

Chapter Eleven

Ages," in Mommsen (E. F. Rice, Jr., ed.), *Medieval and Renaissance Studies* (Ithaca, 1959), 106–29.

27. W. Palgrave as quoted in the opening paragraph of J. Lubbock (Lord Avebury), *Prehistoric Times as Illustrated by Ancient Remains and the Manners and Customs of Ancient Savages* (London, 1865), 1.

28. M. de La Créquinière, *The Agreement of the Customs of the East Indians with Those of the Jews and Other Ancient Peoples* (London, 1705), vii, from the French original (Brussels, 1704).

29. B. Spencer and F. J. Gillen, *The Arunta: A Study of a Stone Age People* (London, 1927), 1: vii.

30. Aristotle *Nichomachean Ethics* 1125a5.

31. F. D. McCarthy, "Presidential Address," *Journal and Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales* 91 (1957): 10.

32. H. W. Turner, *Rudolf Otto, the Idea of the Holy: Commentary on a Shortened Version* (Aberdeen, 1974), 19.

33. A. S. Meigs, *Foods, Sex and Pollution: A New Guinea Religion* (Rutgers, 1984), 4, 6–8, 11–12.

34. J. Haiman, "Hua, a Papuan Language of New Guinea," in T. Shopen, ed., *Languages and Their Status* (Cambridge, Mass., 1979): 36–37; cf. Haiman, *Hua: A Papuan Language of the Eastern Highlands of New Guinea* (Amsterdam, 1980), 515–16.

35. I have drawn some sentences from my article, "What a Difference a Difference Makes," in Neusner-Frerichs, "To See Ourselves As Others See Us," 3–48, esp. pp. 46–48, reprinted in this volume.

CHAPTER TWELVE

WHAT A DIFFERENCE A DIFFERENCE MAKES

The discourse of difference is a difficult one.

T. TODOROV, *La conquête de l'Amérique: La question de l'autre*

"TO SEE OURSELVES as Others See Us: The Theory of the Other in the Formative Age of Christianity and Judaism." What a formidable topic to set before an international gathering of scholars as the focus for a summer's weeklong period of papers and reflections! Only the title's points of chronological reference to the first centuries strike me as bearing a measure of self-evidence. Quite rightly, they have supplied the skeletal outline for the proceedings of our conference. Abstaining from the question of the referent for "Christianity" or "Judaism," what is by no means clear is what was intended by the framers of our topic when they employed the portentous phrase "the theory of the other." I take it to be the obligation of one charged to give a "keynote" address to inquire into this most general aspect of our subject.

For this reason, in what follows I shall not dwell at all on the stated chronological period, nor venture to anticipate the welter of historical particularities and exempla concerning Christians and Jews which the full program promises. Rather, I shall direct my inquiries toward that phrase "the theory of the other" and attempt to discern several senses in which the "other" can be framed as a theoretical issue. That is to say, I shall want to ask, from the perspective of intellectual history, what difference does difference make? My point of entry into this difficult matter has been supplied by the poetic apostrophe in our conference's title. ★

I

There is no settling the point of precedence between a louse and a flea.

DR. JOHNSON

I would like to believe it was far from accidental that our conveners chose to introduce our topic with a line from the concluding stanza of a poem by Robert Burns. First published in the historic Kilmarnock edition of 1786, it has, detached from its context, since become a piece of proverbial lore.

O wid some Power the giftie gie us
To see oursels as ithers see us!
It wad frae mony a blunder free us,
An' foolish notion:
What airs in dress an' gait wad lea'e us
An' ev'n devotion!¹

In quoting Burns's lines, we have already gained an initial purchase on our topic. What language was the poem written in? The language seems not-quite-English, yet, is it different enough to be classified as "other"? To quote one distinguished scholar of Scottish literature on Burns:

Though all of this is still unmistakably Scots, only a small change of spelling is required to make these couplets visually indistinguishable from English . . . [but] they have to be pronounced with a Scottish accent. Thus they fall within the compass of Scottish speech and the language employed in them cannot strictly be called 'English'; perhaps it should rather be termed 'near-English'.²

It may be fairly asked, how "near" is near? How "far" is far? How different does difference have to be to constitute "otherness"? Under what circumstances, and to whom, are such distinctions of interest?

The question of interest reminds us of yet another facet to our theme, one that is contained within the original sense of "interest" as continued in legal and economic usage. Difference is rarely something simply to be noted; it is, most often, something in which one has a stake. Above all, it is a political matter. As the proximate historical setting of Burns suggests, following the Union of the Crowns in 1603 and the Par-

liamentary Union of 1707, and contemporary with the establishment in Edinburgh of a "Select Society for the Promoting of the Reading and Speaking of the English Language," what appears from a linguistic point of view to be "near" appears from a political vantage to be exceedingly "far."³ How far might be measured by comparing Burns's self-consciously vernacular poems with the equally self-conscious classic English prose of his Scottish contemporary, Adam Smith. Difference is seldom a comparison between entities judged to be equivalent. Difference most frequently entails a hierarchy of prestige and the concomitant political ranking of superordinate and subordinate.

Yet, as the Scottish example illustrates, such distinctions are usually drawn most sharply between "near neighbors." For a Scotsman to opt for either Scottish or English (both being Anglo-Saxon dialects) is a more politically striking decision than to have chosen to speak either French or Chinese.⁴ The radically "other" is merely "other"; the proximate "other" is problematic, and hence, of supreme interest. *

But there is more. The choice of our conveners proved to be of even greater prescience. For the poem that contains the line "to see ourselves as others see us" is entitled "To a Louse: On Seeing One on a Lady's Bonnet at Church." Perhaps this will seem an unsuitable topic; it has appeared so to many of Burns's deepest admirers. But the louse has provided the subject for a wide variety of poets and painters,⁵ although it has been eclipsed in this regard by the equally parasitic flea⁶ in the works of poets ranging from John Donne to Roland Young, in operatic works by Mussorgsky and Ghedini, and not forgetting its place in the anonymous Victorian pornographic novel, *Autobiography of a Flea, told in a Hop, Skip and Jump, and recounting all experiences of the Human and Superhuman Kind, both Male and Female; with his Curious Connections, Backbitings and Tickling Touches*.⁷ Burns's poem will not repay further study—it's lousy; but its pediculine subject will.

There is, perhaps, no scientific area of scholarship in which more sustained attention has been devoted to the taxonomy and definition of "otherness" than parasitology. Rare for biology, here is a subdiscipline devoted not to a natural class of living things but, rather, to a relationship between two quite different species of plants or animals. It is the character of the difference and the mode of relationship that supplies both the key characteristics for classification and the central topics for disciplinary thought. This is especially apparent in the literature of the last half of the nineteenth century, while parasitology was achieving status as an independent field of inquiry.⁸ Observations about some of the larger parasites on animals and man may be found throughout antiquity.⁹ However,

awareness of parasitism's ubiquity had to await the late seventeenth-century development of the microscope.¹⁰ This resulted in a decisive shift of intellectual interest to the scientific, philosophical, and literary topos of the intricately small.¹¹ Even after this point, despite the enormous increase in data,¹² theoretical issues with respect both to taxonomy¹³ and "spontaneous generation" had to be settled before the discipline of parasitology could emerge.¹⁴

While the majority of biology's historians have focused their attention on the aetiological issues associated with the theory of "spontaneous generation" (*generatio aequivoca* or "abiogenesis"), it was, in fact, the taxonomic implications that were more serious for our theme. Until the stunning monograph by J. J. S. Steenstrup (1842),¹⁵ it was by no means clear that many parasites go through both free-living and parasitic stages of development (at times, with sex changes) that bear no resemblance to each other and often with an invariant sequence of hosts. It is the generation of parasitologists that immediately followed upon this discovery that developed the classificatory systems of most interest to us.¹⁶ It was first thought that one biological class could contain all zoological parasitic forms, and so the older nomenclature of external form which presented the parasite as "wormlike" (whether expressed through the Greek, *helminth*, or the Latin, *vermis*) yielded to a neologism of relative position, the *Entozoa* (animals who live within).¹⁷ This was a major shift in taxonomic strategy, creating a class of animals joined together by their "mode of existence" even though, judged by other criteria, they belonged to different zoological classes.

Regardless of what biological class the individual parasitic species belonged to, they might be classified *qua* parasites by the mode of their relationship to their hosts. From this point of view, parasitology is not the study of parasites, it is the study of the host-parasite relationship. Parasites are classified by their relationship to the "other," by the modes and degrees of "otherness."

The initial move in this complex taxonomic endeavor was to attempt a general definition of "parasitism" within the animal kingdom. (Plant parasitism posed a different set of issues). A "parasite" was defined as an organism of one species that obtained benefits (most usually food) from an organism of another species with whom it was in direct contact and that served as "host." It was understood that this definition was both relative and nonreciprocal. The definition was relative in that the parasite must be smaller than its host (e.g., the leech, which, when it preys on smaller animals, is properly termed a "carnivore," is rightly called a "parasite" when it attaches itself to larger animals). It was nonreciprocal in

that the host must derive no benefit from the parasitic association. Indeed, most usually the association is detrimental to the host. This latter, nonreciprocal criterion is understood to imply that the negative effect must be the direct result of the benefit derived by the parasite (e.g., the destruction of the host's cells by feeding) and not indirect, such as in the case of diseases transmitted to the host by the parasite.¹⁸

Concealed within such late nineteenth-century attempts at a generic definition of "parasitism" were a set of thorny taxonomic distinctions. If attention was focused on the criterion of "benefit," then the attempt was made to distinguish the nonreciprocal benefit to the parasite from closely related phenomena such as "symbiosis" (a term invented in 1879 by A. de Bary) in which both species derived necessary mutual benefits from their association, "mutualism" (a term introduced by Beneden in 1876) in which one species derived benefit without affect on the other, and "commensalism" (likewise created by Beneden) in which one species lives on or in another without apparent benefit or harm to either.¹⁹

Note that such taxonomic distinctions, by virtue of their concern for matters of association, are explicitly political. The definitions are based on hierarchical distinctions of subordination and superordination, on mapping structures of benefits and reciprocity. Such political interests are continued in those taxonomic distinctions made with respect to the nature and character of the direct relationship between host and parasite which constitute a virtual typology of "otherness."

Perhaps the most influential of these was that developed by R. Leuckart in *Die menschlichen Parasiten* (1863–76). His first distinction was between what he termed "ectoparasites" (or "epizoa") and "endoparasites" (or "entozoa"). Ectoparasites "live on" their hosts; endoparasites "live in" their hosts. Both may be further subdivided into two classes on the basis of whether the relationship of parasite to host is "temporary" or "permanent."

In general, ectoparasites are temporary. They seek their hosts in order to obtain food or shelter and leave them when they have been satisfied. They tend to inhabit the surface of their host's body or its immediately accessible orifices. Their bodily form is little modified by their parasitic habit when compared with closely related nonparasitic forms.

In general, endoparasites are more complex. They tend to have both parasitic and nonparasitic life stages, the former being highly modified when compared with the latter. In their parasitic stages, the relation to their host is stationary. They more usually inhabit the internal organs of their host.

With primary reference to endoparasites, Leuckart introduced a further set of classificatory differentia based on "the nature and duration of

their strictly parasitic [stage] of life.” (1) Some have “free-living and self-supporting” embryos which become sexually mature only after they have reached their hosts. (2) Others have embryos which are parasitic but “migratory,” moving (a) to a “free life,” (b) to another part of their host, or (c) to a different host, before becoming sexually mature. (3) Others are parasitic during every stage of their lives, having no migratory embryonic stage and passing their entire lives on a single host.²⁰

In the above, it should be noted that Leuckart's entire classificatory project is based on the differing forms of relationship between parasite and host. It is a relativistic, economic or political system that does not follow the traditional anatomical/morphological criteria for taxonomy.

Before continuing, it may be well to pause and to make explicit what considering this brief history of late nineteenth-century parasitology has contributed to the question of a “theory of the other.”

Perhaps the most important point is that reiterated by Leuckart: “no broad line of demarcation can be drawn between parasites and free-living animals.”²¹ That is to say, “otherness” is an ambiguous category. This is so because it is necessarily a term of interrelation. “Otherness” is not so much a matter of separation as it is a description of interaction. As the taxonomy of parasitism makes clear, the relation to the “other” is a matter of shifting temporality and relative modes of relationship. There are degrees of difference, even within a single species.

While at one level the taxonomy of parasites (and, hence, of “otherness”) appears to be reducible to the ancient legal question, *Cui bono?* at another level the distinctions between “parasitism,” “symbiosis,” “mutualism,” “commensalism,” “epiphytism,” and the like are distinctions between types of exchange. A “theory of the other” must take the form of a relational theory of reciprocity. “Otherness,” whether of Scots or of lice, is a preeminently political category.

It might have been thought that I would go on and attempt to make a further contact with this symposium's theme by cataloging the varied roles parasites have played in western religions²²—not forgetting the Roman deity, Verminus.²³ Indeed, parasites, and most particularly, the louse, have supplied a variety of Christian theological conundrums ranging from the justification for their existence in terms of natural law (a matter still raised by Immanuel Kant)²⁴ to ticklish questions as to whether Adam and Eve had lice in Paradise prior to the Fall (I remind you that what is alleged to be the shortest poem in the English language reads, in full, “Adam Had 'em”),²⁵ whether Eve contained in her body not only the seed of all future human beings but also of all future human parasites,²⁶ and whether lice and other parasites found a place on Noah's Ark.²⁷ Nor

should we ignore Charles Bonnet's triumphant demonstration of the Virgin Birth's scientific credibility when he observed parthenogenesis in plant lice.²⁸ But I have another sort of connection in mind.

It would appear that the term “parasite” came into technical discourse as a generic category only in the last decades of the nineteenth century. A search of lexica, encyclopaedia, and earlier scientific works reveals that it was in common use in botany at the beginning of the century,²⁹ and was taken over only at a later stage by zoologists, replacing, as we have seen, “entozoa,” and “helminths.”³⁰ This is not the first time the word “parasite” has replaced a previous set of terms. Such a substitution had occurred once before, in ancient Athens during the first half of the fourth century B.C. This earlier shift established “parasite” as bearing a cultural connotation. And this sense persisted through the middle of the nineteenth century as the prime meaning of “parasite,” while laying the ground for the later European scientific usage.³¹

As is well known, the figure of the fawning Parasite was a stock character in ancient Greek comedy. The type is archaic, going back at least to the first half of the fifth century and the play *Hope or Riches* by the Sicilian, Epicharmus. But while the character is old, its name, “Parasite,” is at least a century younger. It first appeared in Alexis's play by that name (c. 360–50 B.C.) and replaced the older names for this stock figure, the “Flatterer” (*kolax*) and the “Sycophant.”

Much ink has been expended on this name change by modern scholarship,³² but the issue was posed centuries earlier in a lengthy (now lost) lexicographical work preserved in excerpted form by the third-century A.D. rhetorician, Athenaeus.³³

The relevant passage, in a manner typical of Athenaeus, is in the form of a quotation within a quotation.

Plutarch said, The name, parasite, was in earlier times a dignified and sacred name. Take, for example, what Polemon³⁴ writes about parasites. . . . Parasite is nowadays a disreputable term, but among the ancients we find it used of something sacred, equivalent to companion [*synthoinos*, “messmate”] at a sacred feast. (6.234d)

Six examples are given to illustrate this archaic, cultic use of the term “parasite” before a series of quotations are marshalled to illustrate its transformation into a comedic term of opprobrium.³⁵ It is the first cultic example that is of greatest interest to us—that of the annual celebration of Herakles at Kynosarges, outside Athens.

The gymnasium at Kynosarges³⁶ was open to membership by Athenian residents lacking the status of full citizens, most particularly, since the law of Pericles in 451–50,³⁷ the children of mixed marriages (*nothoi*) between Athenian males and foreign women.³⁸ According to Polemon, the Herakleion at Kynosarges possessed a stele with a law from Alcibaidēs:

The priest shall sacrifice the monthly offerings in company with the parasites. These parasites shall be drawn from men of mixed descent [*ek tōn nothōn*] and their children according to ancestral custom.³⁹ And whoever shall decline to serve as parasite, the priest shall charge him before the tribunal. (6. 234e)

In addition to their monthly sacrificial duties, the chief annual cultic activity of the parasites was to eat a meal, during the month, Metageitnion, together with Herakles—hence the derivation of “parasite” from *para* + *sitos*, (to eat) grain beside (another).⁴⁰

With this last piece of information on the most archaic use of the term “parasite,” we may briefly come to rest. The earliest use of the term referred to a rule-governed, legally required relationship of commensality between representatives of a community of not-quite-Athenians (the *nothoi*) and a cult figure (Herakles) who was neither quite hero nor quite god.⁴¹ To think about parasites, whether in the most ancient or most modern sense of the term, is to think about reciprocal relations of relative “otherness.”⁴²

Before attempting a fresh start on the question of a “theory of the other,” it might be well to collect and restate the conclusions that might be drawn from this first set of reflections on the topic which began with an eighteenth-century poem by Robert Burns and ended with an archaic cult law, after rapidly passing through the history of late nineteenth-century parasitology.

