

SACRED PLACES AND PROFANE SPACES

ESSAYS IN THE GEOGRAPHICS OF
JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY,
AND ISLAM

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The Politics of Sacred Place: Jerusalem's Temple Mount/*al-haram al-sharif*

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Oct. 29, 1938: Arriving at the Wall this morning for the first time—after an intermission of two weeks—I discovered to my sorrow that the Wall was brutally desecrated. Bits of stone were chopped off. The marauders lit a fire and succeeded in blackening the face of the Wall with soot. The congregation was very upset. . . . Accompanied by the British sergeant and constable, I visited the rooms where we store the sacred vessels and discovered they have all been burned and destroyed: Torah scrolls, washbasin, bookshelves, more than two hundred prayerbooks and Psalms. . . .

Isaac Victor Orenstein,
Diary of the Western Wall (Jerusalem, 1951)¹

. . . The active widespread propaganda undertaken by the Jews with a view to influencing the London Government and other powers as well as the League of Nations in order to take possession of the Western Wall of the Mosque at Aqsa, called al-Burak, or to raise claims over the place. . . .

Having realized by bitter experience the unlimited greedy aspirations of the Jews in this respect, Moslems believe that the Jews' aim is to take possession of the Mosque of al-Aqsa gradually on the pretense that it is the temple, by starting with the Western Wall of this place, which is an inseparable part of the Mosque of al-Aqsa. . . .

Hajji Amin al-Husayni,
"Memorandum to the Shaw Commission 1930"²

These two texts reflect the claims and counterclaims of two religious traditions in the same sacred location in Jerusalem. The Jews refer to this wall and platform within the Old City of Jerusalem as the *kotel ha-ma' aravi*, "the Western Wall," and *har ha-hayit*, "the Temple Mount," while the Muslims call them *al-buraq*, referring to the Prophet's magical steed tethered to this wall, and *al-haram al-sharif*, "the Noble Sanctuary."

For Jews, the Temple Mount is the place where Abraham bound his son Isaac for sacrifice, where David and Solomon constructed the first Temple, where the second Temple was reconstructed after the Babylonian Exile, later expanded by Herod the Great, and finally destroyed by the Romans in 70 C.E. The sacrificial ritual of the Temple maintained the order of the cosmos and bound heaven and earth. Even though the Temple was destroyed and Jews were pushed from Jerusalem, they maintained mental citizenship in this city. They built its sanctity into the structure of their prayers, in the rituals marking life's transitions, in the architecture of their synagogues, in their vision of the messianic endtime, and eventually into the center of their nationalist movement.

For Muslims, the *haram al-sharif* was identified after the Muslim conquest of Palestine as the destination of Muhammad's *isra'*, or "flight," from the Qur'an's *al-masjid al-haram* in Mecca to *al-masjid al-aqsa* (Sura 17:1). Still later perhaps, the traditions of the *mi'raj*, or "ladder" to heaven, were fused with the traditions of the *isra'* so that the Prophet was understood to have stopped in Jerusalem before ascending the ladder to the heavenly sphere. Some Muslim commentators in the early Middle Ages were revolted by the thought of Judaizing Islam by making Jerusalem holy. They argued that Jerusalem is nothing for Islam and those who sought to sanctify Jerusalem were just copying the Jews. And some have speculated that it was really towards Mt. Sinai that Muhammad had been oriented; tradition evolved so that as R. J. Zwi Werblowsky has observed: "There are no direct flights from Mecca to heaven; you have to make a stop-over in Jerusalem."³ The Muslims, too, built the sanctity of Jerusalem, but because they controlled the city for so many centuries they did it through the construction of vast structures on the *haram* like al-Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock around the stone from which Muhammad was believed to have ascended to heaven, by building architecturally impressive walls around the city, complemented by hadith and poetry celebrating the virtues of *al-quds*, "the holy," and, of course through pilgrimage and their own speculation about the role of this city on the day of judgment.

The authors of the texts with which we began occupied very different positions within their respective communities. Rabbi Orenstein was a longtime resident of the Jewish Quarter and during the siege of Jerusalem from December 1947 to May 1948 was in charge of arrangements at the Western Wall.⁴ He was killed along with his wife when a Jordanian artillery shell fell on their apartment shortly after the declaration of statehood in May 1948.⁵ Throughout that period he kept a detailed account of events at the Western Wall attesting to the increased

politicization of this sacred space in the conflict between Jewish and Palestinian nationalists.

After World War I, Hajj Amin-Husayni, the Mufti of Jerusalem, became the preeminent leader of the Palestinian nationalist cause. As the highest Islamic cleric in Palestine, he mounted a campaign to protect the sanctity of the *haram al-sharif* which allowed him to mobilize the populace against the Jews and to lay claim to speak for all Palestinians, until he was forced to flee Palestine after the British put down the Arab Revolt of 1936-39. In 1948 the Mufti organized a small Palestinian army aimed at creating an independent Palestinian state. Yasser Arafat is a member of Husayni's extended family and received his initial political education at the Husaynis' home in exile in Cairo.⁶

Husayni's text was written in 1930 for the Shaw Commission convened by the British to determine the causes of the intercommunal rioting of August 1929 sparked by political conflict over the Western Wall. Orenstein's text was written for a private readership at the end of the 1930s. A half-century has gone by, yet the positions they reflect remain virtually unchanged.

The two texts illustrate an almost entirely overlooked element in the study of sacred places—their intimate connection with politics. The history of religions has understood sacred place to be the result of the sudden manifestation or eruption of the Sacred into the world. Because they undergird identities and ethical commitments, because they galvanize the deepest emotions and attachments, material and symbolic control over the most central sacred places are sources of enormous social power. Therefore these sites are periodically contested, states to be won in the struggle between different religious communities and between different groups who hold opposing worldviews within each community. These conflicts transform the meaning of the site, the doctrines which are ritualized there, and the identities of those who claim the site as their own. The history of religions has treated religious traditions as consensual and closed systems. Studies based on the "essentialist" interpretation tend to be apolitical, and thus necessarily consensual or at least nonconflictual, often textual and oriented to elite understandings of the normative tradition, and either completely ahistorical or reduced to a temporal sequence of ideas.

Control over the organization and meaning of Jerusalem's Temple Mount/*al-haram al-sharif* has been repeatedly contested within and between the Jewish and Muslim communities. The degree and meaning of their sanctity to each community hinges historically upon their changing position in those intra- and intercommunal struggles. Just as the state stands as the ultimate guarantor of the "sanctity" of private property and the self-regulating market, so too the state stands at the profane perimeter of any sacred space as the guarantor of its sanctity. By implication, wherever there is political conflict over the organization of sacred space, it falls to the state to manage that organization. As we shall show, the state's role in the regulation of these sites is overwhelming.

In the case of the Temple Mount/*al-haram al-sharif*, the primary external conflict has been between the Israeli state on the one hand, and the Palestinian

nationalist movement on the other. For Israelis and Palestinians, this site has been both a symbolic resource for political mobilization and a site for political struggle. In the 1920s and early 1930s the Western Wall was used by Revisionist Zionists to mobilize Jews to their standard within the Zionist community, as well as against the Palestinian nationalist movement. On the Palestinian side, clerical elites used the *haram al-sharif* to build Palestinian nationalism and advance their own leadership of the movement, and to struggle against Zionism. Ever since Jordan asserted sovereignty over Jerusalem in 1948, the site has been a battleground between the PLO, Jordan, and Islamic militants over the claim of the allegiances of the Palestinian people. And ever since Israel claimed sovereignty, the site has been a critical background between Israelis who are willing to achieve territorial compromise with the Arabs and those who are not, between those who seek to ground the legitimacy of the state in a secular democratic constitution and those who would ground it in the Torah and religious law.

AESTHETICS OR POLITICS OF SACRED SPACE

The social organization of space has long been "read" metaphorically to apprehend the divine world. This tradition can be traced back to the great urban civilizations of the ancient world.⁷ The modern world has not gone far beyond poetic metaphors in its efforts to understand sacred and profane space. Gaston Bachelard was correct in alerting us to our own metaphorical reveries about space and other mysteries.⁸ Scholars such as Otto von Simpson have read the cathedral and its light as metaphors for the medieval worldview, while John James understood it as a metaphor for the presence of God.⁹ David Brodsky has interpreted the freeway as the metaphor for the experience of modernity.¹⁰

Naturally, the history of religions abounds with metaphorical descriptions of sacred space: Wensinck's *The Ideas of Western Semites Concerning the Navel of the Earth* (Amsterdam, 1917), Jeremias' *Golgotha* (Leipzig, 1926), and Mus' *Barabudur* (Hanoi, 1935). These three classical studies of sacred space develop metaphors to describe the cosmologies of holy space in the ancient Near East, where "navel" has a pan-Semitic root (*TBR*), in Judaism and early Christianity in late antiquity where Golgotha takes on the additional symbolism of the Greek *omphalos*, and at Barabudur where time and space are materialized in the structure of the Buddhist stupa.

Descriptive terms identified with the work of Mircea Eliade such as "center," *axis mundi*, *universalis columna*, "cosmic mountain," *imago mundi*, *templum et tempus*, or *terre pure* are more recent examples of this metaphorical treatment of space. Eliade's study of what he called "architectonic" symbolism¹¹ is part of a longer phenomenological tradition. For example, Gerardus van der Leeuw, in his *Phänomenologie der Religion* (1933), saw sacred space as "that locality that becomes a position by the effects of power repeating themselves there, or being repeated by man."¹² His evolutionary model began with its simplest form, the "natural shrine" where man adds nothing at all to a natural locale which is

filled with an "awe-inspiring character"; moved to the house and temple where both are sacred by virtue of the power residing in them; to the city where man forms his settlement and converts the discovered possibilities of the locality into a new powerfulness; finally to the internationalization of sacred space where heart or soul becomes the holy of holies. In Muslim mystical tradition, van der Leeuw noted, the pilgrimage to Mecca might be undertaken "in one's room" or "by walking seven times around a sage: the real sanctuary is man."¹³ Van der Leeuw, like Eliade, understood that sacred space was created by the presence of power, but van der Leeuw failed to tell us anything about the politics of that power. Their sacred space is devoid of real humans and their specific and divergent ideal and material interests.

Joachim Wach's sociology of religious experience pointed out that all such experiences are subject to far-reaching social forces acting upon them from outside.¹⁴ Yet Wach's efforts to uncover the universals of religious experience forced him to separate both time and space from social forces. He wrote that the religious language which articulates religious experience is always metaphorical ("The way of negation, of analogy and eminence is used in all religious language"), and we must remember that the concepts of sacred time and sacred space are the frameworks "within which religious thought and religious acts enfold themselves."¹⁵ Thus, while sacred space and time are social metaphors, their making and the evolutionary movement between them are not problematic. The human species somehow descends naturally into the sacrality of its individual members.

These approaches make sacred space into a static and substantive category. They simply assume the Durkheimian dichotomy of sacred and profane and ground it in Rudolf Otto's later attempt to secure the epistemology and ontology of the sacred. Consequently, under the tutelage of van der Leeuw, Wach, and Eliade, the history of religions has come to understand that the sacred manifests itself at a specific place, making it, for all intents and purposes, sacred for all time. The history of religion has then produced a marvelous tapestry of metaphors or aesthetic indices for space, but has not clarified how space is socially constructed, organized, and reproduced over time. Sacred space is stripped of politics and real history.

Students of religions, of course, now recognize that religious phenomena are multivalent, but they have a multiplicity of meanings, to use Eliade's terminology. But the meanings are chronologically arranged and never create conflict. Indeed, Eliade's real importance is his presentation of the multiplicity of meanings of religious phenomena, whether in chronological order or arranged structurally within his categories. So, when Eliade was forced to explain what he meant by "history" he wrote, "l'histoire des religions étant en grande partie l'histoire des dévalorisations et des revalorisations du processus de manifestation du sacré."¹⁶ Kurt Rudolph recently commented that, for Eliade, "the history of religions is concerned not with historical processes in the context of political, economic, cultural, and social conditions, but with the 'history' of the transhistorical structures

of religious meanings, of 'hierophanies,' or 'kratophanies,' we could also say of religious ideas."¹⁷ Human beings, real actors, are apparently irrelevant to these transhistorical processes of the manifestation of the sacred.

Likewise in Eliade's approach, there are no conflictual meanings in religious phenomena. Everything always fits together. In his *Traité d'Éliade* provides us with the marvelous example of the crowd which comes to the Kalighat in Calcutta to worship Durga. For the great majority, Durga is an awesome goddess who must be appeased by bloody sacrifice. To the religious elite, Durga is a manifestation of cosmic life in constant and violent regeneration. To the crowd, the Siva *lingam* is the archetype of the generative organ, but for the initiates it is the symbol of the cycle of creation in which everything periodical returns to its primordial unity before being reborn again. He writes:

What is the true meaning of Durga and Siva—what is deciphered by the initiates, or what is taken up by the mass of the faithful? In this book I am trying to show that both are equally valuable; that the meaning given by the masses stands for as authentic a modality of the sacred manifested in Durga or Siva as the interpretation of the initiates. And I can show that the two hierophanies fit together—that the modalities of the sacred which they reveal are in no sense contradictory, but are complementary, are parts of a whole.¹⁸

While Eliade refuses to give primacy to any group's understanding, the mechanism by which the understandings of elites, initiates, and the populace "fit together" is not of theoretical concern. It is simply assumed.

