

Christian Theology

AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS TRADITIONS AND TASKS

Edited by
PETER C. HODGSON
and
ROBERT H. KING

Newly Updated Edition

FORTRESS PRESS Minneapolis
IRA J. TAYLOR LIBRARY
THE ILIFF SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY
DENVER, COLORADO

CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY

An Introduction to Its Traditions and Tasks

Newly Updated Edition copyright © 1994 Augsburg Fortress. Prior editions copyright © 1982, 1985 by Fortress Press. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in critical articles or reviews, no part of this book may be reproduced in any manner without prior written permission from the publisher. Write to: Permissions, Augsburg Fortress, 426 S. Fifth St., Box 1209, Minneapolis, MN 55440.

Scripture quotations, unless otherwise noted, are from the Revised Standard Version of the Bible, copyright 1946, 1952, © 1971, 1973 by the Division of Christian Education of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. and are used by permission.

Cover design: Pollock Design Group

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Christian theology : an introduction to its traditions and tasks / edited by Peter C. Hodgson and Robert H. King. —Newly rev. ed.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-8006-2867-5

1. Theology, Doctrinal—Introductions. 2. Theology, Doctrinal—Study and teaching. I. Hodgson, Peter Crafts, 1934–. II. King, Robert Harlen, 1935–. BT65.C47 1994

230—dc20

94-4764

CIP

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standards for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z329.48-1984.



Manufactured in the U.S.A.

AF 1-2867

98 97 96 95 94 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

5. CREATION AND PROVIDENCE

WHERE WE ARE

Traditional Christian beliefs about the divine origin, governance, and final disposition of the world were for many centuries foundational components of the dominant world view in Western culture. Residues of these beliefs can be found today in various places, in arguments advanced by the pro-life camp in the abortion controversy, for instance, and in such quasi-religious sentiments as "Life is a gift" and "Things tend to work out for good in the long run." But the powerful convictions once expressed in traditional formulations of the doctrines of creation and providence do not now have a vivid and compelling life in the churches. In secular thought the convictions and the doctrines have been in deep recession for several centuries.

One cause of this inclusive decline is to be found in a tendency of the doctrines to distort or obscure the convictions and passions of the religious life. But many important elements of doctrine and conviction have been powerfully challenged, if not overthrown, by views inspired by modern science. The traditional teaching of the doctrine of creation is that the world as a whole had an absolute beginning: before creation nothing but God existed; everything begins when God said, "Let there be. . . ." Modern scientific theories concerning the origin of the physical universe have virtually nothing in common with traditional Christian teachings. The life sciences offer explanations of the origin and development of human beings which are strictly incompatible with historic creation. So also for the doctrine of providence. The theological tradition holds that events great and small, cosmic and historical, faultlessly operate to serve a divine ordination. This exaltation of purpose controlling—indeed defining—every entity and every set of entities in the cosmic spread runs afoul of the decision made very early in the modern world, and powerfully reinforced at critical junctures thereafter, to drop the category of purpose altogether from scientific explanation. So the conviction that

God the Creator has oriented human beings toward a perfectly fulfilling good beyond nature and history, and makes all things conspire to this end, has fallen into a deep and persistent recession—but not simply because the facts, none of which is more appalling than the Holocaust, ruinously assault the Christian view. It is also because hardly any large and potent intellectual current in the modern world seems to support Christian teaching about providence.

Thus many Christian theologians have made systematic rather than marginal adjustments in the traditional doctrines of creation and providence. The large intent in this activity has been twofold: (1) to recover the authentic pulse of Christian experience and (2) to respond appropriately and creatively to the religious pathos of contemporary existence. Accordingly, we must note that the commanding theological posture has not been simply defensive, as though the faith of our ancestors had to be protected against the assaults of a secularism determined to destroy it. To the contrary, many theologians believe that there is much that is creative in modern life, much that offers enrichment for humanity; and, by no means least in proper reckoning, much that offers release from archaic and mordant prejudice skulking behind conventional pieties.

Theological efforts to preserve a significant measure of continuity with a Christian past, and to make a sympathetic and convincing response to the challenges of the modern and postmodern world, are treated in the third part of this chapter. Here we must be content to note that profound ambiguities surround the doctrines of creation and providence as elements in the message of the contemporary churches. Modern philosophies have raised havoc with the traditional doctrines. Are there things working on the convictional and experiential levels that theologians might well grasp for the reconstruction of creation and providence as integral components of Christian faith? Suitable answers to that question must first reckon with the rise and decline of the tradition.