In this first stage of our inquiry, even though three quite different sorts of data were explored, the conclusions drawn were symmetrical. “Otherness,” it is suggested, is a matter of relative rather than absolute difference. Difference is not a matter of comparison between entities judged to be equivalent, rather difference most frequently entails a hierarchy of prestige and ranking. Such distinctions are found to be drawn most sharply between “near neighbors,” with respect to what has been termed the “proximate other.” This is the case because “otherness” is a relativistic category inasmuch as it is, necessarily, a term of interaction. A “theory of otherness” is, from this perspective, essentially political and

economic. That is to say, it centers on a relational theory of reciprocity, often one that is rule-governed.

While I shall return to this set of contentions in my conclusion, it seemed useful to inquire as to whether there was a stronger “theory of the other” than the political; that is to say, were there situations that led to a more radical theory of “otherness”? It is to this essentially anthropological question that I turn by way of making a second start on our theme. Such a theory, we shall see, is essentially a project of language.

II

The Sioux have a saying, ‘With all beings and all things we shall be as relatives.’ Our Hillel said, ‘Separate thyself not from the community.’ Mazel Tov to Rabbi Glaser and his excellent programs linking Judaism to brothers and sisters of Indian cultures and for reminding us that we are all members of one tribe.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR, *Reform Judaism* 12.4 (1984): 32.

The social and cultural awareness of the “other” must surely be as old as humankind itself. “Cultures are more than just empirically comparable; they are intrinsically comparative.”⁴³ As Robert Redfield has argued, the world-view of any people consists essentially of two pairs of binary oppositions: MAN/NOT-MAN and WE/THEY.⁴⁴ These two oppositions are often correlated, i.e., WE = MAN; THEY = NOT-MAN. Indeed, the distinction between “us” and “them” is present in our earliest written records.⁴⁵ It is an omnipresent feature of folk taxonomies.⁴⁶ The distinction is most ubiquitous in the complex rule-governed matter of kinship in institutions such as endogamy, exogamy, and the incest taboo.⁴⁷ Likewise, it is universal in the detailed etiquette and laws concerning “the stranger,”⁴⁸ as well as in those devoted to its less-studied opposite, “the friend.”⁴⁹ Social and cultural awareness of the “other” is also the centerpiece of the most persistent ethnographic traditions.⁵⁰ As times, cultural differences appear merely to have been noted (for example, as “curiosities” in travel reports). More frequently, “difference” supplied a justificatory element for a variety of ideological postures, ranging from xenophobia to exoticism, from travel, trade, and exploration to military conquest, slavery, and colonialism. The “other” has appeared as an object of desire as well as an object of repulsion; the “other” has rarely been an object of indifference.

On rare occasions, meditation on cultural difference, on “others,” itself became one of a culture’s dominant features. Such was the case in

fifth-century B.C. Ionia⁵¹ and in the Chinese periods of the T'ang and Southern Sung,⁵² and such may be inferred from the preconquest court of Moctezuma with its remarkable zoological collections of all types of birds and animals and human forms.⁵³ This living museum appears to be quite similar to that all-but-contemporary "human zoo" maintained by Cardinal Ippolito de Medici, which consisted of "a troop of barbarians who talked no fewer than twenty different languages and were all of them perfect specimens of their races."⁵⁴

As this last example hints, the cultural meditation on difference received its most massive institutionalization in the vast modern western enterprise of anthropology: a xenological endeavor which began with the savants of the Renaissance and Enlightenment was fueled by the discoveries of the "Age of Reconnaissance" and continued into the present. Indeed, the most distinctive feature of modern anthropology is its relatively recent requirement that the anthropologist have living experience of the "other." It is fieldwork that makes anthropology a distinctive enterprise among the human sciences.⁵⁵ Because of this, anthropology may be described as the science of the "other." As Claude Lévi-Strauss bluntly states:

Anthropology is the science of culture as seen from the outside. . . . Anthropology, whenever it is practiced by members of the culture it endeavors to study, loses its specific nature [as anthropology] and becomes rather akin to archaeology, history and philology.⁵⁶

That is to say, anthropology holds that there is cognitive power in "otherness," a power that is removed by studying the "same." The issue, as Lévi-Strauss has phrased it in the passage quoted above, is not the sheer distance of the object of study,⁵⁷ but rather the mode of relationship of the scholar to the object. In anthropology, the distance is not to be overcome, but becomes, in itself, the prime focus and instrument of disciplinary meditation.⁵⁸

To be sure, even within contemporary anthropology, "otherness" remains a relative category in at least two important senses. First, unlike parasitism, the "other" is of the same species. Despite wide variation, it is man studying man; it is *Homo sapiens* and not some Martian that is the object of attention. (It may be noted that, since 1970, the American Anthropological Association has sponsored a section at its annual meeting on the issues raised by the possibility of the future study of extraterrestrial beings. However, to date, such matters have been better explored by science fiction writers, for example, the profound work of Michael Bishop).⁵⁹

Matters with respect to this first qualification are, in fact, more complex. Anthropologists have at times explored other cultures (or particular institutions within them) in such a way as to suggest that they might be conceived of as "limiting cases,"⁶⁰ that they represent so extreme a development of something known and familiar that they appear to be radically "other."⁶¹ More usually, they have insisted on just the opposite: in some often unspecified way, the "other" is to be seen as "typical." While the field encounter is most frequently described as an extremely traumatic, disorienting kind of experience, the result, as reported in the monograph, reads as an encounter with "Everyman." Edmund Leach has characterized this quixotic element with precision:

When we read Malinowski we get the impression that he is stating something which is of general importance. Yet how can this be? He is simply writing about Trobriand Islanders. Somehow . . . he is able to make the Trobriands a microcosm of the whole primitive world. And the same is true of his successors; for Firth, Primitive Man is a Tikopian, for Fortes, he is a citizen of Ghana.⁶²

Second, anthropological investigation is, by nature, relational. What an anthropologist reports is almost always solely based on his or her interaction with a particular people. For this reason, anthropology has tended to develop and embrace theories that factor out time and the historical, that eliminate all past before the fieldworker's presence.⁶³ Hence, the evolutionism of the late nineteenth-century "armchair" anthropologists was jettisoned by workers in the field in favor of a functionalism that depended on the observation of a given society at time "t," or, later, in favor of the atemporalism of a variety of structuralist approaches. For this reason, as well, the anthropological report, no matter how great a period of time had elapsed between the field experience and publication, is almost always written in the "ethnographic present," in what Jan Vansina has called the "zero-time fiction."⁶⁴

The effect of these two qualifications (and there are more) has been to relativize "otherness" in anthropological discourse—if not in experience. Anthropology has become largely an enterprise of "decipherment," attempting to "decode" an encrypted message from "another" with the firm prior conviction that, because it is human, it will be intelligible once it is "broken."⁶⁵ That is to say, anthropology is essentially a project of language with respect to an "other," which concedes both the presence of meaning and the possibility of translation at the outset. Indeed, without these two assumptions, "all the activities of anthropologists become

meaningless."⁶⁶ As such, contemporary anthropology is to be seen as part of the Anglo-American philosophical tradition, which has tended to view "otherness" as a problem of communication in contradistinction to the Continental philosophical tradition, which has tended to conceive of the "other" in terms of transcendence and threat.⁶⁷

This contemporary anthropological viewpoint stands in sharp contrast to the classical ethnographic tradition where, from Herodotus on, there is rarely the perception of an opacity to be overcome. Difference is, itself, utterly transparent. The "other" is merely different and calls for no exegetical labor. Within the classical ethnographic sources, differences may be noted; at times, differences may be compared, but they are most frequently set aside. Difference is insignificant—that is to say, difference signifies nothing of importance and therefore requires no decipherment, no hermeneutical projects. In classical ethnography, the "other" does not speak. This topos can be illustrated from traditions as far apart as the notion that the "other" is a "barbarian," that is, one who speaks unintelligibly⁶⁸ (or, in stronger form, one who is mute),⁶⁹ and the conventions of "silent trade."⁷⁰ For the classical ethnographer, the labor of learning an "other's" language would be sheer folly.⁷¹ Classical ethnography manipulated a few basic explanatory models to account for "others." Briefly put, similarity was, above all, to be explained as the result of a temporal process: common descent and genealogy in remote times; contact, borrowing, and diffusion in more recent times. Difference was, above all, to be explained as the consequence of a spatial condition, pre-eminently climate. This would later become known as "environmental determinism."

To be sure, there were perturbations, encounters with "others" that appeared to present cognitive shocks—the Greek experience of Egypt; the thirteenth-century "Mongol Mission"—but these were rapidly assimilated to the prevailing models. However, there was one perturbation that was not so readily assimilable, that of the so-called "discovery" of America. It is here that the anthropological issue of the "other" as pre-eminently a project of language most clearly begins.⁷²

If there was one cosmographical element that could be taken for granted in the west prior to the "voyages of discovery," it was that the inhabitable world, the *oikoumenē*, was divided into three unequal parts.⁷³ It was this tripartition, Ovid's *triplex mundus*, that allowed the classical traditions to be so readily merged with the biblical. For most of western history, Pliny and Genesis 10 contained all that was necessary for both anthropological and geographical theorizing.⁷⁴ If there was one cosmographical element that became increasingly apparent to the west after the

impact of the "voyages of discovery," it was that there were additional inhabitable landmasses, and that neither the classical nor the biblical traditions could be easily harmonized with this new world-view. To Europe, Asia and Libya/Africa must now be added the neologism "America"⁷⁵—the *quarta orbis pars*.⁷⁶ This "fourth part," eventually recognized as what the ancients had theoretically termed an *orbis alterius*,⁷⁷ for the first time in western intellectual history raised the theoretical issue of the "other" as a project of language and interpretation. For this reason, we must pause and examine this cosmographical shift more carefully.

The classical cosmography may be summarized in terms of four elements.

(1) The earth, most usually thought of as spherical, was pictured as a great terraqueous globe, divided into Northern and Southern hemispheres. The earth's most distinctive feature was a large island in the Northern Hemisphere—the *orbis terrarum*.⁷⁸

(2) Of greater significance than the division into hemispheres was the marking off of the terrestrial globe into "zones" (most usually five) in which only the intermediate (temperate) zones were presumed inhabitable.⁷⁹ That is to say, the extreme northern and southern (polar) zones and the middle (equatorial) zone were judged too severe to support human life in any recognizable form.⁸⁰ Habitation was possible only in the northern and southern temperate zones.

(3) The distinction as to habitability became central and was expressed by the term *oikoumenē*.⁸¹ Geographically, the *oikoumenē*, the "inhabitable world," was that portion of the northern earth-island south of the Arctic Circle, north of the Tropic of Cancer, bounded on the east and west by Ocean, that was known to be inhabited. Theoretically, the possibility was entertained that there might be a corresponding "inhabitable land" in the Southern Hemisphere—a possibility most usually advanced for reasons of geometric symmetry.⁸² If so, it would be "another world . . . an other *oikoumenē* . . . not inhabited by ones such as us" but by other species of men.⁸³

(4) The northern *oikoumenē* was divided into three lobes:⁸⁴ Europe, Asia, and Libya/Africa.⁸⁵ These were most frequently distinguished from one another by river boundaries.⁸⁶

In time, these four essential classical cosmographic elements received distinctively Christian interpretations. Combining the speculations of the Greco-Roman geographers and Genesis 10, the three lobes of the world-island became identified with the three sons of Noah who repopulated the *oikoumenē* after the Flood.⁸⁷ In turn, the tripartition became identified allegorically with a range of specifically Christian elements

ranging from the Trinity⁸⁸ and the “Three Wise Men”⁸⁹ to the triple papal tiara (the *triregnum*).⁹⁰

Such a view, with its striking monogenetic implications, made all but impossible Christian belief in the existence of other inhabited worlds apart from the northern, tripartite *oikoumenē*. As Augustine declared of the monstrous races as described by encyclopaedists such as Pliny, so, too, of “other worlds”:

Either the written accounts of certain races are completely unfounded; or, if such races do exist, they are not human; or, if they are human, they are descended from Adam.⁹¹

That is to say, either “other worlds” do not exist or, if they exist, they are uninhabited or, if they are inhabited, then they must (somehow) be descended from Adam and have been populated by the sons of Noah. All Christian discussion of “antipodes” and “austral” landmasses took place within the framework of this logic.⁹²

With this brief sketch, the stage for the emergence of our theme has been set: how to make room for an “other world,” for an inhabited fourth part of the globe, a “world,” an *oikoumenē*, unanticipated by either the Greco-Roman or the biblical traditions?

It is simple, in retrospect, to appreciate the impact of the “discovery” of America, and to sense its challenge to both biblical and classical world-views.⁹³ But this is anachronistic. What was apparent by the middle of the sixteenth century was by no means clear half a century earlier.⁹⁴ It is a distinctly modern voice that we hear in the remark of the sixteenth-century Florentine historian, Francesco Guicciardini, suppressed until the Freiburg edition (1774–76):

Not only has this navigation confounded many affirmations of former writers about terrestrial things, but it has given some anxiety to the interpreters of the Holy Scriptures.⁹⁵

A voice echoed by his contemporary, the Parisian lawyer, Étienne Pasquier:

It is a very striking fact that our classical authors had no knowledge of all this America which we call ‘new lands.’⁹⁶

A voice so modern that it has called forth recent reinterpretations of the very words “discovery”⁹⁷ and “conquest”⁹⁸ as they appear in the fifteenth-

and sixteenth-century literature. But the earlier voices are less clear. The anthropological perception of the “other” had yet to occur and to find its voice.

For the cognitive issue of the “otherness” of America to emerge, America first had to be perceived as truly “other.” Despite an emerging vocabulary of “otherness” (from Columbus’s *otro mundo* to Vespucci’s *un altro mondo*, or *mondo nuovo* and Peter Martyr’s *nova tellus*, *alter* or *alius orbis*, *novus orbis*, and *de orbe novo*),⁹⁹ the moment at which this perception first emerged in intellectual discourse is far from clear.

It is tempting to place the emergent perception no later than the point at which Balboa first saw the Pacific (September 25, 1513),¹⁰⁰ or the point at which the reports of the survivors of the Magellan trans-Pacific circumnavigation of 1517–21 became available.¹⁰¹ But this is by no means certain. It can be no earlier than the report of the first voyage of Columbus (April, 1493).¹⁰² But this is premature. There can be no doubt that Columbus interpreted all of his sightings and land-falls in terms of the classical, tripartite *oikoumenē*, perhaps expanding, in theory, only the classical limits of inhabitability to all five “zones” of the world-island.¹⁰³ From the first to the last, he was convinced that he had reached the Asian coast, the easternmost boundary of the *orbis terrarum*.

His persistence was remarkable and unrelenting. The day after his first landfall at San Salvador (October 14, 1492), he wrote that “in order not to lose time” he will set off immediately to “see if I can find the island of Cipango [Japan].”¹⁰⁴ In a letter dated July 7, 1503, at the conclusion of his fourth and final voyage, he wrote that he was only nineteen days’ journey westward from “the river Ganges.”¹⁰⁵

Throughout his writings, what was in fact new and previously unknown was translated endlessly and effortlessly by Columbus into what was old and well-known. For example, on November 26 and again on December 11, 1492, having “understood”¹⁰⁶ the Arawaks to speak of a nearby man-eating tribe which they feared, “the *Carība*,” Columbus misunderstood them to have pronounced the name as *Caniba*—a misunderstanding we perpetuate every time we utter the word “cannibal.” This misperception was further compounded by being placed within Columbus’s preexistent interpretative scheme. *Caniba* sounded to him like the familiar *cane*, “dog.” Therefore, Columbus concludes, the *Caniba* must be the cynocephalic monsters of European travel lore, associated especially with India.¹⁰⁷ Alternatively, *Caniba* reminded him of the word *Can* (i.e., Khan), therefore, he declared, “*Caniba* is nothing else but the great *Can* who ought now to be very near.”¹⁰⁸

At only one juncture does Columbus's confidence appear shaken and the easy verbal translations and associations seem to falter. During his third journey, on August 5, 1498, Columbus became the first European to set foot on the South American mainland, on the Paria Peninsula on the coast of what is now called Venezuela. Although he first believed the peninsula to be another island, by August 15th, he correctly interpreted the physical evidence as requiring the landmass to be "a great mainland, of which nothing has been known until now."¹⁰⁹ Remarkably, Columbus was able to fit even this "discovery" into the tripartite schema in its Christian interpretation. For concealed within the Christian topography was a "wild card"—an option hitherto of merely theoretical status, that, in addition to the tripartite world-island, there was a terrestrial Paradise.¹¹⁰ It is this mythic landmass that Columbus understands himself to have discovered, in the process altering the commonly accepted view of the globe as spherical into something rather more eccentrically bulbous. The letter to the Spanish court of October 14, 1498, is devoted almost entirely to this remarkable proposition.¹¹¹

Columbus begins his Letter with a sort of preamble, summarizing his accomplishments in all three voyages and making plain his conservative intention to place his "enterprise . . . which was foretold in the writings of so many trustworthy and wise historians" (including Isaiah!) within the context of the "sayings and opinions of those [ancients] who have written on the geography of the world."¹¹² Nevertheless, the land of which he will now write is "another world [*otro mundo*] from that which the Romans, and Alexander, and the Greeks made mighty efforts . . . to gain possession of."¹¹³ What does this portentous phrase, "another world," mean?