More recent scholarship has also managed to recognize the multivalence of sacred space while retaining a consensual, apolitical understanding. In her magisterial work, Diana L. Eck interprets the city of Banaras as a "text" which continually acts to reinterpret the classical Sanskrit texts about the same city. In short, the relationship between the city text and canonical text is both complementary and contradictory. She writes in her preface:

The sacred geography of the city provides information the Sanskrit texts cannot provide. Some of the temples I sought out, which had clearly been important in the era of Sanskrit literature, no longer exist. Some such sites are now occupied by mosques. Others are marked only by tiny shrines or have been moved to new locations. Conversely, some temples barely mentioned in the Sanskrit texts have achieved great fame and popularity. Reading the text of the city's geography has often been difficult, for most of the city has changed in the past 700 years, with hardly a stone left upon stone. Parts of it, including many major temples, were destroyed by Muslims several times between the twelfth and seventeenth centuries, and in the eighteenth century whole new sectors of what is now the dense urban heart of the city were constructed. And yet, with all this change, most of the temples of the great Sanskrit tradition are still here, somewhere.¹⁹

Here, Eck understands the historical development of Banaras and the multivalence of its sacred geography (i.e., there are many Hindu and Muslim sites in the city)

and even the conflict between the canonical texts and the urban text (i.e., those temples which are hardly mentioned in the canonical texts have great popularity). However, she pays little or no attention to the politics which formed the city in the classical Hindu period, the Muslim middle ages, or in the modern period with the renaissance of both traditions. The multiple meanings of sacred space may reflect both profound historical and contemporary conflicts. Unfortunately the historical relationship between the urban and canonical text is not theorized. It is not made into a problem in the original and so remains unexamined in the contemporary as well. The history of the city becomes a chronology of events without the political forces and the alternative readings which motivated them and have shaped the sacred spaces of contemporary Banaras.

More recent analysts have pointed out that sacred space is more a matter of interpretation, of setting boundaries, and of relationships than fixed categories which have universal consent and agreement among and between believers. Commenting on the work of Mary Douglas, Jonathan Z. Smith, for example, recalled an experience drawn from his youth working on a dairy farm in upstate New York. In the morning his boss would wash his hands, then go outside and rub them with dirt. When Smith asked about this curious series of actions, he was reminded by his host that folks from the city know little. Inside the house, he was told it's "dirt," outside it's "earth." You wash it off to be with your family inside and you put it on when you are with the animals outside. Smith uses this experience to argue against the essentialist or substantive tradition of sacred and profane within the history of religions. "There is nothing," he writes, "that is inherently or essentially clean or unclean, sacred or profane." Rather, Smith argues, there are situational or relational categories, "mobile boundaries which shift according to the map being employed."²⁰ At another point in his work, he reminds us of the similarity between attempts to fix canons and divinatory situations. He is struck by "the great variety of such canons and divinatory situations . . . by the differences in exegetical techniques and skills, by the variety of presuppositions. But the essential structure of limitation and closure along with exegetical ingenuity remains constant." The task of the history of religions, Smith argues, should be "an examination of the rules that govern the sharp debates between rival exegetes and exegetical systems in their efforts to manipulate the closed canon."²¹ Sacred space must also be understood as a structure of limitation and closure, like the canon or the process of divination with a fixed and limited number of objects to be interpreted and understood. Sacred space then is a matter of context and relation with specific grammars which make them meaningful. Both the setting of relational boundaries and determining the grammars which regulate sacred space are political activities. Indeed, the most rewarding studies of sacred space following from the critique of the history of religions' aesthetic interpretation are those which have focused on this political dimension or sacred topographies and landscapes. David Harvey has studied the social conflict between the contradictory sacralities of Paris' Basilica of the Sacred Heart and the Mur des Fédérés, where the surviving

and to mobilize the Palestine people. Conflict over the city's sacred sites was a way both to establish a new Palestinian identity and to engage the enemy. The struggle over the platform and the wall surrounding it were linked to the struggle for the city in which both were interested.

Haji Amin al-Husayni, the highest Islamic cleric in Palestine, built his nation and his own political base against the rival Nashistubni family by building the sanctuary of Jerusalem. Before the British mandate, expressions of Muslim piety were regionally fragmented. Jerusalem's religious elites had long visited and made pilgrimage to the tomb of Moses, at least as Palestinian Islam understood it, on the road from Jerusalem to Jericho. Shortly after Salah al-Din conquered the city from the Crusaders, Palestinian Muslims located the burial place of Nebi Musa, or "the Prophet Moses" near Mt. Nevo. An elaborate multidomed mosque was constructed in the desert near Jericho marking that place.²⁵ Many visitors to the city in the nineteenth century already recognized that, unlike all other festivals in the Muslim religious calendar, this pilgrimage was correlated with the Orthodox Easter calendar in order to rival Easter celebrations.²⁶ The pilgrims traditionally arrived at the tomb of Moses on Monday of Holy Week and spent two days there. A whole local tradition of piety evolved in which Muslims from Jerusalem would walk in procession on the festival of Moses' burial to the desert shrine behind the large green banner of the Prophet Muhammad, one of the Dome of the Rock's most precious relics, which belonged to the Husayni family. The pilgrims would also bring their own family flags, which would be unfurled in the procession linking Palestinian families to the family of the Prophet. Amidst the feasting and flute and drum music, scores of young boys were circumcised there. Such a circumcision was believed to be particularly auspicious for the recipient. On Wednesday, all pilgrims returned in procession to Jerusalem, arriving there on Holy Thursday when the Orthodox Christians of the city reenact Jesus' washing of his disciples' feet. The Banner of the Prophet was carried at the head of the procession by Jerusalem's most influential Muslim families. On Friday, the *haram al-sharif* was crowded with pilgrims and the central ritual was the carrying of the Banner of the Prophet, along with all the other flags, from al-Aqsa mosque to the Dome of the Rock. At the al-Kas fountain directly between the two buildings, the procession would stop and point the banner toward an olive tree near the fountain. This olive tree was believed to become animated at this point; its trunk and branches would bend in recognition of the Prophet. The banner was then received at the Dome of the Rock and wrapped in silk and stored in the Dome until the following year.²⁷

Before al-Husayni, the pilgrim to Nebi Musa might be joined by fellow pilgrims from Jericho and even Bedouin tribesmen from across the Jordan. But Muslims in the Galilee, on the coastal plain, or even nearby Hebron and Nablus were preoccupied with their own local saints whose tombs they visited on pilgrimage. Few came to Jerusalem for the festival of Nebi Musa.

In April 1920, Hajj Amin played an important role in violent demonstrations which broke out in Jerusalem in conjunction with the Nebi Musa pilgrimage.

members of the Paris Commune were executed in 1871. Harvey demonstrates that the building of the Basilica concretized the ascendancy not only of a new national piety in the devotional cult of the Sacred Heart, but also the new ruling classes which emerged as a result of the civil war. The Basilica was sited on the exact location where the Commune had begun in order, as the National Assembly put it when it voted for its erection in 1873, to serve "in witness of repentance and as a symbol of hope." Not unlike the stings of early medieval churches on the sacred sanctuaries of pre-Christian Europe and the Islamic construction of mosques on top of Christian churches and Jewish synagogues, they appropriated the symbolic power of this site and imprinted it with their own understanding of the larger sacred territorial unit: France. Yet, the memory of the Commune did not die and was memorialized in the wall located in Père Lachaise Cemetery, creating an alternative sacred locale.²² The Basilica and the wall are two sacred sites for the followers of conflicting worldviews of the meaning of the French nation. Today, both are pilgrimage sites for the right and left wings of France's political order. Each spring the National Front celebrates the feast day of Joan of Arc with huge bonfires on the hillside leading to the Basilica. Within view of Montmartre, the graves of almost all the major left-wing political elites as well as memorials to those deported to their deaths in the Nazi death camps are situated around the wall of the Paris Commune's martyrs.

Another seminal piece of work is that of David Carrasco, who has laid out the microeconomics of symbolic power which governed the relationship between the Aztec capital and its far-flung provinces, between center and periphery. He argues that the human sacrificial system which was acted out at the Templo Mayor was a system "to maintain Aztec dominance in the face of threats (rebellions) and fluctuations (droughts). . . . It was a religious strategy carried out to conserve the entire cosmogonic structure of the Aztec city-state."²³ More recently, using J. Z. Smith's interpretation of ritual as controlled space, he has argued that "just such a ritual substitution of spaces takes place in the Aztec sacrifice of warriors captured in battles fought in territories peripheral to the settlements of competing city-states. The accidents of variables of the battlefield are eliminated in the sacrificial ceremony, where the enemy warrior is under the total control of the sacrificer and the symbolism of the ceremonial center of the city. What was up for grabs in the periphery is completely under control in the center."²⁴ While the phenomena interpreted by Harvey and Carrasco are vastly different, their studies both demonstrate the relationship between the construction of sacred space and the social organization of power.

THE CONFLICT OVER THE WESTERN WALL FROM THE BRITISH MANDATE TO THE SIX-DAY WAR

The religious conflict over the sacred centers of Jerusalem must be understood with respect to the national conflict between Arab and Jew in Palestine. Islamic elites, centered in Jerusalem, used their control over its sacred sites to mold

rural areas, and even the rivalries between prominent families of Jerusalem.

Almost immediately after his appointment to the position of Grand Mufti, he began an extensive restoration project on the *haram al-sharif*. Al-Aqsa mosque and many of the religious schools and foundations located near it had deteriorated under the Ottoman administration of the city and had been damaged as a result of earthquakes. In order to complete his project, he began to build a hotel for Muslim pilgrims and borrowed heavily from other Arab regimes. The project, completed in 1928, earned him the title of "Restorer of *al-Haram al-Sharif* and Defender of the Holy Places."

If the Mufti built his nation by building the sanctity of Jerusalem, he also engaged the enemy by politicizing access to the Western Wall. Muslims considered the Western Wall to be an inseparable part of the *haram al-sharif*, while the paved street below was part of a *waqf*³¹ created by the Abu Madyan family in 1320 intended to provide housing and charity for Moroccan Muslim pilgrims.³² A small Moroccan Muslim neighborhood developed around the original *waqf* property. Before the nineteenth century, Jews worshipped at other areas of the surviving Herodian walls surrounding the *haram* on the south and east. In the middle ages, there is some evidence that Muslims may even have allowed Jews to pray on the Temple Mount or the *haram* itself.³³ Muhammad Ali of Egypt had issued a decree or *firman* in 1849 granting Jews permission to visit the wall and to pray there. Muhammad Ali's decree became part of Jerusalem's complex code of rights and privileges to the holy places. Jews were permitted to worship there, but they were not allowed to bring chairs, reading tables, or screens to divide male and female worshippers as required by *Halakha* or religious law. They were not allowed to blow the *shofar* or the ram's horn which is normally a part of the Rosh ha-Shannah and Yom ha-Kippurim ritual.

In 1920, even before Hajj Amin became Mufti, there had been a serious conflict over the status of the wall. Minor repairs to the wall were initiated by the Muslim authorities of the *haram al-sharif*. These repairs included the removal of weeds on the top of the wall. The Jews objected and the matter was brought to the British military administration of Palestine. The arbitrators ruled that since the area cleaned was from the Ottoman period, well above the Herodian levels lower on the walls, the Muslims could clean the wall. But, since the wall was considered an antiquity, it must be cleaned or repaired under the supervision of the Department of Antiquities, and no work was to be done on either Friday or Saturday.

The British sought to manage the potential conflict between Jews and Muslims as well as between the diverse Christian communities of Jerusalem by retaining intact the entire series of Sultanic declarations awarding custody of the sacred places to one community or another. This body of *firman*s was widely known as the *Status Quo* in the holy places. The Muslims not only feared a Jewish homeland in Palestine, but also believed that the Jews were intent upon rebuilding their Temple on the *haram*.³⁴ Hajj Amin al-Husayni shared this fear from the very beginning. He believed that the Jews would not be content with only the

That year the festivals of Passover, Easter, and Nebi Musa all took place at the same time in April. Earlier that year the Emir Fayisal had been made king of Syria. Hajj Amin then wanted Palestine to become a part of Greater Syria under Hashemite leadership. When the procession winding its way up from the tomb of Moses arrived in Jerusalem, it circled the Old City and halted in front of the municipality building on Jaffa Road. There were a number of anti-Zionist speeches. When Hajj Amin rose to speak, he held up a portrait of Fayisal and told the crowd, "This is your King!" The crowd roared back, "God save the King."

Jerusalem was not a stronghold for the Revisionist Zionists, who would brook no compromise in the formation of a Jewish state that they hoped would include all of Mandatory Palestine. The Revisionists, led by Ze'ev Jabotinsky, had organized a counterdemonstration in the Jewish Quarter of the Old City. This apparently provoked the Muslim pilgrims, who rioted, killing three Jews and injuring scores. Jabotinsky's followers then attacked the Muslim rioters. When the British finally were able to separate the two groups, the death toll was five Jews and four Palestinians and there were nearly a hundred injured. The British dismissed the Palestinian mayor, Musa Kazim al-Husayni, who had addressed the group, and arrested Jabotinsky. Hajj Amin escaped the British dragnet and eventually fled across the Jordan River and was given a ten-year sentence in abstentia for his inflammatory speech to the crowd. Jabotinsky was sentenced to fifteen years, although this was quickly commuted to one year.²⁸ Hajj Amin was pardoned the following September and returned to Jerusalem. The Palin Commission, convened to determine the causes of the rioting, concluded the following year that the rioting appeared to be spontaneous, but that "firebrands" had exploited it for their own political purposes.²⁹ Throughout the 1920s Hajj Amin continued to press the prestige of the pilgrimage and even convinced the British that he did not wish the pilgrimage to become another context for political violence. Indeed, the fact that there was no violence during the pilgrimage in 1921 was one of the factors which led Herbert Samuel, the High Commissioner of Palestine, to appoint Hajj Amin to the position of Mufti a month after the pilgrimage.³⁰

Cemeteries provide powerful clues to social transformations. The cemetery surrounding the Nebi Musa mosque and hospice is filled with graves of prominent Jerusalemite families, indicating the prestige and power of interment there. Suddenly in the early 1920s people from all over Palestine were being buried in the cemetery at Nebi Musa near Jerusalem. Wealthy pilgrims who traveled from all over Palestine began to dedicate plaques in the mosque commemorating their pilgrimage. Each village, town, and city made its way separately to the shrine, behind its own flag, usually arriving and departing on its own appointed day. The Nebi Musa pilgrimage under the stewardship of Hajj Amin became a national pilgrimage. The pilgrims not only paid homage to Moses, but to Hajj Amin as well, whose organization largely financed the festival. Through the pilgrimage, he attempted to consolidate ritually a national community of Palestine, overcoming the fragmentation of clan and village, between cities and

Western Wall, but desired the entire *haram* where they planned to construct the third Temple. He told a correspondent of *Le Journal* in September of 1929 that Lord Melchet had told him at the very beginning of the Mandate that "the day of rebuilding the temple has approached and I shall devote the rest of my life to building the temple on the spot of the Mosque of Aqsa."³⁵ Hajji Amin believed that the Jews were violating the Status Quo by bringing chairs and benches to the wall. On September 28, 1925, he wrote to the governor of Jerusalem saying that "you are undoubtedly aware of the fact that the Jews had on several occasions attempted to disregard the rules of the Wailing Wall by placing benches and wooden chairs [there]. . . . Recently the Jews renewed this attempt publicly [and hence] the Muslim community was greatly annoyed."³⁶ The Mufti made it increasingly more difficult for the Jews to worship at the Western Wall. The paved street used by the Jews, for example, was originally a dead-end alley. The Mufti ordered the closed end of the alley to be opened, converting the street to a public thoroughfare.

