2a. 3, 8

⁷1a. 58, 3; 79, 8

⁸1a. 84, 7; 89, 1

⁹The question has already been broached, 1a2a. 3, 8. But how can a desire welling up from man's nature really reach to the supernatural? A long-felt difficulty, and the controversies surrounding it have been touched off anew in recent years. cf. H. de Lubac, *Le surnaturel*, Paris, 1946. But see Appendix 5.

Some guide-lines may be quickly stated: First, a Christian theologian is dealing with the happiness promised us by God in the historic plan of Providence: natural beatitude is for him an academic question. Second, the present article proposes to show only the possibility of the divine vision for us, not the fact, from natural desire. Third, the term 'natural' has at least two meanings; one refers to the constitution of

and unrestricted and his will can desire it. Therefore he is open to receive it.

Moreover, we have shown in the *Prima Pars*⁵ that he is able to see the divine essence, in which, as we have defined,⁶ his complete happiness lies.^a

Hence: 1. While rational exceeds sentient nature as intellectual exceeds rational nature, the grounds of comparison shift when we come to the present question. Rational surpasses sentient nature with respect to the object it can reach, for reason can know the universal, which sense cannot know at all. Whereas intellectual surpasses rational nature with respect to the mode of knowing, but not to the object.^b Let me explain.

We have shown in the *Prima Pars*⁷ how an intellectual nature lights on a truth straightway which a rational nature has to approach by reasoning about it. For one there is insight, for the other a discourse. And so a rational being can reach the happiness which is the perfection of a pure intelligence, though the manner is not the same. For angels gain it immediately after their beginning in nature and grace, whereas men come through to it in time.^c In no way, however, can sentient nature arrive at this goal.

2. Under the conditions of the present life the connatural mode for the human perception of intelligible truth is through images of sense. After this life another mode of knowing, which we have examined in the *Prima Pars*,⁸ will be connatural.

3. In the hierarchy of beings men cannot surpass the angels, who by nature are of higher order. Yet a man can pass beyond them in his knowing, as when he understands there is a being above them who can make him blessed and when quite possessed will give complete bliss.

a thing at the level of its species, the other to the principle of movement from within. Thus the life of grace is supernatural to man according to the first meaning, but not according to the second. But cf Vol. 1 of this series, Appendix 8, *Natural and Supernatural*.

The capacity of human nature to be acted on by grace and to receive the beatific vision is known as obediential potentiality. See 2a2a. 2, 3; 3a. 11, 1; and Glossary. The proper object of the human mind in its present state is said to be the essences of material things, in other words to know what's what in the world about us. cf 1a. 83 & 86. But this present proper object does not constitute the adequate object of the mind.

Note again the stress on the object of an act, not on its category according to created reality, or mode of knowing. cf 1a2a. 2, 8, note 6; 3, 1, note d. For the angels there was one dramatic test. cf 1a. 62, 5; 63, 4 & 5. Vol. 9, ed. K. Foster. St Thomas recognizes the restlessness of the human will, its 'veritability', and is accordingly not inclined to be crisis-minded. 'Divine justice does not treat men who still have their course to run as though they had finished.' *Compend. Theol.* 145.

articulus 2. utrum unus homo possit esse beator altero

AD SECUNDUM sic proceditur:¹ 1. Videtur quod unus homo alio non possit esse beator. Beatitudo enim est *premium virtutis*, ut Philosophus dicit.² Sed pro operibus virtutum omnibus aequalis merces redditur: dicitur enim *Matt.*,³ quod omnes qui operati sunt in vinea, *acceperunt singulos denarios; quia*, ut dicit Gregorius,⁴ *aequalem aeternae vitae retributionem sortiti sunt*. Ergo unus non erit alio beator.

2. Praeterea, beatitudo est summum bonum. Sed summum non potest esse aliquid majus. Ergo beatitudine unius hominis non potest esse alia major beatitudo.

3. Praeterea, beatitudo, cum sit perfectum et sufficiens bonum desiderium hominis quietat. Sed non quietatur desiderium, si aliquod bonum deest quod suppleri possit: si autem nihil deest quod suppleri possit, non poterit esse aliquid aliud majus bonum. Ergo vel homo non est beatus, vel si est beatus non potest alia major beatitudo esse.

SED CONTRA est quod dicitur *Joann.*,⁵ *In domo Patris mei mansiones multae sunt*; per quas, ut Augustinus dicit,⁶ *diversae meritorum dignitates intelliguntur in vita aeterna*. Dignitas autem vitae aeternae, quae pro merito datur, est ipsa beatitudo. Ergo sunt diversi gradus beatitudinis, et non omnium est aequalis beatitudo.

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est,⁷ in ratione beatitudinis duo includuntur, scilicet ipse finis ultimus, qui est summum bonum, et adeptio vel fructio ipsius boni. Quantum igitur ad ipsum bonum quod est beatitudinis objectum et causa, non potest esse una beatitudo alia major: quia non est nisi unum summum bonum, scilicet Deus, cuius fruitione homines sunt beati. Sed quantum ad adaptionem huiusmodi boni vel fruitionem, potest aliquis alio esse beator; quia quanto magis hoc bono fruitur tanto beator est. Contingit autem aliquem perfectius frui Deo quam alium, ex eo quod est melius dispositus vel ordinatus ad ejus fruitionem. Et secundum hoc potest aliquis alio beator esse.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod unitas denarii significat unitatem beatitudinis ex parte objecti. Sed diversitas mansionum significat diversitatem beatitudinis secundum diversum gradum fruitionis.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod beatitudo dicitur esse summum bonum, inquantum est summi boni perfecta possessio sive fructio.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod nulli beato deest aliquod bonum desiderandum: cum habeat ipsum bonum infinitum, quod est *bonum omnium*

¹cf 1a2ae. 1, 7. In *Joann.* 14, lect. 1. In 1 Cor. 3, lect. 2. IV Sent. 49, 1, 4, ii

article 2. can one be happier than another?

THE SECOND POINT:¹ 1. It would seem not. According to Aristotle, happiness is *the reward of virtue*,² and for the works of virtue the recompense is equal. Recall the parable of the labourers in the vineyard *who received every man a penny*,³ which, comments Gregory,⁴ *signifies an equal return in eternal life*. Consequently, one man will not be happier than another.

2. Besides, beatitudo is the highest good. And what can be higher than the highest? Therefore the beatitudo of one cannot be higher than that of another.

3. Further, since it is complete and sufficient good, happiness brings man's desires to rest. This it would not do if some available good were still wanting: if nothing were wanting then, of course, there could be no other greater good. Either, then, a man is not happy, or if he is, then no other could be happier than he is.

ON THE OTHER HAND there is the Gospel saying, *In my Father's house there are many mansions*,⁵ which for Augustine⁶ signifies *the various dignities of merit in eternal life*. The worth of eternal life, granted in reward, lies in the happiness itself, and this, therefore, admits of various degrees, and is not equal in every case.

REPLY: We have explained how there are two sides to happiness, the objective ultimate end, which is the sovereign good, and the gaining and enjoying of it by the subject.⁷ As for the first, the object and the cause of happiness, there is no variation in blessedness, for there is but one supreme good, namely God, and men are in bliss by their joy with him. As for the second, one can be more blessed than another, for the deeper his joy the more blessed he is. And in point of fact his joy can be deeper because he is more open and adapted to receive it.⁸

Hence: 1. The one penny symbolizes the unity of happiness with regard to its object, the many mansions its diversity with regard to the various degrees of enjoyment in its subjects.