In the body of the letter, two interpretative options are proposed. The landmass is either "an immense tract of land situated in the south" (i.e., a new austral world-island) or it is "terrestrial paradise." Columbus opts for the latter interpretation. Citing the opinions of patristic authorities, he states, "the more I reason on the subject, the more I become satisfied that the terrestrial paradise is situated on the spot I described."¹¹⁴

From our perspective, it would appear that rather than opting for the "correct" choice—that he had indeed discovered a previously unimagined landmass—Columbus persuades himself of the opposite.¹¹⁵ He does so by arguing for an essential difference between the two hemispheres. The southern is not spherical like the northern,¹¹⁶ for "Ptolemy and the others who have written on the globe had no information respecting this part of the world which was then unexplored, they only established their arguments with respect to their own hemisphere."¹¹⁷ In a bizarre image, Columbus declares:

I have come to another conclusion concerning the world, namely that it is not round as they describe, but is in the form of a pear, which is very round except where the stalk grows, at which point it is most prominent; or like a round ball, upon one part of which is a prominence, like a woman's nipple.¹¹⁸

At the height of this nipple-like protrusion is

the spot of the earthly paradise whither none can go without God's permission, but this land which your Highnesses have now sent me to explore is very extensive, and I think there are many others [countries] in the south [*otras muchas en el austro*] of which the world has never had any knowledge.¹¹⁹

In this manner, Columbus had it both ways. All of the lands previously sighted and explored in his voyages were part of the "Indies"—part of the Asian lobe of the tripartite *orbis terrarum*. This newly discovered *otro mundo* was not contained within the bounds of the tripartite division, but it was not an *orbis alterius*. Rather, it was the only possible exception within Christian topography—terrestrial paradise.¹²⁰ It was an "old" land in terms of biblical tradition; a "new" land in terms of Spanish possession.¹²¹ Peter Martyr's nearly contemporary verdict (1501) will suffice: "*fabulosa mihi videantur*."¹²²

To understand the Columbian "fantasy," it is insufficient to characterize him as possessing a "medieval mind," as many recent commentators have done,¹²³ or to depict him as being deluded through an extreme case of wish fulfillment—an interpretation as old as his early chronicler, Las Casas, who, writing of Columbus's fixation on establishing his proximity to the courts of the Khan, comments: "How marvellous a thing it is how whatever a man strongly desires and has firmly set in his imagination, all that he hears and sees at each step he fancies to be in its favor."¹²⁴ What we must see in Columbus is primarily a failure of language, the inability to recognize the inadequacy of his inherited vocabulary and the consequent inability to project a new. At best, there is a muddle. Things are either "like" or "unlike" Spain, but nothing is "other." In a manner similar to the classical ethnographers', Columbus recognizes nothing that requires "decipherment"; all is sheerly transparent.

We must leave, then, the explorer and turn to the scholar for our purposes, the towering figure of Peter Martyr, whose *De Orbe Novo* represents the first, systematic, historiographical reflection on the Columbian "discoveries" by a nonparticipant.¹²⁵

The most striking element in Peter Martyr's earliest writings on Columbus's "enterprise" between 1493 and 1495 is an absence: he scrupulously avoids the term "Indies" and, hence, the Columbian identification.¹²⁶ This is apparent, already, in his earliest reaction. In May 1493, less than two months after Columbus's return from his first voyage—if the epistolary record is to be credited¹²⁷—he refers to Columbus as having travelled to the "western antipodes."¹²⁸ In September 1493, he augments this description by locating the "western antipodes" in the "new hemisphere of the earth." Here, novelty clearly refers to their previously unknown status; the islands have been "hidden since Creation."¹²⁹

By November, 1493, Martyr reports (in the first book of the first *Decade*) the existence of "recently discovered islands in the western ocean,"¹³⁰ but he remains ambivalent as to their identification. He knows that Columbus understands this "unknown land" to consist of "islands which touch the Indies,"¹³¹ but he is not convinced. He suggests that they are a previously unknown group of westerly Atlantic islands, thoroughly analogous to the long-familiar Canaries.¹³² Furthermore, when reporting on "Hispaniola," he notes that Columbus believes it to be the rediscovered ancient Solomonic site of Ophir (an identification, like terrestrial paradise, which shows forth Columbus's attempt to locate his "enterprise" within the framework of biblical cosmography). Martyr rejects the identification, suggesting instead the legendary western Atlantic islands, the Antilles.¹³³ All three of Martyr's interpretations (the "western antipodes," the analogy with the Canaries, and the Antilles) show Martyr as rejecting Columbus's oriental fantasy. All three place his discoveries in the western Atlantic in terms that recall Greco-Roman geography.

There is, however, a hint in this 1493 account of something more. Columbus claims to have found "indications of a hitherto unknown *alterius terrarum orbis*."¹³⁴ Martyr will later report, in 1501, that Columbus believes it to be "the continent of India"—an identification that Martyr firmly rejects.¹³⁵ But for now, Martyr supplies no identification.

In November 1493, Peter Martyr employs a different terminology, one for which he will become famous. In a letter to Cardinal Sforza, he writes of a *novus orbis* that Columbus has discovered.¹³⁶ Again, we must inquire as to the meaning of this portentous phrase.

Martyr's earliest usage of the term *novus orbis* is closely akin to his even earlier phrase, "the new hemisphere of the earth" (*novo terrarum hemispherio*). It means newly discovered parts of the familiar globe. When Martyr writes of the *novus orbis*, he is not identifying a new geographic entity in the sense we are familiar with when we capitalize the "New World" as the Americas in contradistinction to the "Old World." Martyr's

novus orbis is neither Columbus's *otro mundo* (which he understands, as we have seen, to be terrestrial paradise), nor Vespucci's *mundus novus* (which he understands to be a previously unknown extension of Asia),¹³⁷ but like these terms, it does not challenge the old world-view. This will not occur in explicit fashion until the *Cosmographiae Introductio* of 1508 with its declaration that Vespucci had discovered a previously unsuspected "fourth part of the world."¹³⁸

At any rate, Martyr does not employ the phrase "new world" in his *Decades* until those portions of the work composed after 1514.¹³⁹ Here, it may well carry the connotation of an *orbis alterius*, but only after the period of the initial responses, when the notion of the inadequacy of the tripartite *oikoumenē* had become commonplace in intellectual discourse.

What has been learned thus far from the first explorer and the earliest interpreter of that exploration is the difficulty in conceptualizing "otherness." Something "different" has been sensed but has as yet gained no distinctive voice. Rather, the old language has been stretched to accommodate it. Perhaps this "stretching" is what was meant by the curious phrase the sixteenth-century historian Hernan Pérez de Oliva used to describe the Columbian "enterprise." He speaks of an enterprise in which Columbus "sought to unite the world and give to those strange lands the form of our own."¹⁴⁰ The "other" emerges only as a theoretical issue when it is perceived as challenging a complex and intact world-view. It is only then that the "different" becomes the problematic "alien." The incapacity of imagination exhibited by Columbus and Peter Martyr stands as eloquent testimony to that intactness. Yet, once the question is admitted, once alienation is even fleetingly glimpsed, it cannot be silenced or ignored. It will give rise to thought as expressed in speech. What was inconceivable in the last decade of the fifteenth century became commonplace, for some, by the first decade of the sixteenth. The "Americas" were, as the 1508 *Introductio* named and described them—in an act of language, not of exploration—a "fourth part" of the world. Like us, in that it was inhabited; unlike us, in its geographical form. For the familiar three parts were contiguous landmasses (i.e., continents); the newly discovered "fourth part" was discontinuous, it was understood to be an island surrounded by a vast expanse of water.¹⁴¹ It was the insular nature of the unexpected "discovery" of a "fourth part" of the "world" that gave rise to the more intense debate over "otherness"—that respecting the land's inhabitants: its humans, animals, and plants.

For Columbus, knowing that he was in the "Indies," the presence of human inhabitants, of animals and plants which seemed both familiar and strange, presented no major intellectual problems. True, the naked

men and women did not resemble the high civilization of the “great Khan” that Marco Polo and Toscanelli had led him to expect. But, no matter. As he endlessly repeats, he has heard that the capital of the Khan is just a short journey away. Because he is in what he believes to be both a contiguous and an unfamiliar land, he can recognize differences and impose similarities without giving these matters a second’s thought. Because he cannot speak directly to the natives, except through ambiguous “signs,” he can impose his language on whatever or whomever he encounters without impediment.¹⁴² He “gives to these strange lands the form of our own” precisely because he did not know what Olivia knew decades later, that in some profound fashion, the lands were truly “strange.” The most obvious example of this is also the most enduring: six days after landing, Columbus was able to easily and unquestioningly call the indigenous population “Indios.”¹⁴³

Less often noted but, in fact, far more massive a feature of Columbus’s writings is his constant Europeanization of the indigenous flora and fauna.¹⁴⁴ Take, for example, the matter of the nightingales (the common name for a group of small Eurasian thrushes of which no species is to be found in the Americas). Even before making land-fall, Columbus found one night on board ship so agreeable that, according to Las Casas, “the Admiral said that nothing was wanting but to hear the nightingale.”¹⁴⁵ Columbus was not to be disappointed. On at least three occasions after landing in the “Indies” he heard “the singing of the nightingales and other birds of Castile.”¹⁴⁶

For all the unconscious humor that might be found in these and other examples,¹⁴⁷ the point as to “Indians,” “nightingales,” and the like is far more serious. As Terrence Hawkes reminds us, “a colonist acts essentially as a dramatist. He imposes the ‘shape’ of his own culture embodied in his speech on the new world, and makes that world recognizable” and, hence, “habitable” for him.¹⁴⁸ So long as Columbus and the other early explorers were successful in giving “to those strange lands the form of our own,” the lands could not emerge as truly “strange”; they could not be perceived as objects of thought; there could be no language and, hence, no theory of the “other.”

The early records must therefore be searched for moments of heightened self-consciousness, for crises of confidence in the sheer translatability of “here” to “there,” of “old” to “new,” of “familiar” to “strange.” Such moments are difficult to find and to pinpoint with chronological precision. Nevertheless, a set of such essentially linguistic “turns” can be discerned—although a determination of their contemporary influence must remain problematic.¹⁴⁹

The “issue of the Indians,” that is to say, the question of how the “New World” came to be populated¹⁵⁰ was, as best as can be determined, first raised in interrogatory form¹⁵¹ in a play printed circa 1519 and attributed to John Rastell, brother-in-law of Sir Thomas More. Rastell, a minor Tudor poet and major early English printer, had himself attempted a journey to the “New Founde Lands” in 1517.¹⁵²

In the play *A New Interlude and a Mery, of the Nature of the iiii Elementis, declarynge many proper poyntys of philosophy naturall and of dyvers straunge landys*,¹⁵³ the author, in the guise of describing a globe, knows that there is a single mass of “new landes . . . westwarde . . . that we never harde tell of before thus/by wrytng nor other meanys.”¹⁵⁴ It stretches from the “north parte” where “all the clothes/That they were is but bestis skins” to the “south parte of *that contrey*” where “the people there go nakyd alway/the lande is of so great hete.”¹⁵⁵ The poet immediately goes on to pose the query:

But howe the people furst began
In that contrey or whens they cam,
For clerkes it is a questyon.¹⁵⁶

The first explicit attempt to answer this question,¹⁵⁷ to go beyond narrative and description to the level of explanation, was Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés’s encyclopaedic work,¹⁵⁸ *Historia general y natural de las Indias islas y Tierra Firme del Mar Oceano*, specifically, in those parts published in 1535.¹⁵⁹ Oviedo offers two hypotheses: (1) the land had been populated by the ancient Carthaginians,¹⁶⁰ (2) his more persistent argument, that the lands were ancient Spanish possessions (identified with the Hesperides) associated with the mythical Spanish king Héspero, who was alleged to have reigned circa 1680 B.C.¹⁶¹ Thus for Oviedo, there was no “new discovery” or problematic population; “through the agency of Columbus, God had returned the Indies to their [original and] rightful owner—the Spanish Crown.”¹⁶²

While attempts persisted to deny “otherness” by arguing, in one form or another, that the “new” land was in some sense rediscovered “old” land that was a part of the tripartite *oikoumenē* and a part, as well, of classical geographical lore, these would remain minority positions.¹⁶³ More usually, given the monogenetic interpretations of Genesis 1–10, three kinds of theoretical options were proposed. (1) The new land was not wholly insular. It was connected (most usually by a land bridge) to the tripartite *oikoumenē* and thus, though an “other world” geographically, it was populated by an overland migration of familiar peoples. It should be noted

that this remains, today, the leading explanation. (2) There was a “second Ark”—one not recorded in Scripture, with all that implied. (3) There was some form of miraculous intervention—the *locus classicus* being Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, 16.7, which posed the hypothesis that angels transported animals to remote islands after the Flood.

These interpretative options were taken up and systematically reviewed for the first time by Joseph de Acosta in his remarkable, *Historia natural y moral de las Indias*, a work begun circa 1580.¹⁶⁴ Acosta rejected the hypotheses of the “second Ark” and of angelic intervention,¹⁶⁵ while supporting in a sophisticated manner the hypothesis of a land bridge or a narrow strait separating the “Indies” from the “old world.”¹⁶⁶ He rejected all attempts to deny difference: the “Indies” were not Ophir or Atlantis; the “Indians” were not Hebrews.¹⁶⁷ His understanding of the process of population was complex and suggestive. The inhabitants of the “new world” came over from the “old” at different times in the past. They gradually lost their previous cultures and developed their own indigenous ones, becoming first hunters, then agriculturalists.¹⁶⁸ Therefore, there will be cultural similarities between the “new” and the “old,” but these similarities are the result of similar development, and may not be used, in themselves, as clues to origin.¹⁶⁹ Finally, note must be taken of the publication in 1607 of the first book wholly devoted to the question of the Indians’ origins, Gregorio García’s *Origen de los indios de el Nuevo Mundo, e Indias occidentales*. It is a massive, 535-page review of all possible interpretative options.¹⁷⁰

The concomitant issue, the origin of the flora and fauna and their similarities and differences to those of the “old world,” was largely addressed by the same sort of theorizing as attended the human. But there was one difference. Given the monogenetic interpretations of Genesis 1–10, the “Indians,” if identified as human (and there is little evidence that they were not),¹⁷¹ could never be absolutely “different.” Animals and plants could be so perceived. Thus, it is in their naturalistic observations and writings that we find the clearest early statements of “otherness” framed in terms of the linguistic implications of “difference.”¹⁷² I shall content myself with citing three telling examples from the rich, sixteenth-century Spanish naturalistic literature. First, perhaps the earliest and most extreme statement of “otherness,” from a work by Oviedo published in 1526, which describes what appears to be a jaguar.

In my opinion, these animals are not tigers, nor are they panthers, or any other of the numerous known animals that have

spotted skins, nor some new animal [of the “old world”] that has a spotted skin and has not [yet] been described. The many animals that exist in the Indies that I describe here, or at least most of them, could not have been learned about from the ancients, since they exist in a land which had not been discovered until our own time. There is no mention made of these lands in Ptolemy’s *Geography*, nor in any other work, nor were they known until Christopher Columbus showed them to us. . . . But, returning to the subject already begun . . . this animal is called by the Indians, *ochi*.¹⁷³

This last sentence is of crucial importance. Given the stated inadequacy of “old world” taxa, Oviedo self-consciously shifts to native terminology. Our second example is Acosta’s protest against the imperialism of names (as in Columbus and the nightingales).

The first Spaniards gave many things found in the Indies Spanish names taken from things which they somewhat resembled . . . when, in fact, they were quite different. Indeed, the difference between them and what are called by these names in Castile are greater than the similarities.¹⁷⁴

Finally, Acosta makes a complex, theoretical statement concerning “difference.”

What I say of the *guanacos* and *pacos* I will say of a thousand varieties of birds and fowls and mountain animals that have never been known [previously] by either name or appearance, nor is there any memory of them in the Latins or Greeks, nor in any nations of our [European] world over here. . . . It is well to ask whether these animals differ in kind and essence from all others, or if this difference be accidental. . . . But, to speak bluntly, any one who in this way would focus only on the accidental differences, seeking thereby to explain [away] the propagation of the animals of the Indies and to reduce them [to variants] of the European, will be undertaking a task that he will not be able to fulfill. For, if we are to judge the species of animals [in the Indies] by their [essential] properties, they are so different that to seek to reduce them to species known in Europe will mean having to call an egg a chestnut.¹⁷⁵

The "new world" is not merely "new," not merely "different"—it is "other" *per essentiam*. As such, it calls forth an "other" language.