On September 23, 1928, the eve of Yom ha-Kippurim, an Ashkenazic attendant at the Western Wall began making preparations for the religious services of the next day. He brought a larger than usual ark, spread mats, and set up lamps. But he also attached a dividing screen to the pavement. Apparently, this was brought to the attention of the *mutawalli* or guardian of the Abu Madyan *waqf*. He immediately notified the Mufti, who sent a formal complaint to Edward Keith-Roach, the Deputy District Commissioner of Jerusalem. The District Commissioner immediately ordered the screen removed and was assured that it would be gone by the following morning. However, when the District Commissioner visited the area the next day, the screen was still there. Again the District Commissioner ordered the screen taken down, but now the Orthodox Jews who were at prayer refused to desecrate Yom ha-Kippurim by performing what they considered an act of labor. The police were called and when they started to remove the screen, a fight began in which a number of Jews were injured.

Many have argued that the Mufti transformed this conflict over the Status Quo into a political struggle which allowed him to secure his position as the unrivaled defender of the *haram al-sharif's* sanctity and uncontested leader of the Palestinian nationalist movement. Indeed, both the Jews and Palestinians protested the conflict and both formed committees to defend the sanctity of either the *al-buraq al-sharif* or the Wailing Wall. The initial reaction of the British was in favor of the Mufti; the benches and chairs were ordered removed. But the strongest initial response came from the Yishuv and world Jewry. For the six days following the conflagration, Hajji Amin remained silent, and this has led one scholar to suggest that the Mufti did not consciously set out to transform the issue into a major political event, but was pushed to it by the strength of the Jewish protests of outrage and indignation. However, by the beginning of October his course of action was set.³⁷ In October the Mufti was prepared to write his memorandum to the newly convened Shaw Commission.³⁸

The Mufti's diary entries from 1931 indicate that he considered the Jews' actions to take over the *haram al-sharif* and all Palestine so provocative that it might encourage other Westerners and Europeans to take over other Muslim countries, with the possible loss of even Mecca and Medina. Palestine would soon become a second Andalusia lost by the Muslims.³⁹

In November 1928 he assembled a conference in Jerusalem to discuss the question of the Western Wall. Fearing the influence of the Jews in London, the Mufti suggested that if the Jews continued to violate the Status Quo, the Muslims would be compelled to initiate an uprising. Some of the delegates were from India, and the implied threat to the British was that if they did not restrain the Jews, the insurrections might even spread to India, then a British colony facing very severe communal conflict between Hindus and Muslims. This conference was the opening salvo of what became known as the *al-buraq* campaign in which Hajji Amin hoped to mobilize not only Palestinians, but all Muslims throughout the Arab world, around the issue. His campaign was designed to challenge the British government to adhere to the Status Quo, which they were beginning to see as a flashpoint for major political violence. The Mufti argued that Jewish rights at the Western Wall were only a favor which had been extended by the administrators of the Abu Madyan *waqf*. This ignored the fact that the Jews had established a customary right to the wall through centuries of usage and Muslim acquiescence, and the formal agreements which had been made between the religious Jews and the *waqf*. Hajji Amin was also well aware that the Jews had attempted to purchase sections of the wall immediately after World War I and again just two years before the conflict erupted. In 1918, Chaim Weizmann attempted to purchase the wall for 70,000 Palestine pounds as a way to stimulate enthusiasm for Zionism. The deal was only cancelled when Palestinian nationalists discovered that the *waqf's* administrators had agreed to the transaction. In 1926 the Zionists raised the offer to 100,000 Palestine pounds for property in the Abu Madyan trusteeship. They were able to buy one large parcel only fifty meters from the Mughrabian Gate to the *haram* and were beginning to negotiate for property directly in front of the wall. Immediately after the disturbances in 1928, Weizmann offered 61,000 Palestine pounds for the wall itself, but Keith-Roach dissuaded him and suggested that he should postpone any further attempts to purchase Abu Madyan property until things had quietened down.⁴⁰ The whole affair of Jews attempting to purchase *al-buraq* and Palestinians wanting to sell it must have come as a great embarrassment to the Mufti, who resided in the same neighborhood.

But Hajji Amin also took a number of steps to make the Jewish situation at the Western Wall even more untenable. He ordered that a *mu'azzin* take a position on top of the roof of a house immediately adjacent from the wall to call Muslims to prayer. The house became a *zawiya* or a small mosque and hospice. Sufi Muslims would gather there for ritual *dhihr*, which would be accompanied by cymbals, gongs, and the shouting of "Allah akbar." While the cacophonous sounds that emerged from the *zawiya* interfered with Jewish prayer, in Hajji Amin's strategy

both King Abdullah and then later King Hussein saw the *haram al-sharif* as the central mechanism to assert the legitimacy of their sovereignty in Jerusalem and the West Bank. Both the Hashemite Abdullah and the Mufti Husayni traced their line back to the Prophet and his followers. The Mufti, now in exile in Cairo, had opposed Jordanian annexation of any part of Palestine. Three years later the Mufti's network had King Abdullah assassinated as he made his way to the *haram*. Thus the blood and bones of both Palestinian nationalists and Hashemite kings came to be buried on this sacred platform. Hussein tried to control the symbolic power of the *haram* by making the entire religious infrastructure of the West Bank and Jerusalem economically dependent on Amman as well as using the Muslim Brotherhood to undercut Palestinian nationalists, Communists, Baathists, and Nasserites.⁴⁴

Despite the guarantees provided by Article 8 of the Armistice Agreement of 1949 allowing Jews daily passage to the Eastern sections of the city for purposes of prayer at the Western Wall, visitation of their cemetery on the Mount of Olives and the Tomb of Rachel, the Jordanian regime prohibited Jews and Israeli Muslims from crossing at the Mandelbaum Gate and tourists visiting the Jordanian Jerusalem were periodically required to show baptismal certificates when requesting tourist visas.⁴⁵ Gradually, the *haram* became one of the major centers of Jordanian power and influence on the West Bank. While Hussein relinquished sovereignty over the West Bank and Jerusalem in the summer of 1988, which included the termination of salaries for teachers and civil servants, he continued to fund the *waqf* of the *haram al-sharif* and to pay the salaries of its staff.⁴⁶

THE THEOLOGICAL PROBLEMATIC OF THE SIX-DAY WAR

Immediately after the Six-Day War of 1967, the Israeli Knesset passed "The Law for the Protection of the Holy Places" which guaranteed free access to all holy places in Jerusalem, stipulated that the religious communities of each would administer them, and provided penalties for any violation of their sanctity. This law continued the language of Israel's Proclamation of Statehood stating that "the Holy Places shall be protected from desecration or any other harm, or anything which might affect the access of believers or their feelings for those places."⁴⁷ The Knesset's law failed to mention the Status Quo, which had regulated the holy places which had been used by General Allenby after the British conquered Jerusalem from the Turks in 1917. In 1931 the Mandatory government had sanctioned the Status Quo at the Western Wall with the King's Order in Council. The Status Quo discriminated against the Jews, prohibiting them from bringing benches, dividers, reading tables, and other basic ritual objects necessary for prayer at the Western Wall, and the blowing of the *shofar*. Suffice it to say that the Israeli government could not be expected to reconfirm the very system

it was to underscore the sanctity of *al-buraq* for Muslims. But just as the Muslims had appealed to the British that the Jews had violated the Status Quo, the Jews now turned to them and argued that the Mufti's actions were innovations not sanctioned by the Status Quo.⁴¹

The following year, Hajj Amin's activities to demonstrate that the Jews intended to use the Western Wall as a platform to regain the Temple Mount culminated in the rioting which spread from Jerusalem to Hebron. The Shaw Commission in 1930 would find that the Revisionist Zionist demonstrations on August 15, 1929, had set in motion the escalating politics of symbolic sacrilege. On that day, the Beta youth assembled at the wall, shouting, "The wall is ours," raised the national flag, and sang "Ha-Toqvah." The unsubstantiated rumor that they had attacked Muslim residents of the immediate area and had cursed the name of the Prophet Muhammad only fanned the flames. The following day, some 2,000 Muslims marched to the Western Wall and destroyed a Torah scroll and prayer books. While some argued that Hajj Amin attempted to manage the demonstration, the atmosphere was now so charged that there was no way to avert the explosion of violence which was unleashed a week later.⁴²

The British ultimately took the issue of the Western Wall to the League of Nations, where they proposed that the League establish a commission to "study, define, and determine the rights and claims of the Jews, and Muslims. . . the Mufti protested and argued that decisions concerning the holy places of Muslims could only be established by Shari'a law and by no other authority. The British further attempted to move both Jews and Muslims toward some compromise, but the Mufti steadfastly refused to meet with the Jews, saying that "if he were to meet with the Jews, this would give them rights to the Wailing Wall."⁴³ The British quickly came to see the Mufti as the chief obstacle to any resolution between the contending parties at the Western Wall. For many Palestinian scholars who have attempted to exonerate Hajj Amin al-Husayni from any responsibility for the 1929 revolt, this was a turning point in the British attitude toward the Mufti. The British now recognized him as a distinct danger to the peaceful continuation of the Mandate. They determined to reduce his prestige and influence by stripping him of any control over the revenue of *waqf* property, declaring that all *waqf* land should be returned to the control of the Mandatory government as it had been under the Ottomans. Further, they expelled the Mufti from heading the Shari'a courts and the administration of *waqf* funds. For these scholars, the British also were instrumental in artificially intensifying the dispute between the Husaynis and the Nashishibinis.

The conflict over the Western Wall-Temple Mount and *al-haram al-sharif* continued to simmer throughout the 1930s and early 1940s. During the Palestinian revolt of 1936 through 1939, the *haram* was used to mobilize against both the British and the Zionists. In 1948 the most important Palestinian commander, Abdul Kader al-Husayni, who was also the Mufti's nephew, fell in battle and was buried on the *haram*. After the 1948 war which resulted in the division of Jerusalem and the annexation of the West Bank and the city by the Jordanians,

which had discriminated against the Jews and had been a major issue in the conflict between Jewish and Palestinian nationalists.

The Knesset's Law for the Protection of the Holy Places gave each of the non-Jewish religious communities of the newly united city exclusive control over its holy places. This created both administrative and theological problems for each religious tradition which was now subordinated to Israeli sovereignty.⁴⁸ The world's Christianities had long historical traditions which understood the dispersal of the Jews and the absence of Jewish sovereignty over Jerusalem as proof-texts that the Jews had been rejected by God or that their election had passed to the Christians as a result of their rejection of Jesus. Likewise, for the Muslim community of Jerusalem and the Middle East, Jewish sovereignty over the *haram al-sharif* also posed a theological problem. How could one of the subordinated minorities of traditional Muslim society now exercise political power and control over the Muslims?

For Christians, Jewish sovereignty in Jerusalem created a new problem; for the Muslims, it intensified an old one. Before 1967, the theological problem posed by Jewish sovereignty over Jerusalem for the Christians could be kept away. With the city's division after the 1948 war, Jewish western Jerusalem did not exercise political power over the four major Latin and Orthodox Christian holy places of the city, the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, the Tomb of the Virgin, the Church of the Ascension, and Bethlehem's Church of the Nativity, or even the Protestant alternative sacred space in the Garden Tomb. After 1967, the Christian holy places were subordinated to Jewish rule. For the Muslims, unlike the Christians, the creation of a modern Jewish state in the midst of the historic *umma* had already created a major theological issue which had been problematic before the unification of the city.⁴⁹ The capture of Jerusalem only intensified it.

But the unification of Jerusalem was equally problematic for the Jews. For one thing, sovereignty over all Jerusalem reinforced a profound shift in Jewish religious understanding of the movement of human history and their own role in bringing that history to its messianic end. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Jews had begun to shed their "passive messianism" which had been dominant ever since the disasters of the Jewish revolts of the first and second centuries. God's hand could be read in history. Redemption would not arrive by divine fiat; Jews, it was argued, would have to take an active role.