2. Happiness is called the supreme good as being the complete possession or enjoyment of that.

3. None of the blessed wants for any good he can desire, since each has

¹*Ethics* 1, 9, 1095b16 ²*Matthew* 20, 10 ³*In Evang.* 1, 19, PL 76, 1156 ⁴*John* 14, 2 ⁵*In Joann.* LXVII. super 14, 2, PL 35, 1812 ⁶1a2ae. 1, 8; 2, 7

⁷The underlying philosophy here is of the greater and less, *magis et minus*, in analogical values. For the intensification of dispositions, see 1a2ae. 52, 1: they increase by a deepening possession by their subject, not by addition, by *intensionem* rather than by *extensionem*. Also 1a2ae. 66, 1. The deeper the power of loving, the greater the capacity for happiness, 2a2ae. 24, 4-6.

boni, ut Augustinus dicit.⁸ Sed dicitur aliquis alio beator, ex diversa ejusdem boni participatione. Addito autem aliorum bonorum non augeat beatitudinem, unde Augustinus dicit, *Qui te et alia novit, non propter illa beator, sed propter te solum beatus.*

articulus 3. *utrum aliquis in hac vita possit esse beatus*

AD-TERTIUM sic proceditur.¹ 1. Videtur quod beatitudo possit in hac vita haberi. Dicitur enim in *Psalmis*: *Beati immaculati in via, qui ambulavit in lege Domini.* Hoc autem in hac vita contingit. Ergo aliquis in hac vita potest esse beatus.

2. Præterea, imperfecta participatio summi boni non adimit rationem beatitudinis, aliqui enim non esset alio beator. Sed in hac vita homines possunt participare summum bonum, cognoscendo et amando Deum, licet imperfecte. Ergo homo in hac vita potest esse beatus.

3. Præterea, quod a pluribus dicitur non potest totaliter falsum esse: videtur enim esse naturale quod in pluribus est; natura autem non totaliter deficit. Sed plures ponunt beatitudinem in hac vita, ut patet per illud *Psalmi*: *Beatum dixerunt populum cui hæc sunt, scilicet præsentis vite bona.* Ergo aliquis in hac vita potest esse beatus.

SED CONTRA est quod dicitur *Job*: *Homo natus de muliere, brevi vivens tempore, repletus multis miseriis.* Sed beatitudo excludit miseriam. Ergo homo in hac vita non potest esse beatus.

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod aliquis beatitudinis participatio in hac vita haberi potest: perfecta autem et vera beatitudo non potest haberi in hac vita. Et hoc quidem considerari potest dupliciter.

Primo quidem, ex ipsa communi beatitudinis ratione. Nam beatitudo, cum sit perfectum et sufficiens bonum, omne malum excludit, et omne desiderium implet. In hac autem vita non potest omne malum excludi. Multis enim malis præsens vita subiacet quæ vitari non possunt; et ignorantia ex parte intellectus, et inordinata affectio ex parte appetitus, et multiplicibus poenaliatibus ex parte corporis; ut Augustinus diligenter prosequatur.² Similiter etiam desiderium boni in hac vita satari non potest. Naturaliter enim homo desiderat permanentiam ejus boni quod habet. Bona autem præsentis vite transitoria sunt, cum et ipsa vita transcat, quam naturaliter desideramus, et eam perpetuo permanere vellemus, quia

⁸ *Enarrat. in Psalm. 114, 3. PL 37, 1741*

⁹ *Confessiones V, 4. PL 32, 708*

¹ cf. CG III, 48. In *Ethic. I, lect. 10 et 16. IV Sent. 43, 1, 49, 1, 1, iv.*

the infinite good itself, which, in Augustine's phrase,⁸ is the good of every good. But we call one more blessed than another from the degree of his sharing in this good. There is no question here of his receiving an additional good,⁹ since this does not increase perfect happiness; Augustine declares,⁹ *He who knows thee and other things as well is not the happier because of them, but is happy solely because of thee.*

articulus 3. *can anybody in this life find bliss?*

THE THIRD POINT:¹ 1. It seems possible. There is the verse from the *Psalm*,² *Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord.* They are met with in this life, where, accordingly, a man can be happy.

2. Moreover, a partial sharing in sheer good does not derogate from the notion of happiness, otherwise you could not use it as a standard of reference and speak of one being happier than another. Yet in this life, we can share in the supreme good, by knowing and loving God, if imperfectly. Therefore we can be happy now.

3. Further, a view widely entertained cannot be an entire illusion, indeed the majority view seems to represent the natural course of things, for nature is not altogether ineffective.³ And how many men place their happiness in this world, of whom the *Psalm* speaks,³ *They have called the people blessed that hath these things, namely the good things of the present life.* Surely somebody can be happy in this world.

ON THE OTHER HAND there is *Job* saying,⁴ *Man born of woman living for a short time is filled with many miseries.* But happiness drives out misery. And so man cannot be happy in this life.

REPLY: Some share of happiness can be reached now, but not true and complete happiness. Let us consider first what happiness means, and second, where in reality it lies.

The general notion of happiness, of goodness perfect and sufficient, implies that every ill is banished and every desire fulfilled. Neither is possible in this life. We are subject to many unavoidable ills. Augustine carefully sets them out:⁵ ignorance in our mind, inordinate loves in our affections, and pains exacted of our body. Nor can our desire for good be satisfied. By nature we crave for security, yet how transitory are our blessings: life itself fades away; although our nature is always to hold on to

⁸ *Psalm 118, 1. Psalm 143, 15. Job 14, 1. De civ. Dei XIX, 4. PL 41, 628*

⁹ For the medieval speculation about the accidental rewards of heaven, see *Supplementum* 96, *De aureolis*.

¹ The 'natural' is here taken as the normal; a statistical reading.

naturaliter homo refugit mortem. Unde impossibile est quod in hac vita vera beatitudo habeatur.

Secundo, si consideretur id in quo specialiter beatitudo consistit, scilicet visio divinae essentiae, quae non potest homini provenire in hac vita, ut in *Primo* ostensum est.⁶ Ex quibus manifeste apparet quod non potest aliquis in hac vita veram et perfectam beatitudinem adipisci.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod beati dicuntur aliqui in hac vita, vel propter spem beatitudinis adipiscendae in futura vita, secundum illud *Rom.*⁷ *Spe salvi facti sumus*: vel propter aliquam participationem beatitudinis, secundum aliqualem summum boni fructuonem.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod participatio beatitudinis potest esse imperfecta dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius objecti beatitudinis, quod quidem secundum sui essentiam non videtur. Et talis imperfectio tollit rationem verae beatitudinis. Alio modo potest esse imperfecta ex parte ipsius participantis, qui quidem ad ipsum objectum beatitudinis secundum seipsum attingit, scilicet Deum, sed imperfecte, per respectum ad modum quo Deus seipso fruatur. Et talis imperfectio non tollit veram rationem beatitudinis: quia, cum beatitudo sit operatio quaedam, ut supra dictum est,⁸ vera ratio beatitudinis, consideratur ex objecto, quod dat speciem actui, non autem ex subjecto.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod homines reputant in hac vita esse aliquam beatitudinem propter aliquam similitudinem verae beatitudinis. Et sic non ex toto in sua aestimatione deficiunt.

articulus 4. *utrum beatitudo habita possit amitti*

AD QUARTUM sic proceditur.¹ 1. Videtur quod beatitudo possit amitti. Beatitudo enim est perfectio quaedam. Sed omnis perfectio inest perfectibili secundum modum ipsius. Cum igitur homo secundum suam naturam sit mutabilis, videtur quod beatitudo mutabiliter ab homine participetur. Et ita videtur quod homo beatitudinem possit amittere.

2. Præterea, beatitudo consistit in actione intellectus, qui subiacet voluntati. Sed voluntas se habet ad opposita. Ergo videtur quod possit desistere ab operatione qua homo beatificatur: et ita homo desinet esse beatus.