As this review has suggested, although slow to start, the theoretical issues posed by the "otherness" of "America" were raised in sharp form as a project of language by the end of the sixteenth century. But they could not be solved—not for want of data, but because theory was inadequate. This deficiency at the level of theory persisted for centuries. The nineteenth century finally established the principle of polygenesis—above all, through that major contribution to anthropological theory now discredited, the notion of "race." The nineteenth century also contributed an early understanding of genetic variation's processes and the procedures for polythetic classification. It is only in the last decades, following upon the long and arid debates over independent variation versus diffusion, that we are beginning to develop adequate theories and well-formulated criteria for diffusion.¹⁷⁶

III

"Few questions have exerted so powerful a grip on the thought of this century than that of the 'Other' . . . It is difficult to think of another topic that so radically separates the thought of the present . . . from its historical roots."

M. THEUNISSEN, *Der Andere*

In the first part of this essay, in relation to the notion of "parasite," attention was focused on what might be termed the political aspects of a "theory of the other." That is to say, we were largely concerned with the figure of the "proximate other," with questions of the relativity of "otherness," of its modes and degrees,¹⁷⁷ often perceived hierarchically. We were led to postulate that "otherness," by its very nature, required a relational theory of reciprocity (in other words, politics), and that a "theory of otherness," in this sense, must be construed as a rule-governed set of reciprocal relations with one socially labeled an "other."

In the second part of this essay, that concerned with the "discovery" of "America," we shifted to what might be termed the linguistic aspects of a "theory of the other."¹⁷⁸ In the same way that, according to one historian of science, "Ptolemy's model of the earth was the weapon by which the real earth was conquered intellectually,"¹⁷⁹ so, too, here. The "conquest of America," for all of its frightful human costs, was primarily a linguistic event.¹⁸⁰ Once recognized (in the face of an intact, linguistically embedded world-view), "otherness" was, on the one hand, a challenge to

"decipherment"; on the other hand, it was an occasion for the "stretching" of language—both for the creation of new linguistic entities ("new world" and the like) and the attempt, through discourse, to "give to these strange worlds the shape of our own."¹⁸¹ "Otherness" is not a descriptive category, an artifact of the perception of difference or commonality. Nor is it the result of the determination of biological descent or affinity.¹⁸² It is a political and linguistic project, a matter of rhetoric and judgment.

It is for this reason that in thinking about the "other," real progress has been made only when the "other" ceases to be an ontological category. That is to say, "otherness" is not some absolute state of being. Something is "other" only with respect to something "else." Whether understood politically or linguistically, "otherness" is a situational category. Despite its apparent taxonomic exclusivity, "otherness" is a transactional matter, an affair of the "in between."¹⁸³

In our historical review, this situational and transactional character loomed large through the notion of the "proximate other." That is to say, absolute "difference" is not a category for thought, but one that denies the possibility of thought. What one historian has stated about the concept, "unique," may be applied as well to the notion of the "wholly other" (with the possible exception of odd statements in even odder Continental theologies):

This word 'unique' is a negative term signifying what is mentally inapprehensible. The absolutely unique is, by definition, indescribable.¹⁸⁴

The "otherness" of the common housefly can be taken for granted, but it is also impenetrable. For this reason, its "otherness" is of no theoretical interest.¹⁸⁵ While the "other" may be perceived as being either LIKE-US or NOT-LIKE-US, he is, in fact, most problematic when he is TOO-MUCH-LIKE-US, or when he claims to BE-US. It is here that the real urgency of a "theory of the other" emerges. This urgency is called forth not by the requirement to place the "other," but rather to situate ourselves. It is here, to invoke the language of a theory of ritual, that we are not so much concerned with the drama of "expulsion," but with the more mundane and persistent processes of "micro-adjustment."¹⁸⁶ This is not a matter of the "far" but, preeminently, of the "near." The problem is not alterity, but similarity—at times, even identity. A "theory of the other" is but another way of phrasing a "theory of the self."

In the examples discussed above, the parasite was the object of intense theoretical interest not merely because it was "there," but because

it invaded intimate human space. The parasite was apart from and yet a part of our personal bodily environment.¹⁸⁷ So too, with the “Indian”—although matters here are necessarily more complex. The aboriginal Amerindian became a figure of high theoretical interest only when he was gradually thought of as being “in between”—neither the well-known though exotic citizen of the fabled “Indies,” nor a separate species of man (as in Linnaeus’s remarkable proposal to establish the types *Homo americanus*, *Homo monstrosus patagonici*, and *Homo monstrosus plagioccephali* to describe three forms of Amerindians).¹⁸⁸ Rather, especially in the latter half of the eighteenth century, he became a figure of intense and long-lasting speculation precisely to the degree that Amerindian culture was seen as revelatory of the European’s own past.¹⁸⁹ “In the beginning,” to cite John Locke, “all the world was America.”¹⁹⁰

By way of conclusion, this may be pressed in a direction closer to the explicit theme of this conference. Due to the emergent disciplines of anthropology, history of religions and the like, we know of thousands of societies and world views which are “different,” but in most cases, their “remoteness” guarantees our indifference. By and large, Christians and Jews qua Christians and Jews have not thought about the “otherness” of the Kwakiutl or, for that matter, of the Taoist. The bulk of Christian theoretical thinking about “otherness” (starting with Paul) has been directed toward “other Christians” and, more occasionally, towards those groups thought of as being “near-Christians,” preeminently Jews and Muslims. Today, as in the past, the history of religious conflicts, of religious perceptions of “otherness” is largely intraspecific: Buddhists to Buddhists, Christians to Christians, Muslims to Muslims, Jews to Jews. The only major exceptions occur in those theoretically unrevealing but historically common moments when “proximity” becomes more a matter of territoriality than of thought.

A “theory of the other” rarely depends on the capacity “to see ourselves as others see us.” By and large, “we” remain indifferent to such re-fractions. Rather, it would appear to imply the reverse. A “theory of the other” requires those complex political and linguistic projects necessary to enable us to think, to situate, and to speak of “others” in relation to the way in which we think, situate, and speak about ourselves.

Notes

1. Robert Burns, *Poems Chiefly in the Scottish Dialect* (Kilmarnock, 1786), 192–94, esp. 194.
2. K. Wittig, *The Scottish Tradition in Literature* (Edinburgh, 1958), 201.

3. The social and political settings of Scottish vernacular have been well studied by D. Craig, *Scottish Literature and the Scottish People* (London, 1961). I have taken the detail of the “Select Society” from D. Murison, “The Language of Burns,” in D. A. Low, ed., *Critical Essays on Robert Burns* (London, 1975), 56.

4. For the ideological issues and their relation to continental theories concerning language, see F. W. Freeman, “The Intellectual Background of the Vernacular Revolt before Burns,” *Studies in Scottish Literature* 16 (1981): 160–87.

5. See the study by H. Meige, *Les pouilleux dans l’art* (Paris: 1897). For a catalog of old, scientific illustrations, see G. H. F. Nuttall, “The Systematic Position, Synonymy and Iconography of *Pediculus humanus* and *Phthirus pubis*,” *Parasitology* 1, no. 1 (1919): 329–46, esp. 337–39.

6. For a study of the flea in literature, see B. Lehane, *The Compleat Flea* (New York, 1969).

7. Title page, *Autobiography of a Flea* in the edition published by the Erotica Biblion Society (New York, 1901). The first edition, published for the Phlebotomical Society, London, bears the date 1789. This is false. The *Autobiography* is clearly a work of Victorian England. For a bibliography devoted to the special topic of the flea in erotic literature, see H. Hayn and A. N. Gotendorf, *Floh-Literatur (de pulicibus des In- und Auslandes vom XVI Jahrhundert bis zur Neuzeit)* (Dresden [?], 1913).

8. I know of no good history of parasitology. For the present, W. D. Foster, *A History of Parasitology* (Edinburgh and London, 1965) remains the most serviceable.

9. R. Hoeppli, *Parasites and Parasitic Infections in Early Medicine and Science* (Singapore, 1959) is a rich repertoire of ancient sources (especially valuable for its inclusion of Chinese materials). There are a series of comprehensive notes on the Greco-Roman parasitological literature in F. Adams, *The Seven Books of Paulus Aegineta*, 3 vols. (London, 1844–47), esp. 2: 139–53.

10. See, in general, A. N. Disney et al., *The Origin and Development of the Microscope* (London, 1928); R. S. Clay and T. H. Court, *The History of the Microscope* (London, 1932). The introductory material to the English translation of Leeuwenhoek’s writings by C. Dobell, *Antony van Leeuwenhoek and His “Little Animals”* (London, 1932) is invaluable. It will be recalled that an early term for microscope was “louse-lens.”

11. Much work remains to be done on the topos, “small is more interesting than large.” While such a notion is as old as Pliny (*Historia naturalis* 11.1), it became a dominant motif only after the fashioning of lenses, both for the telescope and, most especially, for the microscope. For the former, one thinks of Galileo’s encomium to the “little moons” of Jupiter, which concludes with a defense of and hymn of praise to tiny things (Galileo, letter dated May 21, 1611, in P. Dini, *Epistolario Galilei* [Leghorn, 1872], 1: 121–22). The latter is summarized, at a late stage of its development, in the well-known dictum in Emerson’s essay “On Compen-

sation": "The microscope cannot find the animalcule which is less perfect for being little," (R. L. Cook, ed., *Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Prose and Poetry* [New York, 1950], 109). The fundamental study of this topos is M. Nicolson, *The Microscope and English Imagination* (Northampton, Mass., 1935), in the series *Smith College Studies in Modern Languages*, 16.4, which should be read in conjunction with her analogous studies of the telescope, "The Telescope and the Imagination," *Modern Philology* 32 (1935): 233–60; "The New Astronomy and the English Literary Imagination," *Studies in Philology* 32 (1935): 428–62, cf. Nicolson, *The Breaking of the Circle: Studies in the Effect of the "New Science" upon Seventeenth-Century Poetry*, 2d ed. (New York, 1960). For other studies of this topos, see A. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (Cambridge, Mass., 1936), 236–40; A. Gerbi, *The Dispute of the New World: The History of a Polemic, 1750–1900* (Pittsburgh, 1973), 16–20.

12. It is the special merit of E. Mayr, *The Growth of Biological Thought* (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), 1: 134–40, to place the increase in knowledge about the number of parasitic species within the context of the general eighteenth-century increase in the knowledge of the number and diversity of animal and plant species. The article by P. Geddes, "Parasitism, Animal," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 9th ed. (1875–89) is an eloquent witness to the perception of parasitism's ubiquity: "we observe not only the enormously wide prevalence of parasitism—the number of parasitic individuals, if not indeed that of species, *probably exceeding that of non-parasitic forms*—but its very considerable variety in degree and detail" (18: 260, emphasis added).

13. For some of the taxonomic implications, see F. B. Churchill, "Sex and the Single Organism: Biological Theories of Sexuality in the Mid-19th Century," *Studies in the History of Biology* 3 (1979): 139–77.

14. For an overview, see J. Farley, *The Spontaneous Generation Controversy from Descartes to Oparin* (Baltimore, 1977), 18–19, 34–38, 58–66 focus on parasites. I have been much helped by the treatment in E. Guyénot, *Les sciences de la vie au XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles* (Paris, 1941), 211–19. With particular reference to parasites, see R. Hoepli and I. H. Ch'iang, "The Doctrine of Spontaneous Generation of Parasites in Old-Style Chinese and Western Medicine," *Peking Natural History Bulletin* 19 (1950–51): 375–415, reprinted with revisions in Hoepli, *Parasites and Parasitic Diseases*, 113–56.

15. J. J. S. Steenstrup, *Über den Generationswechsel; oder, Die Fortpflanzung und Entwicklung durch abwechselnde Generationen, eine eigenthümliche Form der Brutpflege in den niederen Thierklassen* (Copenhagen, 1842). This German translation (by C. H. Lorenzen) is the first publication of Steenstrup's manuscript, *Om Fortplantrning og Udvikling gjennem vekslede Generationsraekker*. An English translation was rapidly published by the John Ray Society, *On the Alternation of Generations; or, The Propagation and Development of Animals through Alternate Genera-*

tions (London: 1845). On Steenstrup and his contributions, see E. Lagrange, "Le centenaire d'une découverte: Le cycle évolutif des Cestodes," *Annales de Parasitologie* 27 (1952): 557–70.

16. A. W. Meyer, *The Rise of Embryology* (Stanford: 1939), 43, supports the notion that the decisive generation in parasitology was the period 1840–70. In what follows, I have surveyed the following widely used texts: J. Leidy, *A Flora and Fauna within Living Animals* (Washington, D.C., 1853); F. Küchenmeister, *Die in und an dem Körper des lebenden Menschen vorkommenden Parasiten* 1st ed. (Leipzig, 1855), 1–2; C.-J. Davaine, *Traité des entozoaires et des maladies vermineuses de l'homme et des animaux domestiques* (Paris, 1860); T. S. Cobbold, *Entozoa, An Introduction to the Study of Helminthology* (London, 1869); P.-J. van Beneden, *Les commensaux et les parasites dans la règne animal*, 2d ed. (Paris, 1878); R. Leuckart, *Die menschlichen Parasiten und die von ihnen herrührenden Krankheiten* 1st ed. (Leipzig and Heidelberg, 1863–76), 1–2, Leuckart, *Die Parasiten des Menschen und die von ihnen herrührenden Krankheiten*, ed. G. Brandes, 2d ed. (Leipzig and Heidelberg, 1879–1901), 1–2 (all citations are to the second edition). For contrast to the "newer" parasitology, C. Rudolphi, *Entozoorum sive vermium intestinalium historia naturalis* (Amsterdam, 1808–10), 1–2 was employed.

17. This process of changing nomenclature may be illustrated by the compound titles in the works by Davaine, Cobbold, and Rudolphi in note 16 above.

18. This last distinction creates a new series of definitional issues still unresolved in the literature. From one point of view, every disease produced by a microorganism might be considered a parasitic disease. In practice, parasitic diseases are more narrowly defined, but the criteria remain unclear.

19. To these distinctions were added others chiefly derived from botany, such as "epiphytism," in which one species derives physical support but not nourishment from another species. (For example, mistletoe is a parasite; English ivy is not).

20. I stress that the above is a summary of an influential late-nineteenth-century taxonomy. For the current state of the question: (1) the most significant work on the theory of parasitism has been done by Russian scientists. Their work has been made available in the English translation of V. A. Dogiel, *General Parasitology* (New York, 1966) with rich bibliography. (2) For a review of the complex contemporary state of the question with regard to taxonomy, see the distinguished collection edited by G. D. Schmidt, *Problems in the Systematics of Parasites* (Baltimore, 1969).

21. Leuckart, *Die Parasiten des Menschen*, 1: 3.

22. For a wide-ranging survey, see the chapter, "Parasites and Parasitic Infections in Religion," in Hoepli, *Parasites and Parasitic Infections*, 396–409.

23. Verminis is known from only one Latin inscription, *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*, 7.1: no. 3732 = H. Dessau, *Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae* (Berlin, 1892–1916), 2.1: no. 4019. See E. Buchner, "Verminis," *Real-Encyclopädie der*

classischen Altertumswissenschaft, 2.8: 1552–53; Hoeppli, *Parasites and Parasitic Infections*, 397–98.

24. I. Kant, *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels* (1755) in P. Mesiger, ed., *Kant: Populäre Schriften* (Berlin, 1911), 127.

25. Leuckart, *Die Parasiten des Menschen*, 1: 35; Meyer, *Rise of Embryology*, 67; H. Zinsser, *Rats, Lice and History* (Boston, 1935), 182; Hoeppli, *Parasites and Parasitic Infections*, 401; Guyenot, *Les sciences de la vie*, 218–19. For the poem, Lehane, *Compleat Flea*, 96–97.

26. Meyer, *Rise of Embryology*, 66.

27. D. C. Allen, *The Legend of Noah* (Urbana, 1963), 72, 185; Hoeppli, *Parasites and Parasitic Infections*, 401.

28. B. Glass et al., *Forerunners of Darwin, 1745–1849* (Baltimore, 1959), 51.

29. “Parasite” is standard in English as a botanical term in the early eighteenth century. See, for example, *Chamber’s Encyclopaedia* (Edinburgh, 1727–41), s.v. “parasite.” For its massive use in an influential, early botanical work, see A. P. de Candolle, *Physiologie végétale* (Paris, 1832), vol. 3, *Des parasites phanerogames*.