Elijah ben Solomon Zalman, the Gaon of Vilna (1720-97), at the end of the eighteenth century argued in his *Kol Ha-Tor* that it was possible during certain "favorable periods" to "awaken the above" by "awakening from below." The Gaon calculated that the next such "favorable period" would be the end of his century in the Hebrew calendar, 5600 or 1840. His messianic activism set in motion a groundswell of immigration to Palestine in the first decades of the nineteenth century which transformed the Jewish community there.⁵⁰

In the mid-nineteenth century, Zevi Hirsch Kalischer, routinely described in the history of Zionism as a "proto-Zionist," had read the regime of Muhammad

Ali in Palestine, the move toward civic equality for Jews in Europe, and Christian interests in the Jewish return to the land of Israel (within their own messianic formulations) as indicators that redemption was near at hand. Kalischer believed that Jews should renew sacrificial offerings which would trigger God's compassion. God would then initiate the miraculous features of the Messianic Age. One recent commentator on Kalischer has written that he held sacrifice to be decisive in the mechanics of redemption because he "took to heart the rabbinic teachings that sacrificial offerings mediated between the divine and human realms and had the power to awaken God's compassion for humanity and bring the Redemption. Kalischer . . . felt that the absence of sacrificial worship left a profound gap in Jewish life, and he argued that only the sacrifices were powerful enough to convince God to bring the Redemption."⁵¹

When Israel captured the Temple Mount, these active messianic ideas suddenly became acutely relevant. Menachem Friedman, who has studied the anti-Zionist and non-Zionist Orthodox Jewish communities which constitute today the "Old Yishuv" of Jerusalem, has noted that

the boundaries delineated after the 1948 war severed the State of Israel not only from the Western Wall but also from the historic land of Israel, the Land of the Patriarchs, cherished as a living thing by generations upon generations of Bible-reading Jews. The State was bereft from many and perhaps most of the paths, lands and tombs of Jewish *Eretz Israel*. Jews had always expressed affinity for their homeland through direct contact with these sites. This situation—and especially severance from the site of the Temple—effectively "neutralized" the State of Israel from the more deeply religious and substantive dimension of the concept of "Redemption." It freed the various factions of the religious public from the need to cope with the religious, practical and concrete ramifications of Jewish sovereignty over the entire Land of Israel and especially the Temple Mount.⁵²

As long as the sacred center of Judaism lay beyond Jewish sovereignty, anti-Zionist and non-Zionist Orthodox Jews could argue that indeed God had pre-vented the "evil Zionist" state from achieving control over the sources of symbolic power to legitimate itself. Israel was just a state like other states and did not necessarily contradict the messianic Jewish state that was still to come.

The Six-Day War undercut the passive messianism which had dominated Jewish messianic speculation. With the extension of Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem and the Temple Mount, the anti-Zionist and non-Zionist Orthodox would have to find new strategies to delegitimize the Jewish state. Some of the most radical anti-Zionist Orthodox Jews sought to deny the event itself. For example, Moshe Hirsch, the self-styled Foreign Minister of the Nature-Karta, a small but aggressively anti-Zionist group, refuses to admit Jewish sovereignty. Only infrequently will he visit the Western Wall and when he does, he writes regularly to King Hussein for permission to travel to East Jerusalem. He regularly describes the Western Wall as the Golden Calf of Zionism which is leading an entire generation to false religion.

they claimed that sovereignty, to have access to the site which undergirds the very nature of that sovereignty. Within days of the cessation of fighting, this contradiction became clear in the debates within the rabbinate over the status of the Temple Mount. Does religious law or *Halakha* permit a Jew to enter the Temple Mount, regardless of its status within Israeli civil law? When the Israeli army's rabbinical staff loaded their staff car to follow the paratroopers to the Western Wall, they packed a Torah scroll, a *shofar*, and a bench to demonstrate that they would not abide by the Status Quo. When they arrived at the very narrow *al-buraq* alleyway, their first acts were to place the bench, hold up the Torah scroll, and blow the *shofar*. Rabbi Shlomo Goren, then Chief Rabbi of the Israeli army, was led by the rabbinical staff first across the *haram al-sharif* and then down to the Western Wall via the Mughrabian Gate. General Uzi Narkiss, who commanded the Israeli troops in the battle for Jerusalem, recalled meeting Rabbi Goren leading a column of paratroopers at the Lions' Gate with "a *sefer torah* under his arm, a *shofar* in his left hand, his beard bristling like the point of a spear . . ." Narkiss invited him to join him in his jeep, as they were going to the same place. They drove through the Gate of Tribes to the Temple Mount, where Goren got out of the jeep, prostrated himself in the direction of the Holy of Holies, and recited the ancient prayer of battle from Deuteronomy 20:3-4. At the Western Wall, Goren immediately donned his *tallit* and began to blow the *shofar*, roaring "Blessed be the Lord God, Comforter of Zion and Builder of Jerusalem, Amen!" The rabbi then recited the *Kaddish* and the *El Maleh Rachamin* for all those killed in the fighting to reach this most sacred of places. "*Leshanah hazot, be-sha'ah hazot, beyerushalayim*," Goren repeated over and over again, "This year, at this hour, in Jerusalem." So the rabbi's actions were not just the acknowledgment of the providence of God in delivering the city, the Temple Mount, and the Western Wall to the Jews nor devout ritual actions in the return to the most sacred of places. They were also political acts announcing that for him the Status Quo was no longer the ruling paradigm for the governance of sacred space in Jerusalem.

Six years later, Goren was made the Chief Ashkenazic Rabbi of Israel. Within weeks he ruled that religious Jews were permitted by *Halakha* to go up to the Temple Mount if the exact precincts of the Temple could be determined. Indeed, shortly after the war, Goren had set up a small office on the *haram* where he carried out research on the Temple Mount. In early August of 1967, Goren presented his findings to a group of army rabbis. At the end of the meeting Goren and the other rabbis made an extensive tour of the *haram* dressed in their military uniforms. Shortly afterward, Goren announced his intentions to pray on the Temple Mount later in the month of Tisha be'Av, the solemn fast day commemorating the Roman destruction of the Temple. On Tisha be'Av, which fell on August 15, Goren, other army rabbis, and a group of students entered the Temple Mount carrying a Torah scroll and a *shofar*. After their prayer service, Goren blew the *shofar*. Goren contended that some parts of the *haram* were not part of the Temple Mount and therefore the ban against any Jew setting

Jewish sovereignty over the sacred sites of Jerusalem has transformed Israel's political culture. The Western Wall now penetrated to the very core of the Israeli state's civil religion. Israel's elite military units are initiated in complex ritual ceremonies in the plaza in front of the wall and the state's new memorial festivals—Holocaust Memorial Day, the Memorial Day for Israel's soldiers who have fallen in war, Independence Day, and Jerusalem Day—all have important ritual ceremonies at the Western Wall. The Western Wall, argue Charles S. Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, "is the central shrine in the Israeli civil religion."⁵³ Some Israelis find this deeply upsetting. Yeshayahu Leibowitz, for example, argues that the Western Wall has been transformed into an idol. Leibowitz has consistently been critical of Israeli "civil religion" which imparts absolute meanings to the state. Only God is holy and only his commandments are absolute imperatives.⁵⁴

Second, the extension of Israeli sovereignty to the eastern side of the city and conquest of the West Bank and Gaza triggered a move to redefine Zionism and a *Kulturkampf* over the basis of state legitimacy. It is beyond the scope of this discussion to explore this redefinition in great detail. However, a word or two are necessary. Palestine's first Ashkenazic Chief Rabbi, Avraham Yitzhak ha-Kohen Kuk (1865-1935), accomplished a major reinterpretation of the relationship of Zionism and Judaism, allowing for the possibility that secular Zionism established the foundations for the redemption of the Jews. His thought allowed religious Jews to participate in Zionist nation-building through the Mizrahi Movement and to make alliances with secular Zionist parties.⁵⁵ His son Rabbi Zvi Yehudah ha-Kohen Kuk exercised considerable influence over an entire generation of religious Zionists who were educated in his yeshivah, Yeshivat Mirkaz Ha-Rav in Jerusalem. The son translated his father's intellectual world into political action.⁵⁶ While the father spoke of the idealized state of Israel, the son spoke of the "real Israel" which was fully embodied in the state. In a collection of sermons and lectures published in 1969 he wrote that the "real Israel is the Israel which is redeemed; the kingdom of Israel and the army of Israel, a whole nation and not an exilic Diaspora."⁵⁷ The state's power had become sacred, its growth and territorial reach, an index of the Jews' relationship to God. It was the son's wielding of his father's ideas that lay behind the emergence of the Gush Emunim and the movement to settle the newly conquered biblical territories of Judea and Samaria shortly after the Six-Day War.⁵⁸ The members of the Gush Emunim believe that all of the events in the political history of Israel are divinely guided, that the growing power and territorial extent of state authority is nothing short of the realization of God's original promises to Abraham and his descendants. They view the Six-Day War as the stirrings of the messianic era and their settlement of the conquered lands of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza as the graduated movement toward the endtime.⁵⁹

The Six-Day War and the Knesset's "Law for the Protection of the Holy Places" exposed the central contradiction of Zionism. The state had chosen to extend full sovereignty over the *haram* without allowing Jews, in whose name

foot on the Temple Mount until the Temple was rebuilt did not apply. Goren had carefully measured areas of the *haram* using the descriptions of the Temple from the Mishnah, the first-century Jewish historian Josephus, and Sa'adia Gaon and Maimonides' descriptions of the Temple from the middle ages against the archaeological evidence from the *haram* itself. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan ordered him to desist from further efforts to pray on the Temple Mount.

In 1977, Goren's colleague, the Sephardic Chief Rabbi, Ovadia Yosef, ruled that it was improper to go there unless those precincts were indeed established, and no one is authorized by religious law to delineate those areas. Ovadia Yosef's decision was prompted by a radio interview in which Goren told reporters that he was completing a book mapping out precisely those areas on the Temple Mount which are "not holy" and on which Jews may walk. One persistent rumor in Jerusalem is that Menachem Begin prevailed upon the Chief Rabbi not to publish his book for fear that this would trigger renewed Jewish attempts to violate the Law for the Protection of the Holy Places or even repeal it. Chief Rabbi Yosef's opinion has held, and therefore today a sign warning religious Jews is posted at the entrance to the Mughrabian Gate of the *haram*: "NOTICE AND WARNING—ENTRANCE TO THE AREA OF THE TEMPLE MOUNT IS FORBIDDEN TO EVERYONE BY JEWISH LAW OWING TO THE SACREDNESS OF THE PLACE—the Chief Rabbinate of Israel."⁶¹

Nevertheless, Goren's efforts to pray on the Temple Mount, and the state's decision to clear away many houses in the Mughrabian Quarter of the Abu Madyan *waff* in order to create a larger plaza in front of the Western Wall, triggered renewed fears among Jerusalem's Muslims that the Israelis were intent upon taking the entire *haram*. Almost immediately after Goren's prayer service on Tish be'Av, the Muslim religious authorities published a *fatwa* or religious pronouncement which stated that the question of the Western Wall had been fixed after the 1929 riots. The Western Wall was Muslim religious property, although Jews have the right to visit it. This they believed "ended the Jewish-Arab debate on the subject of this Holy Place . . . This debate should not be re-opened as it has been resolved through judicial means."⁶²

Just as the Revisionists used the wall as a stage to confront the Arabs before the state was founded, so radical Israeli nationalists who want to intensify Jewish sovereignty in Jerusalem and extend it to Judea and Samaria have engaged in efforts both to assert Jewish ritual rights on the *haram* and to profane Islamic sites there. Since 1967, there have been two dozen separate violent assaults on the *haram*. While some of these assaults have been undertaken by individuals, like the Christian fundamentalist Dennis Rohan, who set fire to al-Aqsa mosque in 1969 and who saw the destruction of al-Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock as a singular event which would catapult the world into the messianic age, most have been acted out of the active messianic Jewish tradition. The most dangerous of these assaults was that planned by members of "the Jewish Underground" which was uncovered in 1984. In the wake of the murder in 1980 of six settlers in Hebron by Palestinians, a small number of Gush Emunim settlers organized an

underground cell which targeted for physical attack members of the Palestinian National Guidance Committee which had been formed in 1978. The settlers perceived that security in the West Bank and Gaza was slowly deteriorating. The brutal murder of another Hebron yeshiva student in 1983 confirmed their suspicions. They opened fire on students at the Islamic College and planned to attack Bir Zeit University. Their plan to detonate bombs concealed on five Palestinian buses was uncovered shortly before hundreds of Palestinians riding those buses would have been killed and injured. The members of the cell were arrested, tried, and found guilty.

Beyond their violent attacks on Palestinian political elites and educational institutions, they had also attempted to blow up the Dome of the Rock. Their plan, initiated after the Hebron attack in 1980, was not simply revenge. The plotters believed that the destruction of the Dome of the Rock would initiate a national redemption movement within Israel. Human action to purify the Temple Mount of the Muslim "abominations" would lead them and the nation toward Israel's transcendent goal. They were not worried about the consequences of their attack. After all, when Rohan had set fire to al-Aqsa mosque, the Arab states did comparatively little.

The plotters broke into a munitions depot and stole an Israeli device used to clear minefields. This provided them with the high explosives they would need for their carefully planned attack. They spent hours on reconnaissance missions, observing the Temple Mount through telescopes and binoculars from several locations. Every movement was logged and studied. One group observed the Temple Mount from a location between Mount Scopus and the Mount of Olives, while another group watched from the roof of Yeshivat Ha-Kotel in the Jewish Quarter of the Old City. A third group watched the Temple Mount from the belfry of the Church of the Redeemer in the Christian quarter. Some members disguised themselves as tourists and entered the Temple Mount itself. To do this, they found rabbinic rulings which permitted a Jew to enter the Temple Mount in order to maintain it or to cleanse it of impurity. Before their visits, they would immerse themselves twice in a *mikveh* or ritual bath. They also planned to deliver a tape recording explaining their reasons for destroying the Dome of the Rock just minutes before the timers were set to explode, and planned to have a photographer stationed on the Mount of Olives to commemorate the historic event.