3. Præterea, principio respondet finis. Sed beatitudo hominis habet principium: quia homo non semper fuit beatus. Ergo videtur quod habeat finem.

SED CONTRA est quod dicitur *Matt.*² de iustis, quod *ibunt in vitam æternam*;

⁶Ia. 12, 2

⁷Romans 8, 24

⁸Ia. 2. 3, 2

¹cf Ia. 64, 2; 94, 1. CG III, 62. I Sent. 7, 3, 2; IV, 49, 1, 1, iv. In Joann. 10, lect. 5. *Compens. Theol.* 166; II, 9

it, and shrink from death. Hence the possession of true happiness is not possible in this life.

Next, to consider where happiness lies, namely in the vision of God face to face. And this, as we have shown in the *Prima Pars*,⁶ men cannot reach it in this life. And so, on both counts, it is manifest that none of us can gain true and complete happiness now.

Hence: 1. Men are called blessed in this life either because of their hope of gaining happiness in the future life—*By hope we are saved*⁷—or because of some snatch of happiness anticipating our joy in the supreme good.

2. Shared happiness can be incomplete on two sides. First, on that of the object itself of happiness: not seeing as it really is implies an incompleteness incompatible with true happiness. Second, on that of the sharer, who may indeed attain the very object of happiness, namely God himself, yet not of the manner of God's joy in himself. Such a non-completeness is not incompatible with true beatitude, for it is an activity, as we have already said,⁸ and consequently its true nature is decided by the object which shapes it, not by the subject.^b

3. Men are persuaded that some happiness can be found in the world now because of the reflections about us of true beatitude. Nor are they entirely out in their reckoning.

article 4. *once gained can happiness be lost?*

THE FOURTH POINT:¹ 1. It seems so.^a For happiness is a quality of perfection, and a perfection endows its subject in the style of that subject. Since man's nature is mutable, it seems that he is not charged with happiness except mutably. Therefore he can lose it.

2. Moreover, happiness is an act of the mind which is subject to the will. Now the will can switch between opposites, and accordingly can desist from the activity which makes us happy. Therefore we can cease to be happy.

3. Besides, where there is a start there is a stop. But there is a start to happiness, for man was not always happy. It would seem, then, that it comes to a stop.^b

ON THE OTHER HAND the Gospel says of the just that *they will go into life*

^a*Matthew* 25, 46

^bAgain the subject-object antithesis. cf Foreword note a.

^cCajetan, *in loc.*, observes that the inquiry is about the complete security or *inamissibilitas* of happiness, not its perpetuity. The first is a matter of immutability, the second of duration. cf Ia. 9 & 10 respectively.

^dHappiness a creature of time, and all that begins in time ends in time.

quæ, ut dictum est,³ est beatitudo sanctorum. Quod autem est æternum, non deficit. Ergo beatitudo non potest amitti.

RESPONSIO. Dicendum quod, si loquamur de beatitudinem imperfecta qualis in hac vita potest haberi, sic potest amitti. Et hoc patet in felicitate contemplativa, quæ amittitur vel per oblivionem, puta cum corrumpitur scientia ex aliqua ægritudine; vel etiam per aliquas occupationes quibus totaliter abstrahitur aliquis a contemplatione. Patet etiam idem in felicitate activa: voluntas enim hominis transmutari potest, ut in vitium degeneret a virtute, in cuius actu principaliter consistit felicitas. Si autem virtus remaneat integra, exteriores transmutationes possunt quidem beatitudinem talem perturbare, in quantum impediunt multas operationes virtutis, tamen possunt eam totaliter auferre, quia adhuc remanet operatio virtutis, dum ipsas adversitates homo laudabiliter sustinet. Et quia beatitudo huiusmodi ipsas adversitates homo laudabiliter sustinet, non simpliciter, sed vitæ amitti potest, quod videtur esse contra rationem beatitudinis; ideo Philosophus dicit⁴ aliquos esse in hac vita beatos, non simpliciter, sed sicut homines, quorum natura mutationi subiecta est.

Si vero loquamur de beatitudine perfecta, quæ expectatur post hanc vitam, sciendum est quod Origenes posuit⁵ quorundam Platoniorum errorem sequens, quod post ultimam beatitudinem homo potest fieri miser. Sed hoc manifeste apparet esse falsum dupliciter.

Primo quidem, ex ipsa communi ratione beatitudinis. Cum enim ipsa beatitudo sit perfectum bonum et sufficiens, oportet quod desiderium hominis quietet, et omne malum excludat. Naturaliter autem homo desiderat retinere bonum quod habet, et quod ejus retinendi securitatem obtineat: alioquin necesse est quod timore amittendi, vel dolore de certitudine amissionis, affligatur. Requiritur igitur ad veram beatitudinem quod homo certam habeat opinionem bonum quod habet nunquam se amissurum. Quæ quidem opinio si vera sit, consequens est quod beatitudinem nunquam amittet. Si autem falsa sit, hoc ipsum est quoddam malum, falsam opinionem habere: nam falsum est malum intellectus, sicut verum est bonum ipsius, ut dicitur in *Ethic*.⁶ Non igitur jam vere erit beatus, si aliquod malum ei inest.

Secundo idem apparet, si consideretur ratio beatitudinis in specialis. Ostensum est enim supra⁷ quod perfecta beatitudo hominis in visione divinæ essentie consistit. Est autem impossibile quod aliquis videns divinam essentiam velit eam non videre. Quia omne bonum habitum quo quis carere vult, aut est insufficientis, et quaeritur aliquid sufficientius loco ejus, aut habet aliquod incommodum annexum, propter quod in fasti-

³Art. 2. sed contra.

⁴*Ethics* I, 10. 1101a19

everlasting,² which, as we have said,³ is the beatitude of God's friends. What is eternal never falls away. Beatitude, consequently, cannot be lost.

REPLY: The partial happiness we can obtain now can be lost. This appears alike in contemplative felicity which can fall into oblivion, as when disease attacks consciousness, or it can be displaced by other occupations which can be completely absorbing and distracting. Active felicity, too, which consists mainly in the activity of virtue, can be lost when the will degenerates into vice. And even if virtue remains unimpaired, external changes can upset the happiness of the active life, at least by hindering good deeds, though they cannot take them away completely, since a man displays active virtue when he honourably sustains his adversities. It is because present happiness can be lost, which is incompatible with the nature of perfect happiness, that Aristotle speaks⁴ of some men being happy, not downrightly, but as *men are*, whose nature is subject to change.

If, however, we are speaking of the perfect human happiness to which we look forward, then we may recall Origen's⁵ view that a man may fall into misery after reaching final beatitude.⁶ He was misled by certain Platonists.⁷ How mistaken they were may be shown by two arguments, one from the abstract, the other from the concrete.

First, let us take the general notion of happiness, which signifies the complete and sufficient good. This should put our desires at peace and banish all evil. For it is our nature to want to hold on to the good we have and to be assured of keeping it, otherwise the threat or the fear of certain loss would cast us into sadness. Happiness demands the conviction that it will never forsake us. If this conviction is unfounded, this itself is an evil, namely of holding what is not true; to quote the *Ethics*,⁸ for mind, the false is the bad as the true is the good. No man will be truly happy who labours under any evil.

Secondly, and to be more specific, we consider the realization of beatitude. It consists, as we have shown,⁹ in seeing God just as he is. To gaze on him and to will not to see him is impossible. For a good that is possessed and is nevertheless relinquished is either found insufficient, so that something more satisfying is sought instead, or else has something wearisome about it, so that it becomes distasteful. Now by seeing God just as he is, the soul

²*Pari Archon* 1, 5 & 6. PG 11, 164 & 167. So read by Jerome, *Ep.* cxxiv, 2. PL 22, 1066. cf. Augustine, *De civ. Dei* x, 30. PL 41, 309

³*Ethics* vi, 2. 1139a26

⁷IAZÆ. 3, 8

⁵Origen (185-c. 254). That there should be an indefinite succession of falls and restorations seems to him a consequence of the endless succession of worlds.