30. I have been unable to locate the first self-conscious use of the term “parasite” as a zoological term. It gained early currency among the first generation of parasitologists as the result of the comprehensive article by the distinguished biologist, Carl von Siebold, “Parasiten,” in R. Wagner, ed., *Handwörterbuch der Physiologie* (Brunschweig, 1844), 2: 641–92, but there is no explicit reflection on the name. (Siebold’s article was a major influence in the acceptance of Steenstrup’s work, op. cit. 646–47). From a review of the citations in the early works cited above (note 16) and a survey of the titles in J. Ch. Huber, *Bibliographie der klinischen Helminthologie* (Munich, 1895), it would appear that Küchenmeister, *Die in und an dem Körper des lebenden Menschen vorkommenden Parasiten*, was the first comprehensive work to use “parasite” in its title. Again, I can find no explicit meditation on the use of the term. This was strengthened in the title of the English translation of the second edition, *On Animal and Vegetable Parasites of the Human Body* (London, 1857), 1–2. As best as I can determine, the *Zeitschrift für Parasitenkunde* (Jena, 1869–75) was the earliest journal to employ “parasite” in its title.

31. In this regard, the articles on “Parasiten” in J. Ersch and T. Gruber, eds., *Allgemeine Encyclopädie der Wissenschaften und Künste* (Leipzig, 1838), 3.2: 417–23 are revealing. There is a brief, one-paragraph article consisting of two sentences which provides a botanical definition of “parasite” by A. Sprengel (423a). This is preceded by a long article of seven pages (thirteen columns) on the social meaning of parasite by M. H. E. Meier—a brief treatment of its cultic use (417a–418a) and a long essay on the figure of the Parasite in ancient comedy (418b–423a). This proportion has been reversed by the turn of the century. For example, in the eleventh edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1910–11), there is an anonymous one-paragraph article on the cultic and literary sense of “parasite”

(20: 770a–b), followed by a twenty-two-page article on “parasitic diseases” (20: 770b–793b) and a five-page article on botanical and zoological “parasitism” (20: 793b–797b).

32. The fundamental study remains O. Ribbeck, *Kolax: Eine ethologische Studie* (Leipzig, 1883) in the series *Abhandlungen der Königl. Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften*, Phil.-hist. Klasse, 9.1: 1–113. See further, M. H. E. Meier, “Parasiten,” in Ersch-Gruber, *Allgemeine Encyclopädie*, 3.2: 418–23; J. E. B. Mayor, *The Thirteen Satires of Juvenal* (London, 1901), 1: 271–72; A. Giese, *De parasiti persona capita selecta* (Kiel, 1908); F. M. Cornford, *The Origin of Attic Comedy* (London, 1914—I cite the new edition edited by T. H. Gaster [Garden City, 1961]), 143–45; J. O. Loftberg, “The Sycophant-Parasite,” *Classical Philology* 15 (1920): 61–72; cf. Loftberg, “Sycophancy at Athens” (Ph.d. diss., University of Chicago, 1917); M. E. Dilley, “The Parasite: A Study in Comic Development” (Ph.d. diss., University of Chicago, 1924); J. M. G. M. Brinkhoff, “De Parasiet op het romeinsche Toneel,” *Neophilologus* 32 (1948): 127–41; L. Ziehen, E. Wüst and A. Hug, “Parasitoi,” *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, 18: 1377–1405; T. B. L. Webster, *Studies in Late Greek Comedy* (Manchester, 1953), 63–5; W. G. Arnott, “Studies in Comedy (1): Alexis and the Parasite’s Name,” *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 9 (1968): 161–68.

33. Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae*, 6. 234d–248c, in the edition and translation by C. B. Gulick in the Loeb Classical Library series (Cambridge, Mass., 1929), 3: 54–119. That Athenaeus was dependent on a lost lexicographical work was argued by V. Rose, *Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus* (Leipzig, 1863); 457–59.

34. On Polemon, fragment 78 (Preller)= Jacoby, *Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, 3: 137–38, see L. Preller, *Polemonis periegetae fragmenta* (Leipzig, 1838), 115–23.

35. On the cultic term, *parasitos*, *parasitoi*, in addition to the works cited above in note 32, each of which devote some pages to the subject, see A. von Kampen, *De parasitis apud Graecos sacrorum ministris* (Göttingen, 1867); A. Tresp, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Kultschriftsteller* (Giessen, 1914), 209–11; R. Schlaifer, “The Cult of Athena Pallensis,” *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 54 (1943): 141–74, esp. 152; L. Ziehen, “Parasitoi (1),” *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, 18.3: 1377–81; H. W. Parke, *Festivals of the Athenians* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1977), 51.

36. On Kynosarges, see J. E. Harrison, *Mythology and Monuments of Ancient Athens* (London, 1890), 216–19; W. Judeich, *Topographie von Athen*, 2d ed. (Munich, 1931), 422–24.

37. For the Periclean law, see Aristotle, *Constitution of Athens*, 26.3. See further, the excellent discussion of this law in relation to the *nothoi* in A. Diller, *Race Mixture among the Greeks before Alexander* (Urbana, 1937), 91–100, in the series *Illinois University Studies in Language and Literature*, 20.1–2.

38. For the *nothoi* in Athens—which means a person of mixed descent instead of its more usual meaning, “bastard”—in connection with Kynosarges, see Demosthenes, *Orations*, 23.216. See further, U. E. Paoli, *Studi di diritto attico* (Florence, 1930), 272–76; K. Latte, “Nothoi,” *Real-Encyklopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, 33: 1066–74, esp. 1069–71.

39. The requirement that the *parasitoi* be chosen *ek tōn nothōn* appears to be burlesqued in the fragment from Diodorus of Sinope, *The Heiress*, quoted in Athenaeus, 6.239d–e (= T. Kock, *Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta* [Leipzig, 1880–88], 2: 420).

40. The *parasitoi* of Herakles are mentioned in Athenaeus's citations of fragments from Kleidemus (6.235a) and Philocorus (6.235d). Other mentions include Aristophanes, *Daitales* (Kock, *Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta*, 1: 438) and Alciphron, *Parasites*, 3.42. For a collection of testimonia concerning the cult of Herakles at Kynosarges, see S. Solders, *Die ausserstädtischen Kulte und die Einigung Attikas* (Lund, 1931), 78–80.

41. There is, thus, an irony in Beneden's attempt to distinguish between *les commensaux* and *les parasites* in his work by that title (see above, note 16). The former is synonymous with the latter.

42. While this would take us far from our theme, see the important monograph by D. Whitehead, *The Ideology of the Athenian Metic* (Cambridge, 1977) for another aspect of “relative otherness” in Athens.

43. J. A. Boon, *Other Tribes, Other Scribes: Symbolic Anthropology in the Comparative Study of Cultures, Histories, Religions, and Texts* (Cambridge, 1982): 230.

44. R. Redfield, “Primitive World View,” *Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 96 (1952): 30–36, reprinted in Redfield, *The Primitive World and Its Transformations* (Ithaca, 1953), 84–110, quotation on 92.

45. See the Sumerian materials in S. N. Kramer, *The Sumerians* (Chicago, 1963), 275–88. Cf. R. Labat, *Manuel d'épigraphie akkadienne* (Paris, 1948), nos. 60 and 74, for the terminology. A particularly instructive example is provided by G. Buccellati, *The Amorites of the Ur III Period* (Naples, 1966), 92–5. Cf. M. Livrani, “Per una considerazione storica del problema amorreo,” *Oriens Antiquus* 9 (1970): 22–26.

46. While the literature on this subject has become vast in the past several years (see H. C. Conklin, *Folk Classification: A Topically Arranged Bibliography* [New Haven, 1972]), the most useful essay, from our perspective, is B. E. Ward, “Varieties of the Conscious Model: The Fishermen of South China,” in M. Banton, ed., *The Relevance of Models for Social Anthropology* (London, 1965), 113–37.

47. See the important remarks on “true endogamy” in C. Lévi-Strauss, *The Elementary Structures of Kinship* (Boston, 1969), 46–47. The close relationship of social sanctions with respect to sexuality and “otherness” is made starkly plain in the title of the published proceedings of the Twelfth Conference of French Jew-

ish Intellectuals (1971), edited by J. Halpérin and G. Lévitte, *L'autre dans la conscience juive: Le sacré et le couple* (Paris, 1973). “Otherness” and “sacrality” are reduced to questions of intermarriage!

48. See the famous “Exkurs über den Fremden” in G. Simmel, *Soziologie*, 3d ed. (Leipzig, 1923), 509–12. This is developed in M. M. Wood, *The Stranger: A Study in Social Relations* (London, 1934). For an excellent collection of thirty-three essays that focus on the legal relations to the “stranger,” see the collective volume, *L'Étranger* (Brussels, 1958), 1–2, which appeared as volume 9 in the series *Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin*. The definitional article by J. Gilissen (1: 5–57) is of particular merit. There are vast collections of data regarding “strangers” from an anthropological perspective—e.g., J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, 3d ed. (London, 1935), 3: 101–16; P. J. Hamilton-Grierson, “Strangers,” in J. Hastings, ed., *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* (Edinburgh, 1921), 11: 883–96. A. van Gennep, spatializing the “stranger,” gained the generative model for *Rites de Passage* (Paris, 1909). There are a set of important theoretical notes in Lévi-Strauss, *Elementary Structures of Kinship*, 60, 402–3. P. Gauthier, *Symbola: Les étrangers et la justice dans les cités grecques* (Nancy, 1972) provides a model monograph for the study of the topic in an ancient society.

49. From an anthropological perspective, this theme has been a consistent object of attention by Africanists. See, among others, M. Wilson, *Good Company* (London, 1951); and D. Jacobson, *Itinerant Tribesmen: Friendship and Social Order in Urban Uganda* (Menlo Park, 1973).

50. M. Duala-M'bedy, *Xenologie: Die Wissenschaft vom Fremden und die Verdrängung der Humanität in der Anthropologie* (Munich, 1977) collects much interesting data in the service of an unsatisfying and confused thesis.

51. The standard monographs remain K. Trüdinger, *Studien zur Geschichte der griechisch-römischen Ethnographie* (Basel, 1918); and L. Pearson, *Early Ionian Historians* (Oxford, 1939).

52. See the various studies by E. H. Schafer, including *The Golden Peaches of Samarkand: A Study of Tang Exotics* (Berkeley, 1963), *The Vermilion Bird: Tang Images of the South* (Berkeley, 1967), *Shore of Pearls: Hainan Island in Early Times* (Berkeley, 1970).

53. Cortés, “2nd Dispatch,” in D. Enrique de Vedia, *Historiadores Primitivos de Indias* (Madrid, 1918), 1: 34b–35a in the series *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles*, 22. Translation in I. R. Blacker and H. M. Rosen, *Conquest: Dispatches of Cortes from the New World* (New York, 1962), 60–61.

54. J. Burckhardt, *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* (New York, 1929), 291–92.

55. For the history of fieldwork, see A. I. Richards, “The Development of Field Work Methods in Social Anthropology,” in F. C. Bartlett, ed., *The Study of Society* (London, 1939), 272–316; P. Kaberry, “Malinowski's Contribution to

Fieldwork Methods and the Writing of Ethnography," in R. Firth, ed., *Man and Culture*, 2d ed. (London, 1960), 71–91, esp. 72–76; G. W. Stocking, Jr., ed., *Observers Observed: Essays on Ethnographic Fieldwork* (Madison, 1983), in the series History of Anthropology, 1. See further, P. C. W. Gutkind and G. Sankoff, "Annotated Bibliography on Anthropological Field Work Methods," in D. G. Jongmans and P. C. W. Gutkind, eds., *Anthropologists in the Field* (New York, 1967), 214–71.

56. C. Lévi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology* (New York, 1976), 2: 55.

57. History, to take up Lévi-Strauss's example, treats the temporally remote at least to the same degree as anthropology treats the spatially remote.

58. Such is most explicitly the case in C. Lévi-Strauss, *Tristes Tropiques* (Paris, 1955) and J.-P. Dumont, *The Headman and I: Ambiguity and Ambivalence in the Fieldworking Experience* (Austin, 1978).

59. For a collection of papers from the 1974 meeting on "Cultural Futuristics," see M. Maruyama and A. Harkins, eds., *Cultures beyond the Earth: The Role of Anthropology in Outer Space* (New York, 1975). For science fiction novels that make extraterrestrial anthropology their central theme, see, among others, the sophisticated works of Michael Bishop, *Transfigurations* (Berkeley, 1979), and Chad Oliver, *Unearthly Neighbors* (New York, 1960). See further, Smith, "Close Encounters of Diverse Kinds," reprinted in this volume.

60. For the notion of "limiting case," see L. Dumont, *Homo Hierarchicus*, 2d ed. (Chicago, 1979), 24–27.

61. Colin Turnbull's novelistic study of the Ik would be an extreme example, *The Mountain People* (New York, 1972).

62. E. R. Leach, *Rethinking Anthropology* (London, 1961), 1.

63. For a profound meditation on this theme, see J. Fabian, *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object* (New York, 1983).

64. J. Vansina, "Cultures through Time," in R. Naroll and R. Cohen, eds., *A Handbook of Method in Cultural Anthropology* (Garden City, N.Y., 1970), 165. See further, Fabian, *Time and the Other*, 80–97, and the shrewd characterization of the "functionalist monograph" in J. Boon, *Other Tribes, Other Scribes*, 13–14.

65. For a profound meditation on "decipherment," see M. V. David, *Le débat sur les écritures et l'hieroglyph aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles, et l'application de la notion de déchiffrement aux écritures mortes* (Paris, 1965).

66. E. R. Leach, *Political Systems of Highland Burma*, 2d ed. (Boston, 1965), 15.

67. This distinction between the Anglo-American tradition of the "other" and the Continental deserves further study. For the present, D. Locke, *Myself and Others: A Study in Our Knowledge of Minds* (Oxford, 1968) may be taken as an exemplary review of the Anglo-American tradition; M. Theunissen, *Der Andere: Studien zur Sozialontologie der Gegenwart*, 2d ed. (Berlin, 1977) may be taken as an exemplary review of the Continental.

68. One need do no more than appeal to the onomatopoeic derivation of bar-

baros from "ba! ba! ba!," that is, unintelligible, stammering, animal- or child-like speech (already in the *Iliad* 2.867). See, among others, the semasiological study by A. Eichhorn, *Barbaros quid significaverit* (Leipzig, 1904). The same notion is found in the sparse Israelitic ethnographic tradition (e.g., Ezekiel 3: 5–6; Isaiah 33: 4–19; Psalm 114:1), and underlies narratives such as Judges 12:5–6. Compare the Mesoamerican analogue. "The Indians of this New Spain derive, according to what is generally reported in their histories, from two diverse peoples; they give to the first the name, Nahuatlaca, which means 'People who explain themselves and speak clearly,' to be differentiated from the second people, at the time very wild and uncivilized, concerned only with hunting, to whom they give the name, Chichimecs, which means, 'People who go hunting.'" Juan de Tovar, *Historia de los indios mexicanos*, in the edition and French translation by J. La Faye, *Manuscrit Tovar: Origines et croyances des Indiens du Mexique* (Graz, 1972), 9, emphasis added.

69. See the collection of examples in T. Todorov, *The Conquest of America* (New York, 1984), 76. A variant of this is to treat the "other" as a "parrot" with no native language, but imitating European speech. See, for example, the report by Bernardino de Minaya cited in L. Hanke, "Pope Paul III and the American Indians," *Harvard Theological Review* 30 (1937): 84.

70. L. Olschki, *Marco Polo's Precursors* (Baltimore, 1943), 4–5 and note 9 citing the earlier literature. See further, H. Hart, *The Sea Road to the Indies* (New York, 1951), 21n.; and P. Wheatley, *The Golden Khersonese: Studies in the Historical Geography of the Malay Peninsula before A.D. 1500* (Kuala Lumpur, 1961), 130–31.

71. The observations of A. Momigliano, *Alien Wisdom: The Limits of Hellenization* (Cambridge, 1975), 7–8, 91–93, et passim may be generalized. Note further the observation that, even with an interpreter, the barbarian may prove unintelligible, as in Hanno, *Periplus*, 11, in the English translation by R. Harris (Cambridge, 1928), 26.

72. Of the many formulations, that by W. Franklin, *Discoverers, Explorers, Settlers: The Diligent Writers of Early America* (Chicago, 1979), 7, is most useful for our theme. "More than anything else, the West became an epistemological problem for Europe. . . . It was simply the fact of 'another' world which most thoroughly deranged the received order of European life. The issue was not merely an informational one. It involved so many far-reaching consequences that the very structure of Old World knowledge—assumptions about the nature of learning and the role of traditional wisdom in it—was cast into disarray. . . . Faced with a flood of puzzling facts and often startling details, the East was almost literally at a loss for words. Having discovered America, it now needed to make a place for the New World within its intellectual and verbal universe."

73. For a brief overview of the classical conception of the *triplex mundus*, see F. Gisinger, "Geographie," *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, suppl. vol. 4: 521–685, esp. 552–56. See further, the standard histories: E. H. Bun-

bury, *A History of Ancient Geography* (London, 1879), 1: 145–6; E. H. Berger, *Geschichte der wissenschaftlichen Erdkunde der Griechen*, 2d ed. (Leipzig, 1903), 82–90; H. F. Tozer, *A History of Ancient Geography*, 2d ed. (Cambridge, 1935), 67–70.