THE DOCTRINES IN THEIR CLASSIC FORMULATION

Root Images of Creator and Provider in Scripture

The general connection between doctrinal propositions and religious convictions much more deeply embedded in experience surely

obtains in the case of creation and providence. On the convictional level, Christian expressions of experience are indissolubly linked with images rather than with concepts; doctrinal formulations tend largely to operate with concepts and often function as theories. We have therefore to review in brief compass the convictional-imaginal substructure of the doctrines of creation and providence.

God is the maker of heaven and earth. As creator, God depends upon nothing but the divine power and wisdom (Genesis 1; Job 38). Even if something is there before God acts, it is thoroughly insignificant, barely worth mentioning—darkness, formlessness, chaos—and biblical writers exhibit little theoretical concern with it. God has no rivals in wisdom, power, and righteousness before or after the act of creation.

Human beings are special projects of divine creativity (Gen. 1:26, 27; 2:7; Ps. 8:5) whether or not Adam is the first living creature God fashions (Gen. 2:4ff.) or the last in the series (1:26ff.). The great point is expressed as *image, likeness* (1:26). The New Testament greatly expands and enriches this conviction with images of family life: God is the Father,¹ we are members of the divine household (Rom. 8:14ff.), sons and daughters. Jesus Christ is the firstborn among many sons (Rom. 8:29); in eternity he is appointed to be the head of the household (Col. 1:15ff.); he is the one alone in whom the divine will is perfectly manifested (John 5:19ff.). So while the majesty of the Creator is displayed in countless ways throughout heaven and earth (Job 38ff.) and is so overwhelming that earth's inhabitants are like grasshoppers before God (Isa. 40:22), and though human beings are made from earth's dust (Gen. 2:7), nevertheless the manifestations of God's concern for human life override all other disclosures of that being, that life.

Just as God provides food for the beast and bird (Job 38:39–41; Matt. 7:26), takes note of the death of a sparrow (Matt. 10:29), and spreads a mantle of glorious beauty across the fields (Matt. 7:28–30), so above all the divine Provider looks after the chosen of humankind. God is their shepherd (Isa. 40:31; Psalm 23; Luke 15:3ff.). For them God controls the formidable forces of nature (Matt. 8:26) as well as the ferociously wicked nations (Hab. 3:12, 13). Thus God stands forth as the one who orders the seasons for humankind's benefit and

1. But see Ps. 103:13; Jer. 31:9; Hos. 1:1ff.

governs the course of cosmic and historical events to an indescribably glorious consummation (1 Cor. 2:9; Rev. 18:22).

The Theological Consensus from Origen to Calvin

The meaning of the classic doctrines of creation and providence can be set out in a series of propositions that we shall treat hereafter as the teachings of "the consensus." This theological consensus reaches from the second century through the seventeenth and includes such luminaries as Origen, Augustine, Aquinas, and Calvin. While these luminaries had their differences, on our two topics they exhibited remarkable agreement.

(1. In creating the world and all that is therein, God made something to exist where nothing was, not even the abstract possibility of something: *ex nihilo*, from nothing God created whatever is. No other being is endowed with divine power, goodness, or wisdom. The divine act of origination has no proper analogies in any act of any creature; God does not need an antecedently existing "material" or a medium in which to work or an idea to be expressed in the medium. All things are from God and everything that any being is. A great seventeenth-century philosophical theologian put it thus: God creates both essence and existence; nothing creaturely exists in any mode before the divine creative act.

Those who contributed most to this doctrinal formulation of biblical teaching were philosophically trained and knew that there were problems for philosophical reflection implicit in that "nothing" from which God creates. Early and late, Job has been taken to be a kind of philosophical work. But are we really to suppose that when Job says God "hangs the earth upon nothing" (26:7) the author is making a *philosophical* claim about what there was or was not before God created? Or should we say that the "nothing" of Job is very like the "void" of Genesis 1 and of the Psalms and Isaiah—a condition so blank, sterile, and uninteresting that it is cited only to set off the majesty of the creator God? The consensus thinkers do not let the matter rest there. They are aware of philosophical alternatives: perhaps God created the world out of nothing but the divine self; perhaps nothing names a reality co-eternal with God, something-we-know-not-what, entirely characterless until God imprints it, but *there*,

accordingly, to be used by God. Such are not merely idle though harmless speculations. They are religiously suspect. They corrode the sense of God's absolute distinction from the world; they dim or weaken the conviction that God's creative action is purely gratuitous as well as all-constituting.