The evacuation of Yamit, a Jewish settlement to be dismantled as part of the peace treaty with Egypt, in the winter and early spring of 1982 accelerated the momentum to carry out the plot. The destruction of the Dome of the Rock would put an end to the Camp David Accords and Egypt, under Arab pressure, would quickly back out of its new treaty relationship with Israel. However, the illness of one of the plot's three leaders and the diversion of their attention to Yamit, forced them to postpone the mission. Shortly after the withdrawal from Yamit, another Jew, Alan Goodman, who was totally unrelated to the plotters, attacked the Dome of the Rock. Security was intensified around the Temple Mount, and a new series of lights on the eastern wall meant that the plotters could not scale the

wall without being seen. It was decided to shelve the plan until some indefinite time in the future. The explosive charges were sealed in watertight packages and hidden in a bomb shelter, whose door they sealed with cement. When the members of the cell were arrested over a year later, the news that they had carried out the attack on the mayors and upon the students at the Islamic College as well as planned to destroy the buses, shook the settlement movement to its very core. Moments before the beginning of Shabbat, immediately after the initial arrests, a Jerusalem lawyer who had met one of the cell's members in jail telephoned Ophra and spoke to Yisrael Harel, the secretary general of the Settlement Movement. He told him that there was something else that they had planned to do—destroy the Dome of the Rock. Harel was visibly shaken. "God help us," he said. "If the plan had gone through, Israel's sovereignty would have been a dead letter. The Americans and the Russians would have sent U.N. forces here to impose order." Harel told this to Haggai Segal, who only hours later would also be arrested for his participation in the underground.⁶³

"THE TIME OF YOUR REDEMPTION HAS ARRIVED"

Rabbi Goren's decision to hold a Tisha be'Av prayer service on the Temple Mount in August of 1967 was just the beginning of what now is over twenty years of struggle to reverse the decision of the Knesset to grant the Muslims exclusive control there. On the twentieth anniversary of the Six-Day War, Rabbi Goren recalled how he had made his way to the Western Wall ahead of the generals who had engineered the stunning victory. When he arrived there he declared: "We have taken the City of God. We are entering the Messianic era for the Jewish people." Immediately after completing his prayers at the Western Wall, Goren rushed to the Mount of Olives to visit the grave of his mother. Like every other Israeli, he had been prohibited from visiting that cemetery since the armistice ending the 1948 war.⁶⁴ For many Jews, the experience of exile or *galut* was not ended by the formation of the Jewish state in 1948. Secular Israelis might believe that for some Jews their status in the world was forever changed by the creation of the state. The *haredim*, often called the "ultra-Orthodox" anti-Zionist Jews, continue to view the state as the exact opposite of any messianic kingdom. For them, living in the state is a continuation of the exile. The Gush Emunim understood the war to be still another step in the messianic drama, calling Jews to settle in the very heartland of the ancient Jewish nation.

For Rabbi Goren the unification of the Jerusalem in the Six-Day War was the end of "the trauma of the 2,000 year exile." This trauma had not ended with the creation of the state, but only with the unification of Jerusalem. Quoting the Midrash, Goren would say, "the time of your redemption has arrived." Goren understands that Jewish history is divided into four epochs—each lasting between 400 and 1,000 years—held together by *Halakha* and prophecy. The first period, which he calls the Period of Judges, runs from the first judge of ancient Israel, Joshua the son of Nun, to the last judge, Samuel. The common features of this

period were that "there was no national government or national army to defend the people against their enemies, nor a temple for their entire nation. Everything operated on a local family or tribal basis." He calls the second the Period of the Kings, which spans the kingdom of David and Solomon, through the kings of Israel and Judea, or the First Commonwealth, the Babylonian Exile, and ends with the destruction of the Temple by the Romans, bringing to a close the Second Commonwealth. He believes that this period was characterized by Israel's national independence in its land, interrupted briefly by the Babylonian Exile, which lasted forty-nine years.

For Rabbi Goren the third period, which he calls the Period of the Long Exile, extends from the destruction of the Temple to the Six-Day War. Drawing from rabbinic sources, Goren believes that this exilic period was unlike the earlier Babylonian Exile. The reasons for the Babylonian Exile and its duration were revealed in the Torah and in the Prophets. However, the reasons for and the end of the Long Exile, as he calls it, were not disclosed to Israel. Many early rabbis believed that this exile would be brief, and their religious laws were predicated upon their hope that the Temple would speedily be rebuilt. For Goren, there were even false starts which seemed to confirm the rabbis' feelings that the exile would be short-lived like the first. The Emperor Hadrian, according to rabbinic texts, ordered the Temple rebuilt until the Samaritans informed him that if it were completed, then Jerusalem would once again become rebellious.⁶⁵ Two hundred years later, the Emperor Julian, who Goren believes was kindly disposed toward the Jews, granted them permission to rebuild the Temple. Unfortunately for the Jews and Julian, the emperor was killed shortly thereafter in his war with the Persians, and his successor, who was not so positively inclined, ordered the building project ended.

However, the most important factor in this period of the Long Exile was the rabbinic debate over whether or not the rebuilding of the Temple depended upon the Messiah. Goren found one text from the Talmud of the land of Israel which stated that the Temple would be rebuilt before the reestablishment of the Kingdom of the House of David or before the advent of the Messiah. This opinion was contradicted by Maimonides, who argued that the Kingdom of the House of David would be established first and then, and only then, would the Temple be rebuilt. Other medieval interpreters suggested that the third Temple would be brought down ready-made from heaven without any human construction. Even though there are two interpretations of when the Temple would be rebuilt, he believes that there is nothing to prevent the Jews from adopting the first position and indeed, that from the time of the great rabbinic sages in the second through the sixth century, "there have been numerous attempts to renew the sacrificial service on the Temple Mount."

Goren calls the fourth period the Third Commonwealth. The Six-Day War, with its liberation of Jerusalem, "raised the hopes, visions and aspirations that our salvation was drawing near and our righteousness was about to be revealed." For many this was the dawn of the Third Commonwealth. Jews cannot, however,

immediately begin to reconstruct the Temple. For one thing, the Dome of the Rock occupies much of the site of the ancient Temple, although Goren's sustained study of the Temple Mount since 1967 has proven to him that the holy of holies, the central part of the Temple, was outside the Muslim structure. He calls areas of the Temple Mount outside the hallowed ground of the Temple *iosetef hordus*, "Herodian additions," referring to the expansion of the Temple's esplanade executed by Herod the Great. Goren has also read articles of Asher Kaufman, a distinguished physicist of Hebrew University, who believes that the real Temple of Solomon was not located on the site now covered by the Dome of the Rock, but approximately 100 meters to the north. Professor Kaufman has studied the Temple Mount for almost twenty years and has collected what many believe is overwhelming evidence to support his conclusion.⁶⁶

Equally important, Goren argues that "we lack the prophetic and halakic information that is vital for the rebuilding of the Temple. Hence, we must have faith and await the coming of the Great Herald of Redemption, Elijah the Prophet, who will teach us the Temple boundaries, plans, forms, designs, laws, the exact spot of the altar, and the pedigree of the priests of Aharonic descent who are permitted to carry out the sacrificial service in the Temple." Goren's argument is, then, that while rebuilding the Temple cannot be accomplished at the present time, there is nothing forbidding Jews from entering the Temple Mount, as long as they steer clear of those areas which made up the site of the Temple and have immersed themselves in a proper ritual bath before entering the Temple Mount.

Yet the Six-Day War produced a bitter truth—Jews were denied access to the Temple Mount by their own government. Goren recalls that

I personally received a message from the Minister of Defence, the late Moshe Dayan, stating that it had been decided to turn over the administration of the Temple Mount and all of its installations to the Moslem Wakf. This was followed by a decision of the ministerial committee on the holy places not to allow Jews to pray on the Temple Mount. . . . The committee's decision, dated August 13, 1967, was personally addressed to me. Paragraph 1 stated: "The committee charges its chairman with meeting with General Rabbi Goren, and with informing him that he must desist from organizing prayers, measurements and the like on the Temple Mount." Paragraph 3 states that "when Jews who wish to pray appear at the entrance of the Temple Mount, they will be diverted by the security forces to the Western Wall."

These decisions crushed all the hopes that had been ascribed to the Six-Day War. These decisions, which Goren believes were approved by all the components of the Israeli government, including Menachem Begin's Herut, effectively turned over the holy of holies to the Muslims and denied Jews the right to set foot on the Temple Mount. In his memorandum in response to the committee's decision he wrote: "My request is that the gates of the Temple should be opened wide for prayer by Jews and all people and that racial segregation that forbids Jews to come and pray on the Temple Mount as the spirit moves them be abolished.

In the empty area, under the open sky, without requiring the favours of the Wakf administrators or functionaries, we can preserve the fruit of our victory for the foreseeable future." Still the answer was no. Rabbi Goren continued to press every Israeli government since the war to reverse the decision, but without results.

Even more difficult for Goren to understand was Menachem Begin's response to the Temple Mount issue after he became Prime Minister in 1977. "In fact," he said, under the leadership of Begin "the plight of Jews who wished to pray on the Temple Mount actually worsened, and the sovereignty of the Wakf over the area became a factor." Goren feared that the Camp David Accords would create a situation in which the Temple Mount might fall prey to political bartering over Judea and Samaria. Begin tried to still his fears, writing to him that "one cannot imagine that we would agree to have a foreign flag wave over the Temple Mount." On the twenty-second anniversary of the unification of Jerusalem in 1989, Goren would tell his nation that

our position on the Temple Mount has worsened tenfold; even the small remnant of Jewish sovereignty over the Temple Mount has almost completely slipped from our hands. If, on this 22nd celebration of Jerusalem Day, we should attempt to define the historical and Halakic status of the State of Israel, and the nature of our period in history, it is doubtful that we could give a clear-cut positive response. Is our period the continuation of the Great Exile or is it the "Beginning of the Flowering of Our Final Redemption" and the opening of the Fourth Historical Period—The Third Temple Period?⁶⁷

Rabbi Goren's most recent activity has been more subtle. In 1987 Goren attempted to place a Holocaust memorial on the roof of the Idra Yeshivah overlooking the plaza in front of the Western Wall. The memorial was designed by the Israeli artist Ya'akov Agam and had six Jewish stars situated in flames burning in fountains. Goren told a reporter that while the memorial directly recalls the Holocaust, it also symbolizes the libations and sacrificial offerings of the Temple.⁶⁸ The municipality fought Goren through the courts, arguing that Goren had not received the necessary permits and the memorial was in violation of the overall plan for the Jewish Quarter of the Old City.⁶⁹ But Goren's plan was not only to symbolize the sacrificial cult of the Temple, but also to make a small inroad in the Status Quo. In late 1988, Goren was able to erect the memorial.

THE VERY BEST BATTLEGROUND

While Israeli courts had granted the abstract right of Jews to pray on the Temple Mount, the Law for the Protection of the Holy Places had turned over complete control of the Temple Mount to the Muslim Council, and they denied access for prayer to the Jews. The Temple Mount did not even appear in the official list of Jewish holy places published by the Ministry of Religion.

are only the custodians); the ancient remains belong to all mankind, and not just to this generation, but to generations past and yet unborn.⁷¹ Cohen also argued that the Temple Mount was being used for political purposes and she pointed to a memorial for the victims of the Sabra and Shatilla massacre of 1982 which was erected on one of the outdoor prayer platforms.⁷²

The *wagf*'s chief architect, Issam Awad, denied that there had ever been deliberate destruction of archaeological remains, telling us flatly, "We respect history." Awad has lived his entire life in Jerusalem. He studied architecture in Jerusalem and then studied preservation of art for an additional year in England. He began working on the restoration of al-Aqsa almost immediately after the fire set by Dennis Rohan had been extinguished. For him it is a lifelong project. We asked him about the charge made by Geula Cohen that the *wagf* has built additions to the existing structures of the *haram al-sharif*. "We are only preserving what is here, that's all," he answered. "But for the open spaces here what we are doing here is paving some areas and planting gardens. But these are not additional things. We don't do anything here which adds to anything. . . . I studied to be an architect and conservator. Conservation means to keep and not to add. We don't even correct mistakes made by others. I'm not really an architect here, because architects create things. I don't create anything. I am only preserving what is already here."

Issam knew all about the Jewish nationalists' efforts to reverse the Law for the Protection of Holy Places, and we asked him whether he thought that it is possible for Jews and Muslims to use the *haram* for prayer. "No, no," he answered and continued, "I don't think it is possible. But I hear that in the Jewish faith they say that no one should set foot here and there are signs that say that, because no one knows where the Temple once stood. And the only way when someone is going to rebuild the Temple is with the Messiah. When the Messiah comes, then I will share. Let the Messiah decide. That seems to be the best solution."⁷³

Knesset discussion of Cohen's charges was tabled because of the attempted break-in by Rabbi Ariel's students in March 1983. It wasn't until late 1985 that the matter reached the Interior Committee. They voted to look over the Temple Mount themselves. In early January 1986, the ten committee members, headed by their chairman, Dov Shilansky from Herut, visited the Temple Mount, but they had not even gotten through the Mughrabian Gate before a huge crowd of Muslims formed, blocking their entrance. The *wagf* guards refused to let them enter, they said, because the cameras of the television reporters were strictly forbidden on the Temple Mount. The loudspeakers on the Temple Mount began blasting, "Jews have approached al-Aqsa and the mosque is in danger!" A shoving match broke out. Geula Cohen was shoved backwards by a *wagf* guard.

She bellowed at him, "You are not the boss here. In your mosque you can tell us no cameras. But not here!"

Shilansky shouted back, "We shall return! Our flag will yet fly over the Temple Mount, and we shall go there freely and the Temple shall be rebuilt."⁷⁴ Later he told reporters that the incident was terribly humiliating.

Religious Zionists, many of them in the active messianist tradition, continue to find this situation intolerable. For example, Yisrael Medad, a Knesset aide to Geula Cohen in the Tehiya party, who had pushed for Jewish prayer on the Temple Mount, told us: "There was a certain civil rights element to it . . . There's a law on the books that says anybody who interferes with your rights, with your feelings, not only your access, but your feelings for your holy places will be sentenced to between five to seven years of imprisonment. Here, the only group in Israel which cannot get the full measure of protection from this is *davkah* [of all things], Jews."⁷⁵

The assertion of Jewish ritual rights on the Temple Mount became a way for militant Zionists who were willing to gain territory wherever it might be. "If I can prove," Medad told us, "that the Arabs are not willing to do the minimal . . . to make a minimal concession, then why should we do the maximum on the other side? Instead of giving back Sinai and then saying what are we going to do, let's see first if we can solve the problem of Jerusalem. Are the Arabs going to let us live in Jerusalem? Are they going to share the Temple Mount? Are they going to share in the Old City? . . . It would be a proof of what we call the salami process. First they get the Sinai, then they get this and then that, and eventually the march is on to Jerusalem."