74. For Pliny's centrality, see E. W. Gudger, "Pliny's 'Historia naturalis': The Most Popular Natural History Ever Published," *Isis* 6 (1924): 269–81, which provides a census of printed editions from 1469 to 1799. Of direct relevance to our topic, see Columbus's copy of Pliny with his annotations in C. de Lollis, *Scritti di Cristoforo Colombo* (Rome, 1894), 2: 471–72 in the series *Raccolta di Documenti e Studi Pubblicati dalla R. Commissione Columbiana*, 1.2. In the early "New World" scientific and historical literature, Pliny serves as the standard of classical knowledge, e.g., E. Alvarez López, "Plinio y Fernández de Oviedo," *Annales de Ciencias naturales del Instituto J. de Acosta* (Madrid, 1940), 1: 46–61 and 2: 13–35.

On Genesis 10, see the commentary and full bibliography in the magisterial work of C. Westermann, *Genesis* (Göttingen, 1966–), 662–706. From our perspective, the most useful work is G. Hölscher, *Drei Erdkarten: Ein Beitrag zur Erkenntnis des hebraischen Altertums* (Heidelberg, 1949), esp. 45–56.

75. The origin and derivation of the name "America" remains a matter of some controversy. J. A. Aboal Amaro, *Amérigho Vespucci: Ensayo de bibliografía crítica* (Madrid, 1962) provides a representative summary of the various proposals. See pp. 15, 18, 20, 31, 53, 55, 56, 60, 61, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 71, 79, 89, 90–94, 123, 124–25, 127–28, 129, 131, 134–35, 136, 144–45, 147–48, 148, 149. See further the important study by C. Sanz, *El Nombre América: Libros y mapas quo lo impulsieron* (Madrid, 1959) and the review of scholarship by J. Vidago, "América: Orígenes e evolução deste nome," *Revista Ocidente* 67 (1964): 93–110.

The figure of "America" as a "fourth" entity was developed through a process of experimentation. This is seen most clearly in the development of "America's" iconography. See, among others, J. H. Hyde, "L'iconographie des quatre parties du monde dans les tapisseries," *Gazette des Beaux-Arts* 66 (1924): 253–72; C. Le Corbeiller, "Miss America and Her Sisters: Personifications of the Four Parts of the World," *Metropolitan Museum Bulletin*, n.s. 19–20 (1960): 209–23. On the general theme, see E. Köllmann, et al., "Erdteile," *Reallexikon zur deutschen Kunstgeschichte* (Munich, 1967), 5: 1107–1202.

76. The first occurrence of this phrase is in M. Waldseemüller[?], *Cosmographie Introductio* (St. Dié, 1507), a iii. See the facsimile edition by J. Fischer and F. von Wieser (reprint, New York, 1969), xxv.

77. The theme of the *orbis alterius* was first developed at length in Pomponius Mela, *De situ orbis*, 1.4, 3.7 (in the edition of G. Parthey [Berlin, 1867]). See, in general, A. Rainaud, *Le continent austral: Hypothèses et découvertes* (Paris, 1893).

78. As is well known, there was a conceptual debate as to whether water or land was primary—the former (and most widely held view) gave rise to the picture of land as insular; the latter reduced the oceans to landlocked lakes. See A.

Norlind, *Das Problem des gegenseitigen Verhältnisses von Land und Wasser und seine Behandlung im Mittelalter* (Lund and Leipzig, 1918) in the series *Lunds Universitets Årsskrift*, n.s. 1.14.2.

79. The "zonal" division is attributed either to Parmenides (Strabo, 2.2.2) or Pythagoras (Aetius, *De placitis philosophorum*, 3.14.1). Both attributions have been the subject of debate. See, among others, W. A. Heidel, *The Frame of the Ancient Greek Maps* (New York, 1937), 76, 80, 91, in the series *American Geographical Society Research Series*, 20; W. Burkert, *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1972); 305–6. The division by *zonai* must not be confused with the division into *klimata* (which were later correlated with the Ptolemaic parallels). See E. Honigsmann, *Die sieben Klimata und die Poleis Episemioi* (Heidelberg, 1929), 4–9, 25–30.

80. Posidonius, fragment 28 (Jacoby) in Strabo, 2.2.3.

81. See, in general, F. Gisinger, "Oikoumenē," *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, 17.2: 2123–74. From our perspective, the most useful study is J. Partsch, *Die Grenzen der Menschheit* (1): *Die antike Oikoumene* (Leipzig, 1916) in the series *Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Königl. Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, Phil.-hist. Kl.* 68 (1916), 1–62.

82. For an influential form of this argument, see Macrobius, *Commentarius in Ciceronis Somnium Scipionis*, 2.5.9–36 in the translation by W. H. Stahl, *Macrobius: Commentary on the Dream of Scipio* (New York, 1952); 200–6. Note that the view that the southern temperate zone "is also inhabited is inferred solely from reason" (2.5.17, emphasis added). This symmetrical argument goes back to the speculation of Krates that the northern *oikoumenē* is but one of four inhabited landmasses. See H. J. Mette, *Sphairopoia: Untersuchungen zur Kosmologie des Krates von Pergamon* (Munich, 1936), 76–77.

83. Strabo, 2.5.13. Cf. 2.5.34, 2.5.43. Strabo here denies that such "other worlds" are part of the study of geography, confining geography to "our *oikoumenē*." For an important discussion of this limitation, see C. van Paassen, *The Classical Tradition of Geography* (Groningen, 1957), 4–31. This limitation persisted on the part of some geographers even after the "discovery" of America, e.g., the preface by Johannes Cochlaeus to the 1512 edition of Pomponius Mela, *De situ orbis*: "In our lifetime, Amerigo Vespucci is said to have discovered that new world . . . [that] is quite distinct from [Africa] and bigger than our Europe. Whether this is true or a lie, it has nothing . . . to do with Cosmography or History. For the peoples and places of that continent are unknown and unnamed to us. . . . Therefore, it is of no interest to geographers at all" (emphasis added). The passage has been quoted in E. P. Goldschmidt, "Not in Harrisse," in *Festschrift Lawrence C. Wroth* (Portland, 1951), 133–34 and J. H. Elliott, "Renaissance Europe and America: A Blunted Impact," in F. Chiappelli, ed., *First Images of America* (Berkeley, 1976), 1: 14. Both Goldschmidt and Elliott have drawn negative conclusions

from the passage rather than setting it within the context of the Strabonian limitations on "geography."

84. It is important to avoid the anachronism of imposing our insular notion of "continent" on this tripartition. I have not been able to locate a history of the term, but it would appear that it referred to a contiguous (*continens*) landmass, e.g., W. Cunningham, *The Cosmographical Glasse* (London, 1559), 113, "Continens [margin: continent] is a portion of the earth which is not parted by the seas asunder." Thus Waldseemüller, in 1508, distinguished between the traditional three contiguous landmasses, which made up the northern earth-island, and the newly discovered "island" of "America": *et sunt tres prime partes continentes, quarta est insula* (Fischer and Wieser facsimile edition, xxx). The application of the term "continent" to all of the major landmasses occurs only in the late sixteenth century. F. Gagnon, "Le thème médiéval de l'homme sauvage dans les premières représentations des Indiens d'Amérique," in G. H. Allard, ed., *Aspects de la marginalité au Moyen Age* (Quebec, 1975), 96, attempts to discern an evaluative opposition in the early iconography of the "Indies"—"la terre ferme européenne est opposée à l'île primitive."

85. While the division of the world-island into three landmasses is already presumed by Herodotus (e.g., 2.16), it was, perhaps, implied by the arrangement of Hecateus's *Periodos* into two books (Europe and Asia) with Libya as an appendix. See F. Gisinger, *Die Erdbeschreibung des Eudoxos von Knidos*, 2d ed. (Amsterdam, 1967), 14–18, 35–36.

86. See R. von Scheliha, *Die Wassergrenze im Altertum* (Breslau, 1931), esp. 34–42, in the series *Historische Untersuchungen*, 8.

87. This is graphically depicted in the Noachic "T-O" maps. The study by M. Destombes, *Mappemondes, A.D. 1200–1500* (Amsterdam: 1964) in the series *Monumenta Cartographica Vetustioris Aevi*, 1, supercedes all previous publications.

88. E.g., Hrbanus Maurus, *De Universo*, 2.1 (Migne, *Patrologia cursus completus, series Latina*, 111: 54), 12.2 (111: 353–54). See also the expanded edition of the *Glossa ordinaria* ad Mt 2.11 (Venice, 1603), 5:62. This identification is not found in the *Glossa* as printed in Migne, PL 114:75.

89. The identification depends on first identifying the unnumbered magi of Mt 2 as "three kings" (Leo, *Sermon* 33 [Migne, PL 54: 235] is an early example) and then identifying the three kings with the three continents. See [pseudo] Jerome, *Expositio Quatuor Evangeliorum* ad Mt. 2.1 (Migne, PL 30: 537); Hrbanus Maurus, *Commentariorum in Matthaeum* ad Mt. 2.1 (Migne, PL 107: 760); [pseudo] Bede, *In Matthaei Evangelium exposito* ad Mt. 2.1 (Migne, PL 92: 113); Michael Scot, *Liber introductorius* (MS. Bodleian 266), f. 3 (as cited in L. Thorndike, *A History of Magic and Experimental Science* [New York, 1923], 2: 318). J. Duchesne-Guillemin, "Jesus' Trimorphism and the Differentiation of the Magi," in E. J. Sharpe and J. R. Hinnells, eds., *Man and His Salvation* (Manches-

ter, 1973), 97, asserts, in passing, that the identification is as old as Augustine, but I have not located a reference. On the identification, see in general, H. Kehrer, *Die "Heiligen Drei Könige" in der Legende und in der deutschen bildenden Kunst* (Strasbourg, 1904), 23; and H. Baudet, *Paradise on Earth: Some Thoughts on European Images of Non-European Man* (New Haven, 1965), 17–8.

90. The triple tiara appears to be a fourteenth-century innovation, most usually explained as symbolizing the pope's authority over heaven, earth, and hell (see J. Braun, *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, s.v. "Tiara," 11th ed., 26: 911–12). However, Pedro Simón, *Primera parte de las noticias historiales de las conquistas de Tierra Firme en las Indias Occidentales* (Cuenca, 1627), 1: 9, suggests that a fourth crown be added to symbolize the pope's authority over "America"—the other three crowns being associated with the traditional tripartition. As this latter suggests, the numerical symbolism can be dazzling, e.g., Gregory Horn, *Arca Noe* (Leiden and Rotterdam, 1666), 35, 183, *passim*, who attempts to correlate the three sons of Noah, the four "world empires," and the five "continents."

91. Augustine, *Civitate Dei*, 16.8 (in the Loeb Library edition and translation). Being "human" means, above all, having reason—as in Augustine, *De Trinitate*, 7.4.7. (*Corpus Christianorum*, 50: 255).

92. In addition to Rainaud, *Le continent austral*, see W. Wright, *The Geographical Lore of the Time of the Crusades* (New York, 1925), 157–65 and P. Delhaye, "Le théorie des antipodes et ses incidences théologiques," which appeared as note "S" in his edition, *Godfrey de Saint-Victor: Microcosmus* (Lille and Gembloux, 1951), 282–86. The arguments against the inhabitability of the austral island or the antipodes are elegantly summarized in Pierre d'Ailly, *Imago Mundi*, 7 (in the edition of E. Buron [Paris, 1930] and the English translation by E. F. Keever [Wilmington, N.C., 1948]).

From our perspective, the most interesting argument (in terms of the Augustinian options) is that while the *orbis alterius* is real, its inhabitants are not. This is already implied by the influential encyclopaedia of Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiae*, 14.5.7 (Migne, PL 82: 512); cf. 9.2.133 (82: 341). For Isidore's view, see G. Boffito, "La leggenda degli antipodi," *Festschrift A. Graf* (Bergamo, 1903), esp. 592 and n. 4. Isidore's view of the antipodes found graphic representation in the "Beatus" maps—see K. Miller, *Mappae Mundi* (Stuttgart, 1895–98), 1: 58; T. Simar, *Le géographie de l'Afrique centrale dans l'antiquité au moyen age* (Brussels, 1912), 150–58; and J. Marquis Cañanovas et al., *Sancti Beati a Liebana in Apocalypsin Codex Gerundensis* (Olten and Lausanne, 1962), ff. 54v–55r. Note, however, that in the later figures, which are attached to Isidore's discussion of the "zones" in *De natura rerum* 1.10 (Migne, PL 83: 978–79 with figs.), two inhabitable "zones" are shown. (See the discussion of this in E. Brehaut, *An Encyclopedist of the Dark Ages: Isidore of Seville* [New York, 1912], 50–54). Furthermore, the outline of Isidore's geographical section in the *Etymologiae*, appending a section on

islands after sections on the tripartite *oikoumenē*, suggests yet a third pattern (see Wright, *Geographical Lore*, 259, 460, n. 12).

93. The issue of the geographic impact has been often studied since the pioneering work of K. Kretschmer, *Die Entdeckung Amerika's in ihrer Bedeutung für die Geschichte des Weltbildes* (Leipzig, 1892).

94. This issue has been the special burden of the important and controversial works by Edmundo O'Gorman, which have been fundamental to my construction of this section. See especially, *La idea del descubrimiento de América: Historia de esa interpretación y crítica de sus fundamentos* (Mexico City, 1951) and the similarly titled, though quite different work, *The Invention of America: An Inquiry into the Historical Nature of the New World and the Meaning of Its History* (Bloomington, 1961).

95. F. Guicciardini, *Storia d'Italia* (1561) in the edition of C. Panigara (Bari, 1929), 2: 130–31 as cited in H. Honour, *The New Golden Land: European Images of America from the Discoveries to the Present Time* (New York, 1975), 84.

96. É. Pasquier, *Les oeuvres* (Amsterdam: 1723), 2: 55, as cited in J. H. Elliott, *The Old World and the New, 1492–1650* (Cambridge, 1970), 8.

97. W. E. Washburn, "The Meaning of 'Discovery' in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries," *American Historical Review* 68 (1962–3): 1–21. Note that this article is conceived as a fundamental attack on O'Gorman's work (note 94 above).

98. C. Gibson, "Conquest and the So-Called Conquest in Spain and Spanish America," *Terrae Incognitae* 12 (1980): 1–18.

99. See the useful collection of such terms in Kretschmer, *Die Entdeckung Amerika's*, 360–69.

100. There are no primary sources. See J. Toriboio Medina, *El descubrimiento del Oceano Pácifico* (Santiago, 1914) for a thorough review of the early historians who mention Balboa's discovery, none of whom appear to emphasize its cosmographic implications.

101. The best reviews of the complex Magellan literature are M. Torodash, "Magellan Historiography," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 51 (1971): 313–35, esp. 313–26, and F. Leite de Faria, "As primeiras relações impressas sobre a viagem de Fernão de Magalhães," in A. Teixeira de Moto, ed., *A Viagem de Fernão de Magalhães e a questão de Molucas* (Lisbon, 1975), 473–518, in the series *Estudos de cartografia antiga*, 16. Surprisingly, while the older sources relate the drama and novelty of the circumnavigation, none of them draw cosmographical implications. (1) Fugger Newsletter: *Eine schöne Neue zeytung so Kayserlich Mayestet ausz getz nemlich zukommen sind* (Augsburg, 1522), 8 (in C. Sanz, *Últimas Adiciones to H. Harrisse, Bibliotheca Americana Vetustissima* [Madrid, 1960], 2: 909–12). (2) Maximilian of Transylvania, *De Moluccis Insulis* (Cologne, 1523), on which see Faria, "As primeiras relações", 479–500. See esp., in the English translation by J. Baynes printed in Ch. E. Nowell, *Magellan's Voyage around the World: Three Con-*

temporary Accounts (Evanston, 1962), 274, 275–76, 277, 279–80, 291–92, 309. (3) Antonio Pigafetta, *Primo viaggio intorno al mondo*, written c. 1523. On the complex history of this text, see Faria, "As primeiras relações," 506–16. The earliest printed version, in French (Paris, 1525), is now available in a facsimile edition and translation by P. S. Paige, *The Voyage of Magellan* (Ann Arbor, 1969), esp. 20. See also the Ambrosian manuscript in Nowell, *Magellan's Voyage*, 64. (4) *Roteiro* of the anonymous "Genoese Pilot," in H. E. J. Stanley, *The First Voyage Round the World by Magellan* (London, 1874), 9.

The earliest work that I can find that appreciates the cosmographic implications of the circumnavigation is Richard Eden's paraphrastic translation of Peter Martyr's *Decadas* — *The Decades of the Newe Worlde or West India* (London, 1555), facsimile edition (New York, 1966), 214r–215r, who sets the reports of Maximilian, Pigafetta, and Peter Martyr in the context of the classical tripartition ("the hole globe or compase of the earth was dyvyded by the aunient wryters into three partes") and concludes with a clear statement of novelty ("the antiquitie had never such knowledge of the worlde . . . as we have at this presente by th'industrye of men of this oure age").