⁶Or better, by certain Gnostics.

dium venit. Visio autem divinæ essentiae replet animam omnibus bonis, cum conjungat fonti totius bonitatis: unde dicitur in *Psalm.*⁸ *Satiabor cum apparuerit gloria tua*; et *Sap.*⁹ *Venerunt mihi omnia bona pariter cum illa*, scilicet cum contemplatione sapientiae. Similiter etiam non habet aliquod incommodum adiunctum: quia de contemplatione sapientiae dicitur *Sap.*¹⁰ *Non habet amaritudinem conversatio illius, nec tedium convicius ejus*. Sic ergo patet quod propria voluntate beatus non potest beatitudinem deserere.

Similiter etiam non potest eam perdere, Deo subtrahente. Quia, cum subtrahatur beatitudinis sit quaedam poena, non potest talis subtractio a Deo, justo iudice, provenire, nisi pro aliqua culpa: in quam cadere non potest qui Dei essentiam videt, cum ad hanc visionem ex necessitate sequatur rectitudo voluntatis, ut supra ostensum est.¹¹ Similiter etiam nec aliquod aliud agens potest eam subtrahere. Quia mens Deo conjuncta super omnia alia elevatur; et sic ab hujusmodi conjunctione nullum aliud agens potest ipsam excludere.

Unde inconveniens videtur quod per quasdam alternationes temporum transeat homo de beatitudine ad miseriam, et e converso: quia hujusmodi temporales alternationes esse non possunt, nisi circa ea quæ subjacent tempori et motui.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod beatitudo est perfectio consummata, quæ omnem defectum excludit a beato. Et ideo absque mutabilitate advenit eam habenti, faciente hoc virtute divina, quæ hominem sublevar in participationem æternitatis transcendens omnem mutationem.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod voluntas ad opposita se habet in his quæ ad finem ordinantur: sed ad ultimum finem naturali necessitate ordinatur. Quod patet ex hoc, quod homo non potest non velle esse beatus.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod beatitudo habet principium ex conditione participantis, sed caret fine, propter conditionem boni cuius participatio facit beatum. Unde ab alio est initium beatitudinis; et ab alio est quod caret fine.

articulus 5. utrum homo per sua naturalia possit acquirere beatitudinem

AD QUINTUM sic proceditur:¹ 1. Videtur quod homo per sua naturalia possit beatitudinem consequi. Natura enim non deficit in necessariis. Sed nihil est homini tam necessarium quam id per quod finem ultimum consequitur.

⁸*Psalm.* 16, 15

⁹*Wisdom* 7, 11

¹⁰*Wisdom*, 8, 6

¹¹122æ. 4, 4

¹²*cf* 12. 12, 4; 62, 1. 122æ. 62, 1. *CG* III, 52 & 147. III *Sent.* 27, 2, 2; IV, 49, 2, 6

¹³*cf* the eloquent foreword to *Opusc. IX. Exposition De hebdomadibus*.

¹⁴*cf* 122æ. 31, 2: on the note of eternity in all delight.

¹⁵Being unable to wish not to be happy, this would be a sufficient conclusion. St Thomas, however, prefers to be more sweeping.

is filled with every good; the vision unites us with the source of all goodness: accordingly we read in the *Psalm*,⁸ *I shall be satisfied with beholding thy form*; and in *Wisdom*,⁹ *All good things came to me in her train*, that is, with divine wisdom when contemplated. Nor is any hint conveyed of boredom; *Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness*.¹⁰ Manifestly nobody could give up such brimming happiness of his own accord.

Moreover it cannot be lost by God's withdrawal, for this would be a sort of penalty which God, our just judge, would not impose except because of fault, and a person who sees him face to face cannot fall, for, as we have seen,¹¹ rightness of will necessarily results from seeing him. Nor is there any outside agent who can intervene, for when so conjoined with God the mind is raised above all other things, and what force is there that can break the union?

So then it seems not at all credible that man should alternate between beatitude and misery, passing from one to another and back again, for such vicissitudes can affect creatures only of time and change.

Hence: 1. Beatitude is consummate perfection; it rules out every flaw, and thanks to divine power is granted without shadow of change, so that the blessed are lifted up and share in eternity transcending it.¹

2. Though faced with opposites in decisions concerning objects which are meant for an end, the will has a bent towards the ultimate end from inborn necessity, as is evidenced by human beings being unable not to wish to be happy.²

3. Happiness has a beginning from the condition of the subject, but no ending from the condition of the object, and it is this when shared in which makes a person happy. And so there is one principle for beatitude starting off, another for its never coming to a stop.³

article 5. can a man come to happiness from his native resources?

THE FIFTH POINT:¹ 1. It would seem that he can.² For nature does not fail in necessities. And what more necessary for a man than that he should find

¹See cross-references in Foreword, note 4.

²Man is not born to be happy: the statement is true if it refers merely to his native endowments, not true if it refers to what he is designed for under Providence. The paradox remains, however, that the last end for which we are born we can reach only through a divine and supernatural gift: Vatican I. Denz. 1786. Appendix 5.

³The inquiry is not precisely whether we can deserve happiness, which is dealt with later, 122æ. 109, 5 & 114, 2, but whether the activity in which it consists can be exercised by our natural powers. For discussions on the ability of human nature to reach truth and goodness, see 122æ. 109, 1-4, 8 & 10.

Ergo hoc naturæ humanæ non deest. Potest igitur homo per suam naturaliam beatitudinem consequi.

2. Præterea, homo, cum sit nobilior irrationalibus creaturis, videtur esse sufficientior. Sed irrationales creaturæ per suam naturaliam possunt consequi suos fines. Ergo multo magis homo per suam naturaliam potest beatitudinem consequi.

3. Præterea, beatitudo est *operatio perfecta*, secundum Philosophum.² Ejusdem autem est incipere rem et perficere ipsam. Cum igitur operatio imperfecta, quæ est quasi principium in operationibus humanis, subdatur naturali hominis potestati, quæ suorum actuum est dominus; videtur quod per naturalem potentiam possit perungere ad operationem perfectam, quæ est beatitudo.

SED CONTRA, homo est principium naturaliter actuum suorum per intellectum et voluntatem. Sed ultima beatitudo sanctis preparata excedit intellectum hominis et voluntatem: dicit enim Apostolus, *Oculus non vidit, et auris non audiit, et in cor hominis non ascendit, quæ præparavit Deus diligentibus se*. Ergo homo per suam naturaliam non potest beatitudinem consequi.

RESPONSIO. Dicendum quod beatitudo imperfecta quæ in hac vita haberi potest potest ab homine acquiri per suam naturaliam, eo modo quo et virtus in cuius operatione consistit: de quo infra dicitur.⁴ Sed beatitudo hominis perfecta, sicut supra dictum est,⁵ consistit in visione divinæ essentia. Videre autem Deum per essentiam est supra naturam non solum hominis, sed etiam omnis creaturæ, ut in *Primo* ostensum est.⁶

Naturalis enim cognitio cuiuslibet creaturæ est secundum modum substantiæ ejus: sicut de intelligentia dicitur in *Libro de causis*,⁷ quod *cognoscit ea quæ sunt supra se, et ea quæ sunt infra se, secundum modum substantiæ suæ*. Omnis autem cognitio quæ est secundum modum substantiæ creaturæ deficit a visione divinæ essentia, quæ in infinitum excedit omnem substantiam creatam.