Medad believes that the *wagf* administrators on the Temple Mount have paid close attention to Zionists who wish to press their claims to the Temple Mount. Like Rabbi Goren, Medad doesn't want to pray in al-Aqsa or in any other building on the Temple Mount. "There is enough room outside which is in the open air along the west and the south which is outside the confines of the Temple," he told us. "But the Muslim *wagf* began building prayer platforms so as to restrict the open space as much as possible." In spring 1982, Knesset member Geula Cohen announced to the Israeli lawmakers that the *wagf* was carrying out illegal constructions on the Temple Mount with the intention of making use of every foot of open space. Medad told us that "now you cannot walk on the entire southern portion of the Temple Mount. They claim that there is a prayer niche here, a *miqrah*, you know, a prayer direction, and this whole area from 1,300 years ago was made a holy site. So you can't even walk up there even if you don't have a *kippah* on your head and you're wearing a cross. I have seen Dominican monks go up there and be chased away!" Geula Cohen's strategy was to raise the issue as a civil matter. If they were building prayer platforms on the Temple Mount, this would be a clear violation of the Status Quo. She also argued that the *wagf* had intentionally destroyed archaeological evidence on the Temple Mount which might be used to confirm the exact location of the ancient Temple. Photographic evidence of the destruction of archaeological remains was published along with an editorial by Hershel Shanks, the editor of *Biblical Archaeology Review*, which concluded that "Israel has not only the right but the obligation to assure that this [i.e., that no ancient remains, either exposed or unexposed, are destroyed] is the case. The archaeological remains on the Temple Mount belong neither to Israel nor to the Moslem authorities (both

officers warned that it was now only a matter of time before very serious damage was done to the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa, and a plan to defend the Temple Mount from Jewish extremists must be implemented immediately.⁸²

"THIS IS OUR MOSQUE. IT IS NOT A SYNAGOGUE!"

The Muslims of Jerusalem are just as immovable. Sheik Sa'ad al-Din al'Alami is the Mufti of Jerusalem, the highest Muslim religious authority in Jerusalem and in what he understands as occupied Palestine. In addition to this post, he is also the head of the Supreme Muslim Council and the Council for the *waqf* and Islamic holy places. The Shari'a or religious law of Islam dictates that when Muslim lands are occupied by non-Muslims, the Muslims must elect representatives from amongst themselves to administer their affairs. Shortly after the Six-Day War, a number of Jerusalem's most prominent Muslims formed the Supreme Muslim Council in conformity with the dictates of religious law. This was the very same institution created in 1922 during the early years of the British Mandate.⁸³ The Jordanians had disbanded it in the early 1950s. The Israelis allowed the council to reconstitute itself after the 1967 war. The Muslims refer to it as the Supreme Muslim Council, but the Israelis refer to it only as the Muslim Council, linguistically hoping to separate it from the council which had exercised so much power under Hajj Amin al-Husayni throughout the Mandate. Sheik Alami was born in Jerusalem in 1911 under Ottoman rule. He has survived British occupation and Jordanian occupation. He intends to survive Israeli occupation too. He is proud of his long family lineage in the city. The first al-Alamis came to Jerusalem with Salah al-Din, and his family has always provided religious leadership for Jerusalem's Muslim community.

Israelis like Rabbi Goren want to worship out of doors, outside al-Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock in those places which are empty of Muslim buildings and structures. For them the Muslim claim to the holiness of the *haram al-sharif* is limited to the space within al-Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock. But the Mufti sees things very differently. "The whole area is a mosque," he told us. "Not the buildings only, but all the land, all 144 *dunams*, all of it is our mosque and all of it we believe is a very holy place for all Muslims in the world. We believe that our Prophet Muhammad came and prayed here. These buildings that you see, the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa mosque, were not here then. There were no buildings here at that time. But he prayed in the area and we believe that that was all this area. All of this area is a mosque." Sheik Alami recounted to us the Muslim conquest of Palestine and how the second Caliph, Umar ibn al-Kutab, came to the Temple Mount. There wasn't any holy place here to any religion in the world. There wasn't a synagogue. There wasn't a church or anything. There wasn't a holy building to anybody. He built a small mosque here. Sixty years later, the Umayyad caliph, Abd al-Malik, built the Dome of the Rock and, according to Sheik Alami, enlarged the original mosque of al-Aqsa. The Mufti again reminded us that when he built these, there was only the small mosque

A few days later, a larger delegation of Knesset members tried to enter the Temple Mount. A full-scale riot exploded when Knesset member Rabbi Eliezer Waldman and another Teliya party member took out prayer books and began the recitation of the Kaddish. This time, al-Aqsa's loudspeakers blared, "The Jews desecrate this place" and "We are the Sword of Muhammad!" Over six hundred border police were required to end the rioting, and tear gas had to be used to disperse the mob.⁷⁵ Meanwhile, outside the Temple Mount, four Knesset members from the Citizens' Rights Movement staged their own counterdemonstration against the visit to the Temple Mount. Yossi Sarid and Shulamit Aloni spoke for the group and called Rabbi Waldman's actions "a provocative and senseless move." Shimon Peres, who was Prime Minister in the Unity Government at the time, told reporters that Geula Cohen's initiative was unwarranted, for "Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem needs no further proof or test." Yitzhak Shamir, the Foreign Minister, concurred that there was no need for demonstrations to prove Israel's sovereignty in Jerusalem and especially on the Temple Mount.⁷⁶

Since the mid-1980s the issue of the Temple Mount has also become a central issue for the Gush Emunim, the religious nationalist movement which has spearheaded the settlement of Judea and Samaria. In the early years of the decade, the movement's journal, *Nekudah*, hardly ever printed articles on the Temple Mount, but between 1982 and 1986 dozens of articles advocating the takeover of the Temple Mount appeared.⁷⁷ On Jerusalem Day in June of 1986, over 12,000 Temple Mount activists, many drawn from the ranks of the Gush Emunim, marched from Merkaz Ha-Rav to the Mount of Olives to view a sound-and-sight presentation entitled "The Temple Mount Is the Heart of the People." A large detachment of soldiers and police was required to keep approximately 100 of these activists from forcing their way onto the Temple Mount.⁷⁸ The September 1986 *Nekudah* editorial read: "What is proper regarding the whole Land of Israel must also be proper regarding the Temple Mount . . . if for returning to the whole Land of Israel, and for the establishment of the state, we have pushed to the end, by the same token we must now build the Temple."⁷⁹ The following year, for the festival of Sukkot, the Gush Emunim and the Faithful of the Temple Mount together attempted to pray at the Mughrabian Gate. This caused a major riot in which an estimated 2,000 Muslims fought a pitched battle with police and border troops for over three hours. Tear gas and live ammunition were used to bring the rioters under control, and more than fifty Palestinians were injured. Gershon Salomon, the founder of the Faithful of the Temple, told the press, "No power can stop us. We have the will of God."⁸⁰ In July of 1988, more than 1,500 police were required to separate Muslims who wished to pray on the *haram al-sharif* on 'Id-al-Adha, marking the end of the yearly pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, and Jews who wished to pray at the Mughrabian Gate for Tisha be'Av. Approximately 100 Jews prayed at the gate, but police barred the group from entering the Muslim Quarter. Nevertheless, about twenty members of Teliya and Kach were able to slip through the police barricades and marched through the area waving Israeli flags.⁸¹ Both journalists and high-ranking military

built by Umar. It made no sense to him that even though the Jewish Temple was here two thousand years ago, the Jews should now say that they want to pray in the *haram al-sharif*. He asked us if we had ever been to Spain, to Cordoba or Granada, and had seen the mosques there? "They changed them from a Muslim mosque to a church, yes? Can I go there and say that this is my mosque and I want it back? This is impossible. Surely, I can't. What can I say?"

Sheik Alami complained to us that the Jews had constantly harassed Muslims and Christians since 1967. He sternly told us that "they put bombs near the churches, near the mosques, several times, and here in al-Aqsa mosque. You know that the Jews burned al-Aqsa mosque in 1969." He continued to catalogue the assaults against the sanctity of al-Aqsa. The Jews had taken the keys to the Mughrabian Gate and allowed whoever they wanted to enter whenever they wanted. They stationed their soldiers on the *haram*. But we interrupted him and suggested that the soldiers might be there to protect the *haram* from Jewish extremists. To have Israeli soldiers on the *haram* is to rub the Mufti's nose in the subordination of Islam within Jewish Jerusalem. He understands that it is the duty of the government to protect the holy places, but they would do that with the police, not soldiers. He sent letters and telegrams to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, and the Minister of the Interior who controls the police, demanding the removal of the soldiers. He shrugged his shoulders and told us, "What can I do? I haven't soldiers to oblige their soldiers to go out. I am asking the government to take them out and it's their duty to take them out. . . . They can put police in the mosque." He believed that the police could handle any threat to the security of the al-Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock and he pointed out that when Jews in 1983 attempted to penetrate the *haram*, the police discovered them, not the Israeli military.

But most disturbing to him were the repeated efforts of Jews to enter the *haram* and to pray there. He underscored several times in our discussion that the *haram* was open to all visitors. "Anybody," he said, "can visit any mosque, any of our mosques, here in al-Aqsa mosque or any other place as a visitor, but not as one who enters to pray and to do as a synagogue here." He repeated himself so that there would be no question about his implacable opposition to Jewish prayer on the *haram*. "This is our mosque. It is not a synagogue!" Even if he could compromise, he didn't believe that the Jews would only be content with the open spaces on the *haram*. For him, the litmus test for the sincerity of the Jews was the Ibrahimiyah Mosque in Hebron, what the Jews call the Cave of Machpelah. Its tall Herodian walls suggest to the visitor that this is a fortress rather than a tomb, but within are buried the patriarchs and matriarchs of ancient Israel. The building is made up of two floors; the ground floor is traditionally understood as the burial chambers of the patriarchs, while the second floor contains their symbolic tombs. For the Muslims this structure is the tomb of Ibrahim, the Friend of God and the first Muslim, and for the Jews this is the tomb of Abraham, the first Jew. Before the 1929 evacuation of the Hebron's Jewish community, Jews had only been allowed to go to the seventh step of the outside staircase.

Alami narrated how he believed the mosque had been transformed into a synagogue, after the Jews requested only a small amount of time for their ritual prayer. "In 1967, their Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan, went to the Mayor of Hebron, Sheik Jabbari, and he asked him to give him permission for the Jews to enter and visit the mosque. Sheik Jabbari, the mayor of Hebron, said that all our mosques are open to any visitor who wants to visit, Jews, Christians, to any visitor. . . . The mayor gave his permission. What has happened after that? First of all, they began to enter and visit after they took their shoes off. Then after a few days or a few weeks, they began to enter with their shoes on. Then they began to enter and pray. Then they brought their material for praying, benches and tables and so on. Then they began to pray most of the time and they don't let the Muslims enter to pray inside. If you go to see the mosque, you don't know whether it is a synagogue or a mosque. That's what has happened to our mosque in Hebron."

Sheik Alami is absolutely uncompromising. He will not allow what has happened to the Ibrahimiyah Mosque to take place at the *haram*. "We have now one million Muslims and Christians" in the West Bank and Gaza, he tells us. "When they will kill all this million, the Muslims and the Christians, they may enter, but not before. All the Christians and all the Muslims are ready to die before letting anyone into the mosque. I told you that we have one million Muslims and Christians and we have one billion Muslims outside. No one will enter and change anything to let them pray in our mosque. All the Muslims will come here. If they kill all of them, after that they may do whatever they want, but not before. Not as long as there is one Muslim still alive in this area." Many of Jerusalem's longtime administrators believe that this talk is not just rhetoric.

The Mufti was keenly aware that a significant proportion of the Palestinian population is Christian, but he believed that there was nevertheless an essential unity among all Palestinians. "Here in Palestine," he told us, "we believe that all of us are Arabs. It doesn't matter with me that this one is a Christian and goes to pray in a church and I go to pray in my mosque. After all we are good friends. All the Christian leaders are my good friends. And I love them and we are the same. Christians and Muslims, we all believe that we must be Arabs!"

He told us that beginning in 1982 he began receiving menacing letters from anonymous individuals who he believed were members of Rabbi Meir Kahane's Kach party and others threatening to enter the *haram* and to pray. The letters told him that if he persisted in refusing Jews the right to enter, then the Dome of the Rock, al-Aqsa mosque, the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and other Christian holy places would be destroyed. The letters also threatened to kill both Christians and Muslims and he told us, "to take their blood to build Israel, for the Jews to drink it." Another letter attempted to offer a bribe of one million Jordanian *dinars* to leave the *haram* and Jerusalem and another an explicit death threat. The threats only strengthened his resolve to resist efforts to change the Status Quo. "I'll not let them kill any Christian or Muslim!" he drummed. "I'll not let them destroy the *haram al-sharif* and al-Aqsa mosque. I will protect them.