102. Columbus's first report, *Epistola de Insulis Nuper Inventis* (dated February 15, 1493) was first printed prior to Columbus's arrival at Barcelona (between April 15–20, 1493). There were eleven printed editions by 1497. See C. Sanz, *La Carta de Colón* (Madrid, 1958) for facsimiles of the first seventeen printed editions. Cf. Sanz, *Bibliografía general de la Carta de Colón* (Madrid, 1958). See further, the useful tabulation in R. Hirsch, "Printed Reports on the Early Discoveries and Their Reception," in F. Chiappelli, ed., *First Images of America*, 2: 537–52 and appendices 1–3 (unpaginated).

103. It is reported by his son that Columbus wrote a *Memoria anotacion para probar que las cinco zonas son habitables*, c. 1490. If so, it is now lost. Ferdinand Columbus, *Vida del Almirante Don Cristóbal Colón*, chap. 4, in the English translation by B. Keen (New Brunswick, N.J., 1959), 11.

104. The *Journal* written by Columbus during his first voyage has had a complex history. The document itself has been lost. It was massively excerpted in Bartolomé de las Casas, *Historia de las Indias*, book 1, chaps. 35–75, a work composed between 1527 and 1560 but not published in full until the Madrid edition of 1875–76. (There are excerpts as well in Ferdinand Columbus, *Vida*, which permit some cross-checking). The *Columbus Journal* was first printed separately by M. Fernández de Navarrete, *Colección de los viajes y descubrimientos que hicieron por mar los españoles desde fines del siglo XV* (Madrid, 1825–37), 1: 1–166. C. Sanz, *Diario de Colón* (Madrid, 1962), 1–2, has published a facsimile edition of the Las Casas manuscript (Madrid MS.V.6, n. 7). For the distinction between Columbus and Las Casas, see A. Vázquez, "Las Casas' Opinions in Columbus' Diary," *Tópica* 11 (1971): 45–56. I cite the convenient edition by G. Maraño, *Diario de Colón*

(Madrid, 1968), and the English translation by C. R. Markham, *The Journal of Christopher Columbus* (London, 1893). Quotations are from Merañón, *Diario*, 29 and Markham, *Journal*, 40.

105. The so-called *Lettera rarissima*, addressed by Columbus to the king and queen, July 7, 1503. Text and translation in R. H. Major, *Christopher Columbus: Four Voyages to the New World. Letters and Selected Documents* (London, 1847; reprint, New York: 1961), 169–203. I have combined two separate figures: Ciguane is “nine days’ journey westward” (Major, 175), the “river Ganges” is “ten days” from Ciguane (Major, 176).

106. It must be recalled that Columbus could not “speak” with the natives, despite his frequent (and, sometimes lengthy), translations of what they said. He communicated with them in “signs.”

107. Merañón, *Diario*, 81; Markham, *Journal*, 87. For the appearance of man-eating cynocephali in the Orient in a book owned by Columbus, see H. Yule and H. Cordier, *The Book of Ser Marco Polo*, 3d ed. (London, 1921), 2: 309. The argument by D. B. Quinn, “New Geographical Horizons: Literature,” in F. Chiappelli, *First Images of America*, 2: 637, that Columbus elicited the information concerning the cynocephali by showing “pictures to his Arawak informants” from illustrated editions of Marco Polo and Mandeville is without evidence.

108. Merañón, *Diario*, 103; Markham, *Journal*, 106.

109. Excerpt by B. Las Casas from the Columbus *Journal* of the third voyage in *Raccolta di documenti e studi pubblicata dalla R. Commissione Columbiana* (Rome, 1892–96), 1.2: 22.

110. While most frequently placed in the East, there was a speculative tradition that Paradise lay beyond the earth-island, inaccessible to man. See J. K. Wright, *Geographical Lore of the Time of the Crusades*, esp. 262.

111. *Raccolta*, 1.2: 26–40; text and translation in R. H. Major, *Christopher Columbus*, 104–46.

112. Major, *Christopher Columbus*, 105–6.

113. Major, *Christopher Columbus*, 109, cf. 143.

114. Major, *Christopher Columbus*, 142.

115. The most remarkable instance of this “persuasion” is the oft-cited *Información y testimonio acerca de la exploración de Cuba* printed in Navarrete, *Colección*, 2: no. 76.

116. Major, *Christopher Columbus*, 129–30, 133.

117. Major, *Christopher Columbus*, 131.

118. Major, *Christopher Columbus*, 130. The image is repeated twice, Major, 131 and 137.

119. Major, *Christopher Columbus*, 137 (in revised translation); cf. 135, 136, 142, 145.

120. This distinction between two types of land—the “Indies” and the “Paradisical”—is maintained in two other documents associated with the third voyage: the *Letter* to Dona Juana de la Torres (1500) in Navarrete, *Colección*, 1, esp. 267–68; and the so-called *Papal Letter* (February, 1502) in *Raccolta*, 1.2: 64–66.

121. See Major, *Christopher Columbus*, 143. The Spanish Crown appears to have taken up Columbus’s rejected option. As they had doubted his earlier identification of the newly discovered islands with the “Indies” (see the texts cited in O’Gorman, *Invention*, 81–82, 157, n. 18), settling on the ambiguous phrase, “islands and firm land . . . in the western part of the Ocean sea, toward the Indies [*versus India*],” (papal bull, *Inter caetera* [May 3, 1493] in Navarrete, *Colección*, 2: no. 17), so, now, they inferred the existence of a large southern landmass and dispatched no less than six expeditions during the period 1499–1502 to make territorial claims (O’Gorman, *Invention*, 104).

122. Peter Martyr, *De Orbe Novo*, 1.6. *Opera*, 64; MacNutt, 1: 139 (see note 125, below for bibliographical references).

123. E.g., C. O. Sauer, “Terra firma: Orbis novus,” in A. Leidlmair, ed., *Festschrift Hermann von Wissmann* (Tübingen, 1962), 258, 260, 263; T. Todorov, *The Conquest of America*, 12–3, et passim.

124. Bartolomé de las Casas, *Historia de las Indias*, 1.44. I cite the edition published in Madrid, 1927(?), 1: 224.

125. The major work of Peter Martyr, *De Orbe Novo*, has had a complex history that affects its interpretation. The first *Decade* devoted to Columbus and Martin Alonso Pinzón was completed (with the exception of book 10) between 1493 and 1501. An Italian version, which survives in only two copies, was published (most probably without Martyr’s consent) by P. Trevesan under the title *Libretto de tutta la navigatione de Re des Spagna de le isole et terreni nuovamente trovati* (Venice, 1504)—now available in a facsimile edited by L. C. Wroth (Providence, 1930). It is uncertain whether this text is an abridgement of Martyr’s first *Decade* as eventually published or an accurate copy of Martyr’s first version which he later expanded. The *Libretto* received wide circulation when it was incorporated as book 4 of Francanzano Montalboddo’s collection, *Paesi Novamente Retrouati* (Venice, 1507), which rapidly went through fifteen editions. (See D. B. Quinn, “Exploration and Expansion of Europe,” in the *Rapports* of the twelfth International Congress of Historical Sciences [Vienna, 1965], 1: 45–59.)

The first *Decade*, in Martyr’s final version, was first published in a collection of his works, *P. Martyris Angli Mediolanensis Opera: Legatio babylonica, Oceani Decas, Poemata, Epigrammata* (Seville, 1511), d–f. The first three *Decades* were published under the title *De Orbe Novo Decades* (Alcala: 1516). The fourth *Decade* was published under the title *De Insulis nuper repertis simultaque incolarum moribus* (Basel: 1521). All eight *Decades* were published posthumously, *De Orbe Novo Petri*

Martyris (Alcala, 1530)—now available in a facsimile edition by the Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, *Petrus Martyr de Angleria: Opera* (Graz, 1966), 35–32, 73. Until this facsimile (which I cite), the full text of *De Orbe Novo* was most readily available in the edition by Richard Hakluyt (Paris, 1587).

An English translation of the first four *Decades* was made by Richard Eden, *The Decades of the Newe Worlde or West Indies* (London, 1555)—facsimile edition (New York, 1966), 25–161. An English translation of the entire work was first made by M. Lok, *De Orbe Novo; or, The Historie of the West Indies* (London, 1612). The standard English translation (which I cite with minor revisions) is that by F. A. MacNutt, *De Orbe Novo* (New York, 1912; reprint, New York, 1970), 1–2.

A more difficult question is the correlative use of the extensive correspondence, first published as *Opus Epistolarum Petri Martyris* (Alcala, 1530)—facsimile edition, *Opera* (Ganz, 1966), 275–707, which are available in the important Spanish translation by J. López de Toro, *Epistolario de Pedro Mártir de Angleria* (Madrid, 1953–57), 1–4, in the series Documentos inéditos para la historia de España, 9–12. A selection of the *Letters* which relate to the “new world” were published in French translation by P. Gafferal and l’Abbé Louvot, *Lettres de Pierre Martyr Anghiera relatives aux découvertes maritimes des espagnols et des portugais* (Paris, 1885).

The evidence of the *Letters* must be used with extreme caution. While their authenticity has been challenged, this seems unlikely. It is certain that their chronology is unreliable; many appear to have been backdated. See, among others, J. Bernays, *Petrus Martyr Anglerius und sein Opus Epistolarum* (Strasbourg, 1891).

For the relative chronology of the individual books of the various *Decades*—a matter crucial for their interpretation—I have followed that given by E. O’Gorman, *Cuatro historiadores de Indias* (Mexico City, 1972), 43–44.

126. This is, quite rightly, insisted upon by C. O. Sauer, “Terra Firma: Orbis Novus,” 260–61; 262, n. 7.

127. On the problems attendant on using the *Epistles*, see above, note 125.

128. *Epistle*, 130. *Opera*, 360; *Epistolario*, 1: 236. The term *antipodes* recurs in *Epistles* 134 (September, 1493); 140 (January, 1494); 144 (October, 1494).

129. *Epistle*, 134. *Opera*, 361; *Epistolario*, 1: 244.

130. *De Orbe Novo*, 1.1. *Opera*, 39; MacNutt, *De Orbe Novo*, 1: 57.

131. *De Orbe Novo*, 1.1. *Opera*, 41 and 39; MacNutt, *De Orbe Novo*, 1: 65 and 57.

132. *De Orbe Novo*, 1.1. *Opera*, 39; MacNutt, *De Orbe Novo*, 1: 58.

133. *De Orbe Novo*, 1.1. *Opera*, 40; MacNutt, *De Orbe Novo*, 1: 61, cf. 1: 87, 114 et passim. For this claim, see Columbus’s *Papal Letter* (February, 1502) in *Raccolta*, 1.2: 472, and Columbus, *Libro de las Profecías* (1501–52), in *Raccolta* 1.2: esp. 150–56. The identification persists through the early literature. See the important study by G. Gliozzi, *Adamo e il nuovo mondo* (Florence, 1976), 147–74.

134. *De Orbe Novo*, 1.1. *Opera*: 41. MacNutt’s translation (1: 65) is inadequate at this point.

135. *De Orbe Novo*, 1.4. *Opera*: 54; MacNutt, *De Orbe Novo*, 1: 105, cf. 1: 92, 139–40, 178, 330 et passim. Compare further, *Epistles*, 135 and 142.

136. *Epistle*, 138. *Opera*: 360; *Epistolario*, 1: 250. The phrase recurs in *Epistles* 142 (October 20, 1494) and 154 (February 2, 1494).

137. For the Asian extension, see Vespucci, *First Letter* (July 18, 1500) in R. Levillier, ed., *El Nuevo Mondo: Cartas relativas a sus viajes y descubrimientos* (Buenos Aires, 1951), 277, cf. 299.

The term “new world” occurs only five times in Vespucci’s writings, only in the letter now entitled, *Mundus Novus* (n.p., n.d. [c. 1502–4]). See the summary bibliography in J. A. Aboal Amaro, *Amérigo Vespucci*, 99–111. Its most important occurrence is in the first paragraph: “On a former occasion I wrote to you at some length concerning my return from those *new regions* which we found and explored with the fleet. . . . And these we may rightly call a *new world*. Because our ancestors had no knowledge of them, and it will be a matter *wholly new* to all those who hear of them.” (English translation by G. T. Northup, *Mundus Novus* [Princeton, 1916], 1, [emphasis added], in the series Vespucci Reprints, Texts and Studies, 5). The phrase “*quasque novum mundum appellare licet*” may be taken as indicating the author’s self-consciousness at coining a term, but what does it mean? The context makes plain that *novus* refers to the fact that the lands were unknown and unexpected, i.e., (a) that they could not be harmonized readily with any of the lands described by the ancient authorities, and (b) that they occurred in the Southern Hemisphere which, according to the ancients, was entirely ocean. *Mundus* refers to the fact that the lands were inhabited, i.e., that they constituted a “world” in the sense of *oikoumenē*. The question of whether they were a previously unknown extension of the familiar tripartite *oikoumenē* or constitute a “new” geographical entity was not raised in the *Mundus Novus*.

However, extreme caution must be used in evaluating this text. “Vespucci’s writings have had a strange and complicated history. They have suffered at the hands of translators, copyists, printers. . . . The texts on which we base our judgments are *vastly different* from those which left the author’s hand.” (G. T. Northup, *Amerigo Vespucci: Letter to Pietro Soderini* [Princeton, 1916], 1, in the series Vespucci Reprints, Texts and Studies, 4 [emphasis added]). While it may be too extreme to label the *Mundus Novus* and the *Soderini Letter* “forgeries” as has been done by F. J. Pohl, *Amerigo Vespucci: Pilot Major* (New York, 1944), esp. 144–67, C. O. Sauer, “Terra Firma: Orbis Novus,” 268, n. 19 and 269; R. Iglesia, *Columbus, Cortés, and Other Essays* (Berkeley, 1969), 253, among others, they are most certainly not, in their printed form, by Vespucci. They represent Latin versions by anonymous translators that probably ill accord with Vespucci’s original. See A. Magnaghi, *Amerigo Vespucci: Studio critico* (Rome, 1924), 1–2; the careful tex-

tual and philological study of the *Soderini Letter* by Northup (op. cit.), and the review of the current state of the question in R. Levillier, *Américo Vespucci* (Madrid, 1966), 339–62.

Regardless of authorship (or the original meaning), the phrase took on independent power and was widely disseminated, shifting, in time, from a preeminently geographical to a social-political context. See, on this, C. Ginzburg, *The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth Century Miller* (Baltimore, 1980), 81–86.

In letters subsequent to *Mundus Novus* attributed to Vespucci, the term does not recur. The phrase is dropped in favor of the less suggestive “new lands” in the conventional sense of lands of which there was previously no knowledge. See Levillier, *El nuevo mundo*, 201, 203, 204–5, 233, 251, 259, et passim.

138. Martin Waldseemüller, *Cosmographiae Introductio* (St. Dié, 1507), a iii—facsimile edition by J. Fischer and F. von Weiser (reprint, New York, 1969), xxv. I am aware in giving the traditional attribution, that many authorities consider the *Introductio* to be the work of Matthias Ringmann. See the excellent review of the state of the question by F. Laubenberger, “Ringmann oder Waldseemüller?” *Erdkunde* 13 (1959): 163–79.

139. The first use of the term is in *De Orbe Novo*, 3.1. *Opera*: 105; MacNutt, *De Orbe Novo*, 1: 281, written in 1514. Here, as elsewhere, the term occurs in the dedication. The term appears as the title for the first three books in the Alcalá edition of 1516.

140. H. Pérez de Oliva, *Historia de la Invención de las Yndias*, in the edition of J. Juan Arrom (Bogotá: 1965), 53–54 as quoted in J. H. Elliott, *The Old World and the New*, 15.

141. *Cosmographiae Introductio*, facsimile edition: xxx, “et sunt tres prime partes continentes, quarta est insula.” See above, note 84.

142. In his marginal notations to Columbus’s *Journal* of his first voyage, Las Casas frequently comments on Columbus’s linguistic limitations. See Vásquez, “Las Casas’ Opinions,” esp. 53–54.

143. Marañón, *Diario*, 37; Markham, *Journal*, 48.

144. Rarely, Columbus recorded native names for useful or edible species, e.g., *aje*, *aji*, *cazave*, although some of these may be interpolations by Las Casas (Vásquez, “Las Casas’ Opinions,” 51–52). At times, Columbus does recognize difference, but in a somewhat casual manner. For example: “The trees are as unlike ours as night from day, as are the fruits, the stones, and everything. It is true that some of the trees bore some resemblance to those in Castile, but most of them are very different, and some were so unlike that no one could compare them to anything in Castile.” Marañón, *Diario*, 38; Markham, *Journal*, 49. See in general L. Hughes, *L’opera scientifica di Cristoforo Colombo* (Turin, 1892).