Unde nec homo, nec aliqua creatura, potest consequi beatitudinem ultimam per suam naturaliam.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut natura non deficit homini in necessariis, quamvis non dederit sibi arma et tegumenta sicut aliis animalibus, quia dedit et rationem et manus, quibus possit hæc sibi conquerere; ita nec deficit homini in necessariis, quamvis non daret sibi aliquod principium, quo posset beatitudinem consequi; hoc enim erat impossibile. Sed dedit ei liberum arbitrium, quo possit converti ad Deum, qui eum faceret

² *Ethics* VII, 13. 1153b16

his destiny? Here human nature is not found wanting. The inference is that he can achieve happiness from his native resources.

2. Moreover, man is a higher organism than non-rational creatures, and therefore should be better able to look after himself. Yet they can reach their goals by their natural powers. All the more should man be able to reach happiness of himself under his own power.

3. Aristotle defines happiness as complete activity.² Now it is for the same subject to make a start and to come to a finish. Since incomplete activity, which is like the opening in human acts, falls under man's natural ability, since he is master of his own actions, it would seem that the same ability will take him to complete activity, namely happiness.

ON THE OTHER HAND, men themselves are the natural sources of their own activity through mind and will. Yet the final happiness prepared for the saints surpasses both our thinking and our willing. *Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love him*.³ Such happiness goes beyond our natural reach.

REPLY: The partial happiness we can hold in this life a man can secure for himself, as he can virtue, in the activity of which it consists: we shall discuss this later.⁴ But man's complete happiness, as we have found,⁵ consists in the vision of the divine essence, and this is beyond the natural stretch of any creature, not merely of man, as we have established in the *Prima Pars*.⁶

The knowing natural to any creature corresponds to what sort of thing it is; the *Liber de causis*⁷ says of intelligence, that it knows objects above it and below it according to what sort of substance it is. Now all knowing according to a manner of created thing falls short of seeing what God really is, for the divine infinitely surpasses every created nature.

Consequently neither man nor any creature can attain final happiness through their natural resources.⁸

Hence: 1. Nature does not fail man in necessary helps, for though unprovided with armour and weapons like other animals, he is given the ingenuity and powers to make them for himself. Nor does it fail because it provides him with no inborn ability to reach happiness on his own. For he has been endowed with freewill, so that he can be turned to God who can

² *1st Corinthians* 2, 9

³ *122Æ*. 83

⁴ *122Æ*. 3, 8

⁵ *Ih.* 12, 4

⁶ *Liber de causis* 7

⁷ *Substantia, ovisid.*

⁸ The question of purely natural beatitude is passed over.

beatum. *Quæ enim per amicos possumus, per nos aliquantulum possumus, ut dicitur in Ethic.*⁸

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod nobilioris conditionis est natura quæ potest consequi perfectum bonum, licet indigeat exteriori auxilio ad hoc consequendum, quam natura quæ non potest consequi perfectum bonum, sed consequitur quoddam bonum imperfectum, licet ad consecutionem ejus non indigeat exteriori auxilio, ut Philosophus dicit.⁹ Sicut melius est dispositus ad sanitatem qui potest consequi perfectam sanitatem, licet hoc sit per auxilium medicinæ quam qui solum potest consequi quandam imperfectam sanitatem sine medicinæ auxilio. Et ideo creatura rationalis, quæ potest consequi perfectum beatitudinis bonum, indigens ad hoc divino auxilio, est perfectior quam creatura irrationalis, quæ hujusmodi boni non est capax, sed quoddam imperfectum bonum consequitur virtute suæ naturæ.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod, quando imperfectum et perfectum sunt ejusdem speciei, ab eadem virtute causari possunt. Non autem hoc est necesse, si sunt alterius speciei: non enim quidquid potest causare dispositionem materiæ potest ultimam perfectionem conferre. Imperfecta autem operatio, quæ subiacet naturali hominis potestati, non est ejusdem speciei cum operatione illa perfecta quæ est hominis beatitudo: cum operationis species dependeat ex objecto. Unde ratio non sequitur.

*articulus 6. utrum homo consequatur beatitudinem per actionem
alicujus superioris creature*

AD SEXTUM sic proceditur.¹ I. Videtur quod homo possit fieri beatus per actionem alicujus superioris creature, scilicet angeli. Cum enim duplex ordo inveniat in rebus, unus partium universi ad invicem, alius totius universi ad bonum quod est extra universum, primus ordo ordinatur ad secundum sicut ad finem, ut dicitur *Meta.*² sicut ordo partium exercitus ad invicem est propter ordinem totius exercitus ad ducem. Sed ordo partium universi ad invicem attenditur secundum quod superiores creature agunt in inferiores, ut in *Primo* dictum est.³ beatitudo autem consistit in ordine hominis ad bonum quod est extra universum, quod est Deus. Ergo per actionem superioris creature, scilicet angeli, in hominem, homo beatus efficitur.

2. Præterea, quod est in potentia tale potest reduci in actum per id quod est actu tale: sicut quod est potentia calidum fit actu calidum per id quod est actu calidum. Sed homo est in potentia beatus. Ergo potest fieri actu beatus per angelum, qui est actu beatus.

⁸*Ethics* III, 3, 1112b27

⁹*De Caelo* II, 12, 292a22

¹cf Iazæ. 3, 7

²*Metaphysics* XI, 10, 1075a11

make him happy. To quote the *Ethics*,⁸ *what we can do through our friends can, in a sense, be done through ourselves.*⁹

2. Aristotle reasons⁹ that a nature which can attain the perfect good, although it needs outside help, is of a higher condition than a nature which can attain without such recourse only a lesser good: a man is better disposed to health who can be perfectly fit, though with medical aid, than one who has but middling health without it. Likewise it is better to be a rational creature who can reach complete happiness, though needing divine help, than a non-rational creature which is not capable of this happiness, but arrives at some partial good under its own natural power.

3. When the embryonic and fully developed conditions of a thing are the same in kind, then they can be caused by the same cause. Not necessarily, however, when they are different in kind. For not everything that can prepare the material can give the finishing touch. The inchoate activity falling under our natural control is not the same in kind as the culminating activity of happiness. Remember it is its object which shapes the specific character of an activity.⁶ And so the objection does not hold.

article 6. does man reach happiness because acted on by a higher creature?

THE SIXTH POINT.¹ I. It would seem that he can become blessed through the action of angels.² A double order runs through the universe: one makes the pattern of things among themselves, the other sets the whole towards a good beyond. And the second is the purpose of the first, according to the *Metaphysics*,² thus the co-ordination of its various arms is in order that the whole force in the field may execute the plan of the commander. Now, as was agreed in the *Prima Pars*,³ the acting of higher on lower creatures composes the pattern of parts within the universe. Man's beatitude bears on a good outside the universe, namely God. Therefore he reaches happiness under the action of superior or angelic creatures.

2. Moreover, what is potentially positive can be made actually positive by what is actually positive; thus the potentially hot is made actually so by what is actually hot. Man is potentially happy, and can be made actually so by an angel who is actually happy.

¹ia. 19, 5 ad 2; 48, 1 ad 5; 109, 2

²The quotation suggests in miniature the world of difference between Aristotle's ideal of friendship and the Christian *agapè*. The answer parries the objection, but does not meet the point, that man is a misfit by his nature if his nature is unable to make him happy.

³Again the importance of 'object', already noted. cf Iazæ. 2, 8, note e; 3, 8, note d; 5, 1, note b.

⁴The article has in mind the views of Algazel and Averroes, that our happiness depends on a First Intelligence midway between God and man, and corresponds to Iazæ. 3, 7 above.

3. Præterea, beatitudo consistit in operatione intellectus, ut supra dictum est.⁴ Sed angelus potest illuminare intellectum hominis, ut in *Primo habitum* est.⁵ Ergo angelus potest facere hominem beatum.