I myself will go to the Holy Sepulchre and I'll protect the Holy Sepulchre and all the holy places for the Christians and Muslims. Also, all the Christians will come here and aid me to protect our mosques. All of us here see ourselves as Arabs."⁸⁴

Sheik Alami is a public man who knows that his sermons and interviews with the foreign press are closely watched by the Israelis. But he is also a sophisticated politician who wields considerable influence on the West Bank, and even after King Hussein cut his ties to the area in August 1988, he continues to administer a huge Jordanian-funded bureaucracy of Islamic officials. The center of King Hussein's power base in Jerusalem and on the West Bank has always been the *waqf* and the religious court system. These have functioned as vehicles to extend the king's patronage and to generate loyalty to him rather than to Palestinian nationalist causes. The king has retained the nucleus of his infrastructure and he has not ceded his authority over the management of religious affairs in Jerusalem or in the West Bank. Sheik Alami remains an important player in Hussein's dreams to realize his grandfather's claim to the *haram al-sharif*. Alami's public persona and his ties to an extensive patronage machine are very much unlike other Muslim religious leaders, such as Sheik Ibrahim Yazuri, Sheik Ahmad Yasin, Sheik Abd al-Aziz Odeh, and Sheik Fathi Shqai, all of Gaza and all involved in the emergence of resurgent Muslim groups such as the Islamic Jihad or the Islamic Resistance movement.⁸⁵ The Islamic Jihad first appeared in 1987, well before the beginning of the Intifada. However, the Islamic Resistance Movement is a product of the uprising and is widely known through its acronym, HAMAS or in Arabic "zeal." Both groups are spinoffs from the Muslim Brotherhood which has had a long history in Gaza, where the British, the Egyptians, and the Israelis used it to undercut Palestinian nationalism. Both groups would replace Israel with an Islamic state. HAMAS' "covenant" defines all of historic Palestine, both Israel and the occupied territories, as "an Islamic *waqf* for all generations of Muslims until the resurrection." The covenant also rejected any two-state solution, stating that "various initiatives, peace proposals and international conferences [here perhaps referring to the diplomatic moves of the PLO in the fall of 1988] run counter to the principles of the Islamic Resistance Movement, since giving up part of Palestine is like giving up part of religion." It also ruled out any international peace conference which might be set up to mediate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, since it would "give the infidels the role of arbiter over the land of the Muslims. When have infidels ever dealt justly with believers?"⁸⁶ Sheik Yassin is widely believed to be the chief organizer of HAMAS and was jailed by the Israelis in June 1989. However, in an interview a few months earlier with the *Jerusalem Post*, he said that "I want to be a citizen of Palestine, with full rights, social and political. My aspiration is to have a Muslim state, but I'll accept the decision of the majority. If the PLO wins, I'll accept, but at the same time, I'll continue with my [religious] preaching."⁸⁷

These resurgent Muslim groups have also tried to control the meaning of the *haram* and assimilate its power to their efforts to define the Palestinian struggle against Israel. In April of 1989, there were massive disturbances on

the *haram* which coincided with the beginning of Ramadan. The disturbances were widely believed to have been organized by members of HAMAS who had come to Jerusalem from the Gaza Strip. Huge boulders and stones, which had been stored on the *haram* according to police sources, were hurled down onto the Jews praying at the Western Wall. Police retaliated with tear gas and rubber bullets.⁸⁸ The Israelis responded on the following Friday, restricting entrance to the *haram* only to those Muslims who were from Jerusalem. In order to keep the HAMAS people from gaining their symbolic center, roadblocks on the highways leading from the West Bank and Gaza to Jerusalem stopped many who wanted to pray in al-Aqsa. Soldiers and border police, who manned checkpoints in the Old City and at the entrances to the *haram*, scrutinized every person's identity card so that only Muslims from Jerusalem could enter.⁸⁹ Approximately 7,000 Muslims were allowed onto the *haram*, but police had earlier estimated that 35,000 or more Muslims would attempt to pray in Jerusalem. The following week Sheik Alami, through his spokesman, called for Muslims to pray in al-Aqsa. The spokesman said that if the Israelis "prevent them from entering the mosque, they are to pray in the Old City of Jerusalem. If they are barred from entering the city, they are to pray on the roads leading to Jerusalem."⁹⁰ HAMAS and the Islamic Jihad were unwilling to adopt the position of the Unified Command and the Intifada which in 1988 and early 1989 pushed the PLO toward a two-state solution with the Israelis. Their exclusion from the leadership of the uprising because of their position meant that their only power could be generated from the symbolic center of the Palestinian community, and during Ramadan 1989 they began to use that power with effectiveness.

In comparison to these movements and their leaders, Sheik Alami appears to be a moderate. Throughout our discussion Alami told us that he is a religious man and wants only peace and justice, not only in Jerusalem, but also in the world. He was willing to countenance a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. "I want Israel," he told us, "to return back to its boundaries in 1967. Let us Palestinians be free in our part and let them be free in their part. And let us be good neighbors. That is the best way, I think." He rejected violence as a way to achieve this two-state solution. "I don't want war. And I don't want a single Jew to be killed or any Muslim or Christian. I want justice and peace." Yet in November of 1988, when firebombs were hurled at buses in Jericho and Jerusalem, killing a Jewish mother and her three children and seriously injuring another woman, Sheik Alami was on the other side. He reportedly made statements about Israeli soldiers' torturing and burning Palestinians alive. This brought back a blistering attack from Mayor Kollek, who told him in a letter that his statements were groundless and intended only to incite violence. "Your first duty," Kollek wrote to the Mufti, "is to condemn the shocking crime by young Arabs whose victims were a Jewish mother and her children, who were burned alive." The mayor went on to say that "it's very strange that we didn't hear or read any denunciation from you and your colleagues about that."⁹¹

BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE

The Knesset's legislation giving full control over the Temple Mount to the *waqf* was motivated by a profound sense of religious freedom in a liberal democracy and an awareness of how politically sensitive the Temple Mount might be. The solution was but a holding action.

Islamic control over the Temple Mount remains a fundamental contradiction for large numbers of Zionists, and there remains substantial support to remove the contradiction. To many, sovereignty without control over the central site of sacrifice is incomplete. To others, it is an infringement upon Jews' religious freedoms in their own capital. To still others, it represents a failure to pursue the human activity necessary to bring on redemption. Since 1967 various polls have sought to measure the Israeli attitude toward the Temple Mount. In 1983, for example, 18.3 percent of Israeli Jews supported the idea of rebuilding the Temple before the coming of the Messiah.⁹²

The debate over the Knesset's Law of Holy Places with regard to the Temple Mount recapitulated the conflicts that had begun in the early years of the British Mandate. Militant Zionists are acting out the very same symbolic claims acted out by the Beta youth in 1929. Sheik Alami is driven by the very same symbolic logic that drove Hajj Amin al-Husayni in the 1920s. And just as Hajj Amin al-Husayni attempted to harness the power of the *haram* to reach for leadership of the Palestinian community, so too are the resurgent Muslim groups attempting to seize control of the meaning of the *haram* to lead the Palestinians toward an Islamic polity. But at the same time that the *haram al-sharif* has become once again a privileged platform for Palestinians, the central irony is that they must rely on the power of the Israeli state to protect them from the incursion of the new Jewish nationalists and to maintain their exclusive control over that space.

The Islamic elite is deeply apprehensive that what happened at the Cave of Machpelah, or the mosque of Ibrahim, in Hebron immediately after the 1967 war, allowing Jews for the first time in centuries to enter and pray in the structure, will also happen on the *haram al-sharif*. The Cave of Machpelah is in fact much more important and less threatening to the symbolic claims of the Jewish state than the Temple Mount. The Cave of Machpelah established the symbolic right of patrimony, while the secular Israeli state has a more ambiguous relationship with the Temple Mount, the symbol of priesthood. The Temple and its priesthood undercuts the symbolic legitimacy of the state in a way that the Cave of Machpelah does not.

As we have shown, this sacred site is a source of enormous social power, control over which has been contested between and within the Israeli and Palestinian communities. It has been used repeatedly to mobilize within each community and against the other community. It is the state which must ultimately adjudicate these inter- and intracomunal conflicts. The use to which this sacred space has been put has enormous implications for the content of the state's legitimacy, that nature of the discourse in which political power is understood

and exercised. There is an intimate connection, then, between the organization of sacred space and the material and cultural organization of power. Sacred space is socially constructed. Its meaning is made, and that making has implications for the doctrines which motivate those who claim it as their own.

Political violence cannot be understood as simply the irrational acts of desperate men. Violence, no matter how distasteful we find it, is a normal part of political conflict and must be understood as such. Typically it is a strategy used by those who are intensely motivated and have few other resources at hand. What we have shown in the case of Jerusalem is that it is the same for symbolic violence. Groups in both communities have chosen to desecrate the others' sacred space. Rabbi Orenstein's text with which we began this discussion noted that the Western Wall had been "brutally desecrated." This desecration continues to the present, whether it be an individual who carries out a murderous assault on the *haram al-sharif* or a grenade attack at the precise moment that Israeli soldiers are being sworn into the army. These are not simply acts of violence. They are a symbolic discourse about the status of a symbolic place.

Bruce Lincoln recently published a brilliant interpretation of one of the most curious events of the Spanish Civil War in which the bodies of hundreds, if not thousands, of Spanish priests and nuns were exhumed. The mummified remains of priests, bishops, and nuns were ritually desecrated in the streets of Barcelona. Churches were burned, ritual images and statues were disfigured and decapitated. Ecclesiastical paraphernalia were appropriated in parody of the church. Francisco Franco's Nationalists immediately seized upon these acts of anticlericalism among the forces of the Communists and Republicans as examples of inhumanity, barbarism, and bestiality. But Lincoln finds something else in these symbolic acts which he calls a "profanophany." He defines this term as "a revelation of the profanity, temporality, and corruption inherent in someone or something."⁹³ These profanophanies were intended "to demonstrate dramatically and in public," he writes, "the powerlessness of the image and thereby to inflict a double disgrace on its champions, first by exposing the bankruptcy of their vaunted symbols and, second, their impotence in the face of attack."⁹⁴ He concludes by stating:

Although the exhumations have consistently been presented as an aberrant and impious act of violence, such a simplistic analysis is untenable. Like all anticlerical violence throughout Spanish history, they were not an assault on religion per se, but rather on one specific religious institution: an institution closely aligned with, and subservient to, the traditionally dominant segment of society. At the same time that the exhumations were a ferocious assault on and mockery of that institution, they were also an assault on the segment of society with which it is symbiotically entangled, and what is more—they were a ritual in which the traditionally subordinate segment of Spanish society sought by means of highly charged discourse of gestures and deeds to deconstruct the old social order and construct a new radically different order in its place.⁹⁵

Violence is a form of communication. Symbolic violence is an adjunct to material violence. Symbolic violence, profanation, is used by members of one community or movement in order to mobilize their own communities, to make their definition of reality the dominant one, to demonstrate the ultimate powerlessness of the other, and to redefine the other as radically alien, as profane. By profaning the other's sacred place you make the other profane, an alien with no claim to possession of that space. Symbolic violence is a way to mobilize intense opposition, to polarize the situation using a very few resources. It is a way to delegitimize those political forces who would treat the disposition of territory as a matter to be negotiated between normal states. If the United States and the Soviet Union on the one hand, and Israel and the PLO on the other, move towards a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we can expect even more violence at the sacred center of Jerusalem.

NOTES

1. Anos Elon reprints a number of entries from Rabbi Orenstein's diary in his *Jerusalem: City of Mirrors* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1989), pp. 84-87.
2. Cited in Tayisir Jabara, *Palestinian Leader Hajj Amin al-Husayni: Mufti of Jerusalem* (Princeton, N.J.: The Kingdon Press, 1985), p. 81.
3. "Jerusalem: Holy City of Three Religions" (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Study Group for Middle Eastern Affairs, 1977), p. 3.
4. Dov Joseph, *The Faithful City: The Siege of Jerusalem, 1948* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. 58.
5. Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, *O Jerusalem* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), pp. 385-86.
6. Alan Hart, *Arafat: Terrorist or Peacemaker?* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1984), pp. 72-74.
7. See, for example, Miniam Lichtheim, "The Praise of Cities in the Literature of the Egyptian New Kingdom," in S. M. Burstein and L. A. Okin, eds., *Panhellenica: Essays in Ancient History and Historiography in Honor of Truesdell S. Brown*, (Lawrence, Kan.: Coronado Press, 1980), pp. 15-24.
8. See especially his *La Poétique de l'espace* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1957) and *La Terre et les rêveries de la volonté* (Paris: J. Corti, 1948).
9. Otto von Simpson, *The Gothic Cathedral* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962), and John James, *Chartres: The Masons who Built a Legend* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982), esp. pp. 83-112.
10. L. A. Freeway, *An Appreciative Essay* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).
11. See his essays "Sacred Architecture and Symbolism" and "Barabudur, the Symbolic Temple" in Diane Apostolos-Cappadona, ed. and trans., *Symbolism, the Sacred and the Arts* (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1985), pp. 105-42.
12. *Religion in Essence and Manifestation*, trans. by J. E. Turner (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1967), 2: 393.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 402.
14. Joachim Wach, *Sociology of Religion* (1944; rpt. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971).
15. "Universals in Religion," in *Types of Religious Experience: Christian and Non-Christian* (1951; rpt. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 34.
16. *Traité d'histoire des religions* (1949; rpt. Paris: Payot, 1970), p. 35.
17. "Mircea Eliade and the 'History' of Religions," *Religion* 19 (1989): 106.
18. *Patterns in Comparative Religion*, trans. by Rosemary Sheed (Cleveland and New York: World Publishing Company, 1963), p. 7.
19. *Banaras: City of Light* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), pp. xiv-xv.
20. Jonathan Z. Smith, *Map is Not Territory: Studies in the History of Religions* (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1978), p. 291.
21. Jonathan Z. Smith, *Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 52.
22. David Harvey, "Monument and Myth: The Building of the Basilica of the Sacred Heart" in *Consciousness and the Urban Experience: Studies in the History and Theory of Capitalist Urbanization* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1985), pp. 221-50. A parallel study is Mona Ozouf, "Le Panthéon," *Les lieux de mémoire*, vol. I, *La République*, ed. by Pierre Nora (Paris: Gallimard, 1984), pp. 139-66.
23. Johanna Broda, David Carrasco, and Eduardo Matos Moctezuma, *The Great Temple of Tenochtitlán: Center and Periphery in the Aztec World* (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1987), p. 156.
24. David Carrasco, "Toward the Splendid City: The Study of Mesoamerican Religions," *Religious Studies Review*, 14.4 (1988): 298.
25. The most complete discussion of the Nebi Musa Mosque is Samuel Tamari, "Maqam Nebi Musa Near Jericho," *Cathedra* 11 (1979): 153-80.
26. For example, James Fin., *Stirring Times or Records from Jerusalem Consular Chronicles of 1853 to 1856* (London: C. Kegan and Paul Co., 1878), 1: 204.
27. The most comprehensive description of the pilgrimage is Tewfik Canaan, *Moham-medan Saints and Sanctuaries in Palestine* (1977; rpt. Jerusalem: Ariel Publishing House, n.d.), pp. 206-14. See also G. E. von Grunbaum, *Muhammadian Festivals* (London: Curzon Press, 1976), esp. pp. 81-83.
28. Philip Mattar, *The Mufti of Jerusalem and the Palestinian National Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 16-17.
29. Cited in Y. Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement 1918-1929* (London: Frank Cass, 1974), p. 98.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 192-93.
31. The term *waqf* literally means a "pious foundation" of either real estate or buildings set aside by specific families or government officials. *Waqf* property cannot be taxed and its entire income must be devoted to charitable uses. Technically, there are two forms of *waqf*. The *zurri* is *waqf* intended for family usage, while *mahbus* is *waqf* intended for public charitable use.
32. The most comprehensive history of this *waqf* is A. L. Tibawi, *The Islamic Pious Foundations in Jerusalem: Origins, History and Usurpation by Israel* (London: The Islamic Cultural Centre, 1978), esp. pp. 10-15.
33. See the comprehensive study of Schmel Berkovitz, "The Legal Status of the Holy Places in Israel," Doctoral Dissertation, Hebrew University, 1978.