145. Marañón, *Diario*, 16; Markham, *Journal*, 30.

146. Marañón, *Diario*, 100, cf. 62, 106; Markham, *Journal*, 103, cf. 71, 109. On the significance of this see Menéndez Pidal, “La lengua de Cristóbal Colón,” *Bulletin hispanique* 42 (1940): 27 and n.1, criticizing the important essay by L. Olschki, “Il lusignuolo di Colombo,” in Olschki, *Storia letteraria delle scoperte geografiche* (Florence, 1937), 11–21. See further, Gerbi, *The Dispute of the New World*, 161, n. 12 and index, s.v. “nightingales.”

147. Compare the incident of the nutmegs and cinnamon, Marañón, *Diario*, 58–59; Markham, *Journal*, 67.

148. T. Hawkes, *Shakespeare’s Talking Animals* (London, 1973), 211. Barry Holstun Lopez, in his short story, “Restoration,” makes effective use of this motif. Lopez, *Winter Count* (New York, 1982), 1–14, esp. 8–12.

149. See the wise comments on the difficulty of establishing criteria for “impact” and “influence” in J. H. Elliott, “Renaissance Europe and America: A Blunted Impact?” in Chiappelli, ed., *First Images of America*, 1: 11–24.

150. This question was made infinitely more complex by the encounter with the “high” civilizations of Mesoamerica. See, for an overview, the important monograph by B. Keen, *The Aztec Image in Western Thought* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1971).

151. See L. E. Huddleston, *Origins of the American Indians: European Concepts, 1492–1729* (Austin, 1967), 8, 110, in the series University of Texas, Latin American Monographs, 11. Huddleston’s survey of the topic is the finest to date.

152. For biographical information on Rastell, see A. W. Reed, *Early Tudor Drama* (London, 1926), 1–28, 187–233. For the attempted 1517 voyage, see the summary account in D. B. Quinn, *England and the Discovery of America* (London, 1974), 162–69.

153. The text survives in only a single, imperfect printed copy in the British Museum. It lacks a title page and other introductory material, hence neither its author, date, or place of publication are beyond dispute. The play was first attributed to Rastell in 1557. The attribution has been accepted by all scholars. The date is more controversial. Estimates range from 1517 to 1530, with the majority of scholars suggesting 1519–20.

I have not seen the facsimile edition in the series Tudor Facsimile Texts (London, 1908). I have used the recent edition by R. Axton, *Three Rastell Plays* (Totowa, N.J., 1979), 29–68, esp. 48–52. The more familiar edition is that by J. O. Halliwell, “*The Interlude of the Four Elements*”: *An Early Moral Play* (London, 1848), esp. 27–33, in the series Percy Society: Early English Poetry, Ballads and Popular Literature in the Middle Ages, 22. It is accessible, as well, in E. Arber, ed., *The First Three English Books on America* (Westminster, 1895), xx–xxi. (In 1971, a modernized and abridged form of the play was performed at Cambridge Univer-

sity. See R. E. Coleman, ed., "The Four Elements" as Performed at the University Printing House [Cambridge, 1971]; B. Critchley, ed., *Siberch Celebrations*, 1521-1971 [Cambridge, 1971], 83-131, esp. 106-11.)

There has been considerable scholarship devoted to the cosmographical elements in the play. See G. P. Park, "The Geography of *The Interlude of the Four Elements*," *Philological Quarterly* 17 (1938): 251-62; M. Borish, "Source and Intention of *The Four Elements*," *Studies in Philology* 35 (1938): 149-63; E. M. Nugent, "The Sources of John Rastell's *The Nature of the Four Elements*," *Publications of the Modern Language Association* 57 (1942): 78-88; G. P. Park, "Rastell and the Waldseemüller Map," *Publications of the Modern Language Association* 58 (1943): 572-74; J. Parr, "More Sources of Rastell's *Interlude of the Four Elements*," *ibid.* 60 (1945): 48-58; H. C. Porter, *The Inconstant Savage: England and the North American Indian, 1500-1660* (London, 1979), 34-37.

154. Axton, *Rastell*, 49 (lines 737-38).

155. Axton, *Rastell*, 51 (lines 811-15). Emphasis added.

156. Axton, *Rastell*, 51 (lines 817-19).

157. Huddleston, *Origins*, 15-16.

158. On the encyclopaedic nature of this work, see Enrique Alvarez López, "Plinio y Fernández de Oviedo," *Annales de Ciencias naturales del Instituto J. de Acosta* (Madrid, 1940), 1: 46-61; 2: 13-35; D. Turner, "Oviedo's *Historia*. . . The First American Encyclopedia," *Journal of Inter-American Studies* 5 (1960): 267-74.

159. Oviedo, *Historia general y natural de las Indias islas y Tierra-Firme del Mar Oceano*, 1st ed. (Seville, 1535) containing the prologue, books 1-19 and book 50.1-10. The bulk of the *Historia* remained in manuscript until the edition of José Amador de los Ríos (Madrid, 1851-55), 1-4. See the careful account of the publication history in D. Turner, *Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés: An Annotated Bibliography* (Chapel Hill, 1966), 7-13. I cite the edition by J. Pérez de Tudela, *Historia general y natural de las Indias* (Madrid, 1959), 1-5, in the series *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles*, 117-21, which reproduces the 1851-55 text.

160. *Historia*, 2.3; Pérez de Tudela, 1: 17. See Gliozzi, *Adamo e il nuovo mondo*, 247-58. The Carthaginian tradition is based on an altered version of Aristotle, *Mirabiles auscultationes*, 84 (see A. Giannini, *Paradoxographorum Graecorum* [Milan, 1965], 258-9).

161. *Historia*, 2.3; Pérez de Tudela, 1: 17-20. See Gliozzi, *Adamo e il nuovo mondo*, 28-30. This identification is based on the pseudo-Berosus forgeries of Anniius of Viterbo, *Commentaria super opera diversorum auctorum de antiquitatibus* (Rome, 1498), on which see D. C. Allen, *The Legend of Noah*, 114-15. Ferdinand Columbus, *Historie*, 10 (Keen: 28-34) responds with heat to both of Oviedo's contentions.

162. Huddleston: 16. Cf. O'Gorman, *La idea del descubrimiento*, 80-3.

163. The most popular version of this thesis identified the new lands with Atlantis. See I. Rodríguez Prampolini, *La Atlantida de Platón en los cronistas del siglo XVI* (Mexico City, 1947); Gliozzi, *Adamo e il nuovo mondo*, 177-246.

164. The first two books of Acosta's *Historia*, those most relevant to our interests, were begun c. 1580 and published in Latin as *De natura novi orbis libri duo* (Salamanca, 1589). Acosta translated these two books into Spanish, added five others, making up the whole, *Historia natural y moral de las Indias*, 1st ed. (Seville, 1590), 2d ed. (Barcelona, 1591), 3d ed. (Madrid: 1608). The *Historia* was translated into Italian, French, Dutch, German, and Latin by 1602. An English version was prepared by E. G. [= Edward Grimston], *The Naturall and Morall Historie of the East and West Indies* (London, 1604). I cite the critical edition by E. O'Gorman, *Historia natural y moral de las Indias* (Mexico City, 1940); and C. R. Markham's reedition of Grimston's translation, *The Natural and Moral History of the Indies* (London, 1880), 1-2.

165. *Historia*, 1.16; O'Gorman, *Historia*, 61; Markham, *History*, 1:45.

166. *Historia*, 1.20-21; O'Gorman, *Historia*, 75-81; Markham, *History*, 1: 57-64.

167. *Historia*, 1.22-23; O'Gorman, *Historia*, 83-88; Markham, *History*, 1: 64-69.

168. *Historia*, 1.24; O'Gorman, *Historia*, 89-90; Markham, *History*, 1: 69-70.

169. In addition to the valuable preface in O'Gorman's edition (reprinted in O'Gorman, *Cuatro historiadores*, 165-248), see Th. Hornberger, "Acosta's *Historia*. . . A Guide to the Source and Growth of the American Scientific Tradition," *University of Texas Studies in English* 19 (1939): 139-62; Gliozzi, *Adamo e il nuovo mondo*, esp. 371-81; Huddleston, *Origins*, 48-59.

170. García, *Origen de los indios de el Neuwo Mundo, e Indias occidentales* (Valencia, 1607). This first edition is exceedingly scarce. The second edition (Madrid, 1729) is most commonly cited. It contains extensive notes by its editor, Andres González de Barcia Carballido y Zúñiga. Unfortunately, these have not always been distinguished from García's words in subsequent scholarship. A facsimile of the second edition has been edited by F. Pease (Mexico City, 1981), in the series *Biblioteca Americana*. Pease's introduction is of great value. Huddleston, *Origins*, 60-76, gives an overview.

Huddleston's overall conclusion deserves notice. "Two clearly distinguished traditions [as to the origin of the Indians in the period 1492-1729] have emerged from my investigations: the Acostan and the Garcian. The first, marked by a skepticism with regard to cultural comparisons, considerable restraint in constructing theories, and a great reliance on geographical and faunal considerations, is named for Joseph de Acosta, who gave it its earliest clear expression. . . . The Garcian tradition, named for the author of the *Origen de los Indios* . . . is charac-

terized by a strong adherence to ethnological comparisons, a tendency to accept trans-Atlantic migrations, and an acceptance of possible origins as probable ones." Huddleston, *Origins*, 13.

171. The various writings by Lewis U. Hanke have been crucial in gaining perspective on this matter. See, among others, "Pope Paul II and the American Indians," *Harvard Theological Review* 30 (1937), 65–102; *Aristotle and the American Indians* (Chicago, 1959); *The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America* (Boston, 1965).

172. To insist on the importance of the naturalistic materials has been the special contribution of A. Gerbi, *The Dispute of the New World* (Pittsburgh, 1973); and *La natura delle Indie nove: Da Cristoforo Colombo a Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo* (Milan, 1975). I have also profited from observations in C. E. Chardon, *Los naturalistas en la américa latina: Los siglos XVI–XVIII* (Cuidad Trujillo, 1949), 1.

173. Oviedo, *De la natural hystoria de las Indias*, 1st ed. (Toledo: 1526), 11—facsimile edition (Chapel Hill, 1969), 37–39; English translation by S. A. Stoudemere, *Natural History of the West Indies* (Chapel Hill, 1959), 47–48. This work, frequently called the *Sumario*, must not be confused with Oviedo's larger and later, *Historia general de las Indias* (see above, note 159). A parallel passage does occur in the *Historia*, 1.12.10, Pérez de Tudela, 2: 39–42, esp. 40.

174. Acosta, *Historia*, 4.19; O'Gorman, *Historia*, 275. The Grimston translation is not useful at this point.

175. Acosta, *Historia*, 4.36; O'Gorman, *Historia*, 325–26. The Grimston translation is not useful at this point.

176. For an important overview of the present state of the question, see the monograph by A. Laming-Emperaire, *Le problème des origines américaines* (Lille, 1980), in the series *Cahiers d'archéologie et d'ethnologie d'Amérique du Sud*.

177. For an interesting attempt to describe "relative otherness" with more precision, see E. S. Bogardus, "A Social Distance Scale," *Sociology and Social Research* 17 (1933): 265–71. J. C. Mitchell, *The Kalela Dance* (Manchester, 1956), 22–28, in the series *Papers of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute*, 27, has adapted the scale for a tribal context with interesting results for our theme.

178. By emphasizing in separate sections the political and linguistic aspects of a "theory of the other," I do not mean to imply their separation. As is well known, especially in matters of colonialism, the two go hand in hand. This is well illustrated in an incident that has become emblematic for historians of the period. "In 1492, in the introduction to his *Gramática [de la lengua castellana]*, the first grammar of a modern European language, Antonio de Nebrija writes that language has always been the partner [*compañera*] of empire. And in the ceremonial presentation of the volume to Queen Isabella, the bishop of Avila, speaking on the scholar's behalf, claimed a still more central rôle for language. When the Queen asked flatly, 'What is it [good] for?' the Bishop replied, 'Your Majesty, lan-

guage is the perfect instrument of empire.'" (S. J. Greenblatt, "Learning to Curse: Aspects of Linguistic Colonialism in the Sixteenth Century," in Chiappelli, *First Images of America*, 2: 562). The story is told in a variety of historical works including: J. B. Trend, *The Civilization of Spain* (London: 1944), 88; Hanke, *Aristotle and the American Indian*, 8 and 127, n. 31; Lach, *Asia in the Making of Europe* (Chicago, 1977), 2.3: 504; Todorov, *The Conquest of America*, 123.

179. J. Leighly, "Error in Geography," in J. Jastrow, ed., *The Story of Human Error* (New York, 1938), 92–93.

180. It is in this sense that O'Gorman is quite right to insist on *la invención de América* (see above, note 94). Cf. H. B. Johnson, "New Geographical Horizons: Concepts," in Chiappelli, ed., *First Images of America*, 2: 623, "[in early German reports] the fourth part of the world was always *erfunden* not *entdeckt*."

181. For an important attempt to describe the "grammar" of such discourse, see B. Bucher, *Icon and Conquest: A Structural Analysis of the Illustrations of de Bry's Great Voyages* (Chicago, 1981), 24–45.

182. See, from a quite different perspective, the arguments by F. Barth, introduction, in Barth, ed., *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference* (Boston, 1969), esp. 9–15. Barth's theoretical work is of crucial importance for our topic.

183. While I place no confidence in the probative force of etymological arguments, it is, perhaps, of interest to note that **an*, the hypothetical root of the Germanic-English, "other," contains the notion of duality: the second or other member of a pair, e.g., Anglo-Saxon, *ōder* (J. Pokorny, *Indogermanisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* [Bern-Munich, 1959–69], 1: 37–38). **Al*, the hypothetical root of the Greco-Roman *alien* and the Germanic-English, "else," contains the notion in extended form, the other of more than two (1: 24–26).

184. A. J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (Oxford, 1961), 12: 11. Cf. the delicious comment in H. W. Turner's *Commentary on Otto's Idea of the Holy* (Aberdeen, 1974), 19, "when Otto describes this experience of the Numen as 'Wholly Other,' he cannot mean *wholly* 'Wholly Other.'"

185. See, however, the stunning exception in the work of the biologist Johannes von Uexküll. In his work (published with the collaboration of the artist G. Krizat), *Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen: Ein Bilderbuch* (Berlin, 1934), he begins with a "tick's eye view of the world" (pp. 1–2, 8–9) and proceeds to present several pictures as they would appear *für die Menschen* and *für die Fliege* (fig. 11c [p. 24], fig. 15 [p. 29], fig. 31 [p. 58], fig. 32 [p. 62]).

186. I owe the phrase "micro-adjustment," to C. Lévi-Strauss's formulation of ritual as processes of *micro-péréquation* in *La pensée sauvage* (Paris, 1962), 17.

187. This intimacy is well symbolized by two closely related folk beliefs, that of the "heartworm" carried in each individual's heart from birth; and the worm which serves as "life index," when it dies, its human host dies as well. See, H. Pa-

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genstecher, *Vermes* (Leipzig, 1878–93), 1: 38; R. Hoeppli, *Parasites and Parasitic Infections*, 64, 160.

188. C. Linnaeus, *Systema natura*, 10th ed. (Holmiae: 1758) as cited in T. Bendyshe, “On the Anthropology of Linnaeus,” *Memoirs of the Anthropological Society of London* 1 (1863–64): 424–25.

189. This has been the special burden of the important monograph by R. L. Meek, *Social Science and the Ignoble Savage* (Cambridge, 1976).

190. This quotation, from the second of John Locke’s *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. P. Laslett (New York, 1965), 343, appears as a major theme in Meek, *Social Science*.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

CLOSE ENCOUNTERS OF DIVERSE KINDS

Noah sail’d round the Mediterranean in Ten Years, and divided the World into Asia, Afric and Europe, Portions for his three Sons. America then, it seems, was left to be his that could catch it.

JOHN LOCKE, *Two Treatises of Government* (1698)

I

To signal at the outset, as Steven Spielberg has done, the indebtedness of my title, I remind you of the labors of the late Chicago-area professor, J. Allen Hynek, to put the study of unidentified flying objects (UFOs) on a scientific basis.¹ In Hynek’s typology, “close encounters of the first kind” are where alien ships are sighted; in the “second kind,” the UFOs leave some physical mark of their presence; “close encounters of the third kind” are where contacts with the occupants of a UFO are made.² It will be with a variant of the third “kind” with which we shall initially be concerned, considered, recently, by some to be a distinctive new type, “close encounters of the fourth kind.”³

Since the fall of 1957, when a Brazilian farmer, Antonio Villas Boas, reported that a spaceship had landed on his farm, the occupants taking him aboard and performing a variety of physical acts on him,⁴ a specific mode of American UFO tale has emerged, and found a secure, iconic place in popular culture: the Abduction Report.⁵

The first North American version was that of Betty and Barney Hill in the White Mountains of New Hampshire on the evening of September 19, 1961; it was widely disseminated through the television movie, *The UFO Incident*, and more recently reconfigured in a characteristically ingenious fashion in the late, lamented TV series, *Dark Skies*.⁶ The Travis