SED CONTRA est quod dicitur in *Psalmo*,⁶ *Gratiam et gloriam dabit Dominus.*

RESPONSIO. Dicendum quod, cum omnis creatura naturæ legibus sit subiecta, utpote habens limitatam virtutem et actionem, illud quod excedit naturam creatam non potest fieri virtute alicujus creaturæ. Et ideo si quid fieri oporteat quod sit supra naturam, hoc fit immediate a Deo; sicut suscitatio mortui, illuminatio cæci, et cetera hujusmodi. Ostensum est autem quod beatitudo est quoddam bonum excedens naturam creatam. Unde impossibile est quod per actionem alicujus creaturæ conferatur; sed homo beatus fit solo Deo agente, si loquamur de beatitudine perfecta. Si vero loquamur de beatitudine imperfecta, sic eadem ratio est de ipsa et de virtute, in cuius actu consistit.

1. Ad primum, ergo dicendum quod plerumque contingit in potentis activis ordinatis, quod perducere ad ultimum finem pertinet ad supremam potentiam, inferiores vero potentie coadiuvant ad consecutionem illius ultimi finis disponendo; sicut ad artem gubernativam, quæ præst navigatvæ, pertinet usus navis, propter quem navis ipsa fit. Sic igitur et in ordine universi, homo quidem adjuvatur ab angelis ad consequendum ultimum finem secundum aliqua præcedentia, quibus disponitur ad ejus consecutionem; sed ipsum ultimum finem consequitur per ipsum primum agentem, qui est Deus.

2. Ad secundum, dicendum quod, quando aliqua forma actu existit in aliquo secundum esse perfectum et naturale, potest esse principium actionis in alterum; sicut calidum per calorem calefacit. Sed si forma existit in aliquo imperfecte, et non secundum esse naturale, non potest esse principium communicationis sui ad alterum; sicut intentio coloris quæ est in

⁴122Æ. 3, 4.

⁵*Psalmus* 85, 12.

⁶Not natural law, which for St. Thomas is moral law (cf. 122Æ. 94. Vol. 28, ed. T. Gilby), but a generalization of natural philosophy drawn from the observation of more or less constant sequences.

⁷Miracle, an effect produced from outside the natural order of things, *præter ordinem naturalem rerum*, 1a. 105. 6-8. God alone is the principal cause, though a creature may be an instrumental cause. A miracle is not supernatural in the way that we say sanctifying grace is supernatural, namely a sharing in the divine nature; it is rather a preternatural event wrought by divine power to witness to the divine life shared by men. It is, then, a gracious interposition—though it may shock the sensibilities of a culture remote by region and period from its original *mise-en-scène*—and falls under the heading of the extraordinary graces, *gratiæ gratis datæ*, which are

¹1a. III, 1.

²art. 5 above

3. Again, we have agreed that beatitude consists in an activity of intelligence.⁴ And we have seen that an angel can enlighten a man's intelligence.⁵ And therefore render him blessed.

ON THE OTHER HAND we sing, *The Lord will give grace and glory*.⁶

REPLY: Since their abilities and activities are limited, all creatures are bound by the laws of nature,⁷ and a work exceeding the world in which they live cannot be produced by any power there. And if it comes about, then it is done immediately by God, such as raising the dead to life, giving sight to the blind, and the like.⁸ We have shown⁹ that happiness is a kind of blessing surpassing the natural scheme of things. Consequently for it to be conferred by any creaturely action is not possible; a man becomes blessed by the agency of God alone. Mind you, we are speaking of perfect bliss, for if we are speaking of partial happiness, which consists in the activity of virtue, then the same rules apply to the acquisition of happiness and of virtue.¹⁰

Hence: 1. Frequently it is the function of the highest power to achieve the final purpose of a working system of active causes, while that of the subordinate causes is to prepare the material; thus the art of admiralty governs the art of naval construction and decides how the ships built for its purpose are to be effectively concentrated. Likewise the order of the universe: angels help men to their ultimate end by bringing them into readiness; all the same, the actual gaining of the ultimate end is from the first cause, who is God.

2. When actually existing in a thing with full and physical being, a form can be the source of action on another, as when a hot thing heats another. But when not so existing in a thing, that is not completely and physically, then a form cannot be the source of such communication, thus the image of colour in the eye cannot paint a thing white.¹¹ Nor, for that matter, can

given *ad utilitatem*, *proos to sumpheros*, 1 *Corinthians* 12, 7, and without directly sanctifying help to build up the Church, 222Æ. 171, Introduction.

The *illuminatio cæci*, given as an example in the text, is taken by commentators to refer to a person radically blind, not one suffering, for instance, from a cataract, but in the light of St. Thomas's teaching on the degrees of miracle, 1a. 105, 8, their insistence seems superfluous. The point of the argument is to show that the source of man's happiness lies outside the created universe.

⁸The cause of virtue, 122Æ. 63. Vol. 23, ed. D. Hughes.

⁹Image of colour translates *intentio coloris* and shows the run of the reply, yet misses the suggestiveness of the text. *Intentio* is a strong word, and implies the objectual relationship and presence to which we have alluded in several places. cf. Foreword note a.

For *lumen gloriae* see 1a. 12, 5. Vol. 3.

pupilla non potest facere album; neque etiam omnia quæ sunt illuminata aut calefacta possunt alia calefacere et illuminare; sic enim illuminatio et calefactio essent usque ad infinitum. Lumen autem gloriæ, per quod Deus videtur, in Deo quidem est perfecte secundum esse naturale; in qualibet autem creatura est imperfecte, et secundum esse similitudinarium vel participatum. Unde nulla creatura beata potest communicare suam beatitudinem alteri.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod angelus beatus illuminat intellectum hominis, vel etiam inferioris angeli, quantum ad aliquas rationes divinarum operum non autem quantum ad visionem divinæ essentiae, ut in *Primo* dictum est.⁸ Ad eam enim videndam omnes immediate illuminantur a Deo.

articalus 7. utrum requirantur aliqua opera bona ad hoc quod homo beatitudinem consequatur a Deo

AD SEPTIMUM sic proceditur:¹ 1. Videtur quod non requirantur aliqua opera hominis ad hoc ut beatitudinem consequatur a Deo. Deus enim, cum sit agens infinitæ virtutis, non præexigit in agendo materiam, aut dispositionem materiæ, sed statim potest totum producere. Sed opera hominis, cum non requirantur ad beatitudinem ejus sicut causa efficiens, ut dictum est,² non possunt requiri ad eam nisi sicut dispositiones. Ergo Deus, qui dispositiones non præexigit in agendo, beatitudinem sine præcedentibus operibus conferit.

2. Præterea, sicut Deus est auctor beatitudinis immediate, ita et naturam immediate instituit. Sed in prima institutione naturæ, produxit creaturas nulla dispositione præcedente vel actione creaturæ; sed statim fecit unumquodque perfectum in sua specie. Ergo videtur quod beatitudinem conferat homini sine aliquibus operationibus præcedentibus.

3. Præterea, Apostolus dicit:³ beatitudinem hominis esse cui Deus confert *justitiam sine operibus*. Non ergo requiruntur aliqua opera hominis ad beatitudinem consequendam.

SED CONTRA est quod dicitur *Joann.*,⁴ *Si hæc scitis, beati eritis si feceritis ea*. Ergo per actionem ad beatitudinem pervenitur.