51. Jody Myers, "Attitudes toward a Resumption of Sacrificial Worship in the Nineteenth Century," *Modern Judaism* 7 (1987): 35. But see also her "Seeking Zion: The Messianic Ideology of Zevi Hirsch Kalischer, 1795-1874," Doctoral Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1985.
52. Menachem Friedman, "The State of Israel as a Theological Dilemma," in Baruch Kimmerling, ed., *The Israeli State and Society: Boundaries and Frontiers* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 203-4.
53. Charles S. Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, *Civil Religion in Israel: Traditional Judaism and Political Culture in the Jewish State* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983), p. 159.
54. Yeshayahu Leibowitz, *Judaism, the Jewish People and the State of Israel* (Jerusalem: Schocken, 1975), pp. 233-335. Leibowitz's position on the sanctity of the Western Wall is parallel to the position taken by Gershon Scholem after the riots in 1929. See David Biale, *Gershon Scholem: Kabbalah and Counter-History* (Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 179.
55. Perhaps one of the most comprehensive discussions of this transformation is Ehud Luz, *Parallels Meet: Religion and Nationalism in the Early Zionist Movement 1882-1904* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1988), esp. pp. ix-xvi.
56. Charles S. Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, *Religion and Politics in Israel* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 74.
57. Zvi Yehudah ha-Cohen Kuk, *On the Paths of Israel* (Jerusalem: Menorah, 1969), p. 160.
58. Among the most important studies of the Gush Emunim are David Biale, "Mysticism and Politics in Modern Israel: The Messianic Ideology of Abraham Isaac Ha-Cohen Kook," in Peter Merkl and Nimian Smart, eds., *Religion and Politics in the Modern World* (New York and London: New York University Press, 1983), pp. 191-204; Janet Aviad, "The Contemporary Israeli Pursuit of the Millennium," *Religion* 14 (1984): 199-222; David Newman, ed., *The Impact of the Gush Emunim: Politics and Settlement in the West Bank* (London: Croom Helm, 1985); Eliezer Don-Yehiya, "Jewish Messianism, Religious Zionism and Israeli Politics: The Impact and Origins of Gush Emunim," *Middle Eastern Studies* 23 (1987): 215-34; Gideon Aran, "From Religious Zionism to Zionist Religions: The Roots of Gush Emunim," in Peter Y. Medding, ed., *Studies in Contemporary Jewry* (Jerusalem and Bloomington: Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Indian University Press, 1986), 2: 116-43, and "Eretz Israel: Between Politics and Religions," *The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies*, No. 18 (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 1985).
59. Gideon Aran, "A Mystic-Messianic Interpretation of Modern Israeli History: The Six Day War as a Key Event in the Development of the Original Religious Culture of Gush Emunim," in Jonathan Frankel, ed., *Studies in Contemporary Jewry* (Jerusalem and Oxford: Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Oxford University Press, 1988), 4:263-75, described how many intellectuals of Gush Emunim interpreted the Six-Day War as marking the beginning of a new historical era, the era of Redemption. See also Uriel Tal, "Contemporary Hermeneutics and Self-Views on the Relationship between State and Land," in Lawrence A. Hoffman, ed., *The Land of Israel: Jewish Perspectives* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), pp. 316-38.
60. Uzi Narkiss, *The Liberation of Jerusalem: The Battle of 1967* (London: Vallentine, Mitchell, 1983), pp. 252-56. See also Abraham Rabinovich, *The Battle for Jerusalem*.

34. The British knew, for example, that in the winter of 1918, Syrian and Palestinian Carenies came together, fearing the establishment in Palestine of Jewish administration or state. On their mind was the expected large-scale Zionist purchases of Arab-owned land, and the possibility that the Jews would rebuild the Temple and thus cause sectarian strife in the country. See Muhammad Y. Muslih, *The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 185.
35. Tayssir Jabara, *Palestinian Leader Hajj Amin al-Husayni: Mufti of Jerusalem* (Princeton, N.J.: The Kingston Press, 1985), p. 78.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
37. Philip Mattar, *The Mufti of Jerusalem*, p. 36.
38. Jabara, *Palestinian Leader Hajj Amin al-Husayni*, p. 81.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 106-7.
40. Mattar, *The Mufti of Jerusalem*, p. 40. The first modern reference to the wall belonging to the Abu Madyan waqf is in 1840. For a history of Jewish interests, see Itzhak Ben-Zvi, "Eretz-Yisrael under Ottoman Rule, 1517-1917," in Louis Finkelstein, ed., *The Jews: Their History* (New York: Schocken Books, 1972), p. 464.
41. Mattar, *The Mufti of Jerusalem*, p. 40.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
43. Jabara, *Palestinian Leader Hajj Amin al-Husayni*, p. 95.
44. Mohammed K. Shadid, "The Muslim Brotherhood Movement in the West Bank and Gaza," *Third World Quarterly* 10: 2 (1988): 658-82.
45. See Walter Zander, *Israel and the Holy Places of Christendom* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 88 and Gabriel Padon, "The Divided City, 1948-1967," in Alice L. Eckardt, ed., *Jerusalem City of Ages* (New York: University Press of America and American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East, 1987), esp. pp. 134-42.
46. On King Hussein's control of the *haram al-sharif* since his disengagement from the West Bank in the summer of 1988, see Adam Garfinkle, "Getting it Right? US Mideast Policy in the Bush Administration," *The Jerusalem Quarterly* 52 (1989): 55-78.
47. The complete text of the Proclamation is found in Itamar Rabinovich and Jehuda Reinharz, eds., *Israel in the Middle East: Documents on Society, Politics and Foreign Relations, 1948-Present* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 13-15. For the text of the "Law for the Protection of the Holy Places" see Zander, *Israel and the Holy Places of Christendom*, pp. 102-3.
48. Meron Benvenisti, *Jerusalem, The Torn City: A Study of a Polarized Community* (Jerusalem: The West Bank Data Base Project, 1983), Research Paper No. 3, p. 41.
49. One recent example of Israel as a theological category for Islam is Mohammad H. Al-Asi, *The Duality of the Palestinian Issue: Islam, al-Intifadah, the Future* (Bethesda, Md.: Islamic Trend of North America, 1988). Here, Israel is the ideology of the nation-state which carves up the unitary *umma* (pp. 4-5, for example). See also Ronald L. Lettler, *Past Trials and Present Tribulations: A Muslim Fundamentalist's View of the Jews* (Oxford and New York: Pergamon Press, 1987), which notes that Muslim religious authorities looked with discomfort at the European emancipation of the Jews (pp. 19-20).
50. See Arie Morgenstern, "Messianic Concepts and Settlement in the Land of Israel," in Richard I. Cohen, ed., *Vision and Conflict in the Holy Land* (Jerusalem and New York: Yad Izhak Ben Zvi and St. Martin's Press, 1985), pp. 141-62, and *Messianism and the Settlement of Eretz-Israel* (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben Zvi Publications, 1985).

June 5-7, 1967-20th Anniversary Edition (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1987), esp. p. 370.

61. For a description of Rabbi Goren's activity immediately after the Six-Day War, see Meron Benvenisti, *Jerusalem, The Torn City*, pp. 287-90.

62. Cited in Meron Benvenisti, *Jerusalem, The Torn City*, pp. 290-91.

63. Hagai Segal, *Dear Brothers: The West Bank Underground* (Woodmere: Beit-Sharnai Publications, 1988), p. 20.

64. Dan Fisher, "6-Day War: The Legacy of Conflict," *The Los Angeles Times*, May 31, 1987.

65. J. Theodor and C. Albeck, *Midrash Bershit Rabbah* 64:10 (Jerusalem: Wahrm Books, 1965), 2: 710-11.

66. See Asher Kaufman, "New Light upon Zion: The Plan and Precise Location of the Second Temple," *Ariel* 43 (1984): 63-99; "Where the Ancient Temple of Jerusalem Stood," *Biblical Archeology Review* 9 (1983): 40-58; and "The Meaning of HAR HABA'YT and its Northern Gate," *Niv Ha-Midrashit*, 18-19 (1984-85): 97-109. See also Abraham Rabinovich's essay on Professor Kaufman, "The Professor in Search of the Temple," in *Jerusalem on Earth: People, Passions and Politics in the Holy City* (New York: The Free Press, 1988), pp. 141-48.

67. Shlomo Goren, "The day of Jerusalem: Our hopes and aspirations," *The Jerusalem Post*, June 2, 1989, p. 10.

68. Cited in Ian Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), p. 324, n. 43.

69. Andy Court, "Rabbi Goren loses first round in court," *Jerusalem Post*, April 18, 1988.

70. Our interviews with Yisrael Medad were conducted on February 26 and March 11, 1984.

71. "Ancient Remains on the Temple Mount Must Not Be Destroyed," *Biblical Archaeology Review* 9 (1983): 61.

72. Yisrael Medad, "Inside the Temple Mount," *Counterpoint: Perspectives on Israel and the Jewish People* 1 (1984): 8.

73. Issam Awad, personal interview, January 15, 1984.

74. Dan Fisher, "10 Israeli Lawmakers, Arabs Clash at Holy Site," *Los Angeles Times*, January 9, 1986.

75. Thomas L. Friedman, "Another Incident on Temple Mount," *The New York Times*, January 15, 1986.

76. "Left, Right trade charges over Mount," *The Jerusalem Post: International Edition*, January 25, 1986.

77. See, for example, Moti Nachmani, "What is going on with the Temple Mount," *Nekudah* 47 (September 3, 1989): 7; Yigal Ariel, "The Temple Mount as waqf property," *Nekudah* 58 (May 17, 1983): 18-19; Shabbatai Ben-Dov, "Facts of the Temple Destruction," *Nekudah* 61 (July 18, 1983): 8-9; Yisrael Eldad, "In the Den of Numerologists," *Nekudah* 78 (September 21, 1984): 14; Baruch Lior, "To Prepare the Generations for Prayer and War," *Nekudah* 85 (April 5, 1985): 12-13; Yisrael Medad, "Battle on the Temple Mount," *Counterpoint* 3 (1986): 8-9; Moshe Ben-Josef, "Prelude to the Mount," *Nekudah* 97 (March 25, 1986): 8. See also the editorials "The Temple Mount is Not in Our Hands," *Nekudah*, 87 (May 24, 1985): 4; "The Fuse," *Nekudah* 95 (January 21, 1986): 4; and "Messiah Now," *Nekudah* 105 (September 5, 1986): 5.

78. Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel*, pp. 170-71.

79. Cited in *ibid.*, p. 172.

80. "Israeli Police, Arabs Clash in Jerusalem: Jewish Group's Plan to Pray at Temple Mount Sparks Violence," *Los Angeles Times*, October 12, 1987.

81. "2 West Bank Arabs Killed; Security tight in Jerusalem," *Los Angeles Times*, July 25, 1988.

82. See Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord*, pp. 172-73. Brigadier General Yoel Ben-Porat stated in *Ma'ariv*, May 10, 1987, a report translated in *Israel Press Briefs*, No. 53 (May-June 1987), that he personally knew of messianic fighters from elite IDF units (pp. 14-15).

83. On the formation of the Supreme Muslim Council see Y. Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918-1929* (London: Frank Cass, 1974), esp. pp. 194-207.

84. Sheikh Sa'ad al-Din al-Alami, personal interview, May 25, 1984.

85. For a detailed account of the relationship of these two groups to the PLO see, Matti Steinberg, "The PLO and Palestinian Islamic Fundamentalism," *The Jerusalem Quarterly* 52 (1982): 37-54.

86. Dan Fisher and Dan Williams, "Islamic Group Changes PLO Over Palestine," *Los Angeles Times*, September 5, 1988.

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89. Sabra Chartrand, "For the First Time, Israel Restricts Palestinians' Freedom of Worship," *New York Times*, April 15, 1989.

90. Dan Izenberg, "Moslems urged to flock to al-Aksa," *Jerusalem Post*, November 11, 1988.

91. Andy Court, "Kolleck urges Mufit to score firebombing," *Jerusalem Post*, November 11, 1988.

92. Cited in Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord*, p. 191.

93. Bruce Lincoln, *Discourse and the Construction of Society: Comparative Studies of Myth, Ritual, and Classification* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 125.

94. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

95. *Ibid.*, p. 127.