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod rectitudo voluntatis, ut supra dictum est,⁵ requiritur ab beatitudinem, cum nihil aliud sit quam debitus ordo voluntatis ad ultimum finem; quæ ita exigitur ad consecutionem ultimi finis, sicut debita dispositio materiæ ad consecutionem formæ. Sed ex hoc non

⁸1a. 106, 1
²Romans 4, 6

¹cf IV Sent. 49, 1, 3, 1
⁴John 13, 17

³art. 6 above
⁵1a2æ. 4, 4

everything which is lit or warmed give light or heat to others; for if they could the process of lighting or heating would go on indefinitely.¹ The light of glory, however, in which God is seen, is fully his by natural being; it is in creatures in a lesser way as being by likeness and derivation. Hence no blessed creature can communicate its happiness to another.²

3. A blessed angel enlightens the intelligence of a man or a lower angel with regard to some meanings in the works of God, not to the face to face vision of him: as we have said in the *Prima Pars*,³ God himself immediately shines on those who see him.⁴

article 7: are good deeds required in order to gain happiness from God?

THE SEVENTH POINT:¹ 1. Apparently not. Since God is a cause of infinite power, his action requires neither pre-existing nor suitably-disposed material, but can produce the whole effect regardless. Now happiness does not require men's deeds as an efficient cause, on this we have agreed,² and so then they can be required only as predispositions. But we have just ruled out the need for predispositions for God to act on, and therefore he grants happiness without preceding good works on our part.

2. Again, as God is the immediate founder of nature, so he is the immediate author of beatitude. When his world was founded he produced creatures without their being prepared or co-operative beforehand: each he made all at once and complete of its kind. Does he not, then, confer happiness on men without preceding good deeds?

3. Besides, St Paul speaks of happiness as for the man *to whom God reputeth righteousness without good works*.³ These, consequently, are not required in order to attain happiness.⁴

ON THE OTHER HAND the Gospel tells us, *If you know these things, you shall be blessed if you do them*.⁵

REPLY: We have already explained how a right good will is required for beatitude,⁶ since it is nothing else than a will properly set on the ultimate end, and is as necessary in order to reach it as the due disposition of material in order to receive a form.⁷ However, this does not prove that any

¹The diminution of light and the degradation of thermal energy enter the argument by way of examples, and need not be pressed. The reply seems to be *ad hominem*.
²That is, as a principal cause.
³cf 1a. 12, 1 & 5.

⁴For the objections of 1a. 45, 1, 5 & 8. Vol. 8.

⁵For the order of grace, election, predestination, merit, glorification, see 1a. 23, 2, 4 & 5. Vol. 5, ed. T. Gilby.

ostenditur quod aliqua operatio hominis debeat præcedere ejus beatitudinem: posset enim Deus simul facere voluntatem recte tendentem in finem, et finem consequentem; sicut quandoque simul materiam disponit, et inducit formam.

Sed ordo divinz sapientiæ exigit ne hoc fiat: ut enim dicitur in II *de Cælo*,⁶ *eorum que nata sunt habere bonum perfectum, aliquid habet ipsum sine motu, aliquid uno motu, aliquid pluribus*. Habere autem perfectum bonum sine motu convenit et quod naturaliter habet illud. Habere autem beatitudinem naturaliter est solius Dei. Unde solius Dei proprium est quod ad beatitudinem non moveatur per aliquam operationem præcedentem.

Cum autem beatitudo excedat omnem naturam creatam, nulla pura creatura convenienter beatitudinem consequitur absque motu operationis per quam tendit in ipsam.⁷ Sed angelus, qui est superior ordine naturæ quam homo, consecutus est eam, ex ordine divinz sapientiæ, uno motu operationis meritoria, ut in *Primo* expositum est.⁷ Homines autem consequuntur ipsam multis modis operationum, qui merita dicuntur.⁸ Unde etiam, secundum Philosophum,⁸ beatitudo est præmium virtuosarum operationum.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum: quod operatio hominis non præcigitur ad consequentem beatitudinis propter insufficientiam divinz virtutis beatificantis, sed ut servetur ordo in rebus.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod primas creaturas statim Deus perfectas produxit, absque aliqua dispositione vel operatione creaturæ præcedente, quia sic instituit prima individua specierum, ut per ea natura propagaretur ad posterum. Et similiter, quia per Christum, qui est Deus et homo, beatitudo erat ad alios derivanda, secundum illud Apostoli, *qui multos filios in gloriam adduxerat*; statim a principio sue conceptionis, absque aliqua operatione meritoria præcedente, anima ejus fuit beata. Sed hoc est singulare in ipso: nam pueris baptizatis subvenit meritum Christi ad beatitudinem consequendam, licet desint eis merita propria, eo quod per baptismum sunt Christi membra effecti.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod Apostolus loquitur de beatitudine spei quæ habetur per gratiam iustificantem, quæ quidem non datur propter

⁶*De Cælo* II, 12: 292a22.

^{7a} 62, 5

⁸*Ethics* I, 9, 1099b16.

⁸*Hebrews* 2, 10

⁶Motion here taken as synonymous with change, and implying potentiality, not as meaning activity. cf. 12. 9. 1 ad 1. Vol. 2. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XI, 6. 1071b37. Plato, *Timæus* 30a, 34b; *Phædrus* 245c.

⁷cf. 12. 26.

⁸Happiness itself, as we have already observed, is a post-moral condition, and therefore as such not a moral value. Moral values in the strictest meaning of the term would seem to be non-ultimate *bonesta* subordinate to the ultimate end, the *summum*

work of man is an indispensable precondition of his happiness, for God could at one stroke make a man whose will was at once rightly set on its end and already possessing it, as sometimes he simultaneously disposes matter and produces its form.

But the order in fact established by divine wisdom does not have it so. The *De Cælo* observes⁶ that of things that have a natural capacity for complete good, one has it without motion, another with one motion, another with many motions.⁶ To possess perfect good without motion is proper to that reality which has it by nature, and to possess happiness by nature is for God alone. Hence it is proper to him alone never to have been in process of becoming happy through activity preceding happiness.⁷

Such happiness surpasses all created nature, and so in the fitting course of things no mere creature gains it without some motion of activity towards it. Superior in nature to man, an angel gains it, according to the economy of divine wisdom, by one meritorious motion: this we have explained in the *Prima Pars*.⁷ Man, however, reaches it through many motions of activity, which are called his merits. The conclusion is in line with Aristotle,⁸ who thought of happiness as the reward for virtuous acts.⁸

Hence: 1. It is the established course of things, not any limit to divine power, that postulates human deeds as necessary preliminaries to happiness.

2. The original things of creation were produced wholly and immediately by God without creaturely contribution by way of disposition or action; so also he set up the original individuals of a species for them to propagate it to posterity.¹ And likewise, because happiness flows to men from Christ, who is God and man, and, according to *Hebrews*,² has brought many children into glory, his soul was blessed from the first moment of his conception, without any preceding meritorious activity.³ But he is unique. Though baptized babies attain bliss through no merits of their own, they draw on his, because Baptism makes them his members.⁴

3. St Paul is speaking of the happiness of hope, bestowed by the grace which makes us pleasing to God, and not owing to preceding good works. For this blessing of hope does not imply the meaning of being the finish of

bonum. God's own goodness transcends moral categories. cf Vol. 18, Appendices 3, 5 & 6.

¹Read in accordance with 1a. 47, 1 (Vol. 8), that God is the immediate cause of the distinctiveness in things, not as taking up any position, for or against, the process of evolution.

²cf 3a, 8, *De gratia capitali Christi*.

³cf 3a. 7, 1, 9, 11 & 13; 9, 2.

⁴cf 3a. 68, 9.

opera præcedentia. Non enim habet rationem termini motus, ut beatitudo, sed magis est principium motus quo ad beatitudinem tenditur.

articulus 8. *utrum omnis homo appetat beatitudinem*

AD OCTAVUM sic proceditur.¹ 1. Videtur quod non omnes appetant beatitudinem. Nullus enim potest appetere quod ignorat: cum bonum appetitum sit obiectum appetitus, ut dicitur in III *De Anima*.² Sed multi nesciunt quid sit beatitudo: quod, sicut Augustinus dicit,³ patet ex hoc, quod *quidam posuerunt beatitudinem in voluptate corporis, quidam in virtute animi, quidam in aliis rebus*. Non ergo omnes beatitudinem appetunt.

2. Præterea, essentia beatitudinis est visio essentie divinæ, ut dictum est.⁴ Sed aliqui opinantur hoc esse impossibile, quod Deus per essentiam ab homine videatur: unde hoc non appetunt. Ergo non omnes homines appetunt beatitudinem.

3. Præterea, Augustinus dicit,⁵ quod *beatus est qui habet omnia quæ vult, et nihil male vult*. Sed non omnes hoc volunt: quidam enim male aliqua volunt, et tamen volunt illa se velle. Non ergo omnes volunt beatitudinem.

SED CONTRA est quod Augustinus dicit,⁶ *Si minus dixisset, 'Omnes beati esse vultis, miseri esse non vultis', dixisset aliquid quod nullus in sua non cognosceret voluntate*. Quilibet ergo vult esse beatus.

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod beatitudo dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo, secundum communem rationem beatitudinis. Et sic necesse est quod omnis homo beatitudinem velit. Ratio autem beatitudinis communis est ut sit bonum perfectum, sicut dictum est.⁷ Cum autem bonum sit obiectum voluntatis, perfectum bonum est alicuius quod totaliter ejus voluntati satisfiat. Unde appetere beatitudinem nihil aliud est quam appetere ut voluntas satietur. Quod quilibet vult.

Alio modo possumus loqui de beatitudine secundum specialem rationem quantum ad id in quo beatitudo consistit. Et sic non omnes cognoscunt beatitudinem, quia nesciunt cui rei communis ratio beatitudinis conveniat. Et per consequens, quantum ad hoc, non omnes eam volunt.

1. Unde patet responsio ad primum.
2. Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum voluntas sequatur apprehensionem intellectus seu rationis, sicut contingit quod aliquid est idem secundum rem quod tamen est diversum secundum rationis considerationem,

*Piana: unus, if one says.

¹IV Sent. 49, 1, 3, 1

²De Trin. xiii, 4. PL 42, 1018

³De Trin. xiii, 5. PL 42, 1020

⁴ibid. 3. PL 42, 1018

⁵art 4 ad 2

⁶De Anima iii, 10. 433a27; b12

⁷1222. 3, 8

motion, which happiness is, but rather of being the start of the motion towards happiness.¹

article 8. *does every human being desire happiness?*

THE EIGHTH POINT.¹ 1. It seems not.² For who can want what he does not know about? The object of human desire is good perceived, as stated in the *De Anima*.² Now many do not know what happiness is; Augustine observes³ that *some put it in pleasures of body, some in virtue of soul and others elsewhere*. Not all, therefore, desire happiness.

2. Further, we have agreed⁴ that the vision of God constitutes happiness. Some, however, reckon this quite beyond the bounds of possibility.⁵ And consequently do not long for it.

3. Besides, Augustine says that *blessed is he who has all he wills, and wills for nothing amiss*.⁶ Not all have that sort of will. For some will amiss, and are quite determined about it. Therefore all do not will happiness.

ON THE OTHER HAND there is Augustine,⁶ *If the comperè says from the stage, You all want to be happy, and do not want to be miserable, his words echo what none of the audience fails to find in his heart*. Everyone, in fact, desires to be happy.

REPLY: Beatitude can be considered in the abstract and in the concrete. Take it in its general meaning, then everybody is bound to wish for happiness. For it signifies, as we have said,⁷ complete goodness. Since the good is the object of the will, the perfect good is that which satisfies it altogether. To desire to be happy is nothing else than to wish for this satisfaction. And each and everyone wishes it.

Take it, however, to point to where happiness lies, then all do not recognize it, for they are ignorant about the object which gathers all good together. And so in this sense not everybody wills happiness.

Hence: 1. The answer is clear.

2. Willing follows perceiving by intelligence or reason. And accordingly, just as a thing which is single in reality may be split into parts in our

¹Hope, theological virtue, 2222. 17-22. Vol. 33, ed. W. Hill.

²As in the other four Questions, the final article brings the topic to a head.

³Allegedly Amaury, or Almaric of Bene (near Chartres), professor at Paris, d. 1207. The 'Amaurians' or 'Amauricians' laid themselves open to the charge of pantheism and were censured. Amaury seems to have taken up the Erigenian doctrine of theophanies, and denied the beatific vision, of the first of the theses condemned at Paris. Demille, *Cartularium*, 123 (i, 170). C. Capelle, *Autour du décret de 1210*. Paris, 1932.

thinking about it, so also it may be wanted under one aspect and not wanted under another.^c Happiness, therefore, can be considered *qua* final and perfect good—its general meaning—and to this, as we have noticed,⁸ the will tends by nature and of necessity. Yet it can also be considered in some particular respect, for instance, in terms of the act of willing, or of the active power engaged, or of what the object involves, and to this the will does not tend of necessity.

3. Blessed is the man who has all he wills, or, as sometimes put, whose choices succeed—this description of happiness^{ad} is well enough in one sense, but not in another. If you take it to refer to wishes that spring from his nature, then it is true that one who has all he wants is happy, for nothing but the perfect good, which is beatitude, satisfies the desires of human nature. If you take it to refer to all that strike him as his wants, then to have some of them will not be his happiness, but rather the reverse: in fact they will stop him from getting what his nature wants. There is a parallel here with the reason, which on occasion thinks things are true which in fact are barriers to knowing the truth. That is why Augustine adds the qualification that no touch of evil^e is willed. Though, as we have admitted, the unqualified statement is well enough if rightly understood.

^cThus I might wish to love God with my whole heart, and yet at the same time feel disinclined to make the effort entailed. Though he is the universal good, he is not yet seen as such. Following a hidden God means taking particular and sometimes unattractive courses. cf. Iazae. 10, 2; 75, 2.

^dAdopted by Peter Lombard, *Sentences* IV, 49, 1.

^e*Nihil male* in objection, *nihil mali* in reply.

ita contingit quod aliquid est idem secundum rem et tamen uno modo appetitur, alio modo non appetitur. Beatitude ergo potest considerari sub ratione finalis boni et perfecti, quæ est communis ratio beatitudinis: et sic naturaliter et ex necessitate voluntas in illud tendit, ut dictum est.^a Potest etiam considerari secundum alias speciales considerationes, vel ex parte ipsius operationis, vel ex parte potentie operative, vel ex parte objecti: et sic non ex necessitate voluntas tendit in ipsam.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod ista definitio beatitudinis quam quidam posuerunt: *Beatus est qui habet omnia quæ vult*, vel, *cui omnia optata succedunt*, quodam modo intellecta est bona et sufficiens; alio vero modo est imperfecta. Si enim intelligatur simpliciter de omnibus quæ vult homo naturaliter appetere, sic verum est, quod qui habet omnia quæ vult est beatus: nihil enim satiat naturalem hominis appetitum nisi bonum perfectum, quod est beatitudo. Si vero intelligatur de his quæ homo vult secundum apprehensionem rationis, sic habere quendam quæ homo vult non pertinet ad beatitudinem, sed magis ad misericordiam, in quantum huiusmodi habita impediunt hominem ne habeat quæcumque naturaliter vult: sicut etiam ratio accipit vera interdum quæ impediunt a cognitione veritatis. Et secundum hanc considerationem, Augustinus addidit ad perfectionem beatitudinis, quod *nihil mali velit*. Quamvis primum posset sufficere, si recte intelligeretur, scilicet quod *beatus est qui habet omnia quæ vult*.

^aart. 3 & 4 above

^bFollowing Augustine *De Trin.* III, 5. PL 42, 1020. Thus Peter Lombard, *Sent.* IV, 49, 1.