② The inclusive effect of God's all-constituting action is the creation. It is a closed order of finite beings. It is a world in which the essential relations of the classes of entities to one another and to the whole order do not change throughout the life history of creation. Within this order each suborder has its own determinative laws, and each class of entities has a particular good it is bound to seek and to attain. On this point the consensus is virtually unanimous from start to finish. Indeed, very few non-Christian thinkers during the ascendancy of the consensus quarrel with the general notion of a closed, finite cosmos.

Thus the work of Creator flows into the work of Provider. But the second proposition, like the first, appears to move us beyond the biblical conviction that "for everything there is a season" (Eccles. 3:1). Now we are dealing with the formal teaching that the wisdom and power of God are manifested in a perfection of teleological organization embracing alike the lowest orders of beings and the highest—from earthworms to angels. God is the provider; every order of being has what it needs fully to be itself and to contribute to the harmony of the whole. Other things being equal, this is true for every member of every order.

3) A fundamental and unalterable law of the entire created world calls for superordination/subordination—*hierarchy*. Materiality is the lowest rung on the ladder, spirituality the highest. Sense experience is at best the crude beginnings of cognition; pure mental activity runs far beyond the stirrings of sense. Carnal pleasure may well link us with the animals, while mystic rapture may move us close to God. To this we must add that the power of being as well as moral authority—the right to rule—always flows from the higher to the lower: the more "eminence" (power plus value) a being has as a cause, the more it ranges above any and all its effects.

In their wholehearted support of this element in the doctrine of creation, the consensus theologians are remarkably close to Platonic views—rather too close for the comfort of some parties, quite accept-

ably close for others. Origen, for example, seems to have felt that materiality is nothing real in itself. Body is an illusion, really, a painful lesson God inflicts upon peccant souls. With this view Augustine sharply disagrees (*City of God* 12). But such disagreements do not diminish general assent to the hierarchical scheme, nor do they reduce or deflect significantly the powerful tendency to discover the pure reason for the existence of the lower in the interests of the higher. So human beings are free to use creatures lower in the hierarchy as suits human interests with only instrumental concern for their well-being. Many generations of Christian people have so construed Gen. 1:26ff. It remains to be seen whether the massive destructiveness of that conviction will become clear and urgent enough in the perceptions of Christian peoples to change the pattern and course of Western civilization before the planet is rendered uninhabitable for other forms of life as well as for humankind.

4. Since God created the world, it cannot lack anything God intended for it to be and to have. The divine purpose and the divine management cannot be violated or even momentarily frustrated by the behavior, intentional or unwitting, of any part of creation. God did not and presumably could not have made a faulty part.

Here the consensus experiences stresses and strains. Obviously God's performance as Creator and Provider cannot be faulted. On the other hand, is not God the only being who is really perfect? The world is a creature. It cannot rival the Creator. But can it not have a reflected perfection, an integrity, a perdurability and intelligibility derived from God, of course, but really invested with such splendors by God?

By the time of the High Middle Ages an important division in the consensus was evident. The Augustinians insisted that the contingency of created being must be construed as meaning absolute dependence on God. Just as the sun gives life to all that lives and is the light in and by which all things are known, so God is the life in all that lives and the truth through which all truths are comprehended. A different view was held by Thomas Aquinas and his followers. "Autonomy" is not the right word for their account of the world's ontological integrity or for the native capabilities of the human mind, but it looks in the right direction. Their view is that God, in the perfection of divine wisdom and benevolence, imparts to creation an

Why must this be the case

ability to function according to what might be called a charter which is at once authorizing and energizing. Each order of being has an inherent stabilizing and fructifying formality (or determining purpose). These forms are available to the natural mind. They are the basis of authentic natural knowledge.²

5. The question concerning the perfection of God's creative and sustaining activities has a more existential bite than this conflict seems to suggest. This is felt most acutely as the problem of evil. Creation and providence embrace what we experience as evil. Evil then is not a freakish occurrence. It is not something unexpected, unforeseen, unplanned-for in God's creation and management of the world.

The consensus is firm on this point just so long as the operating terms are ambiguous. It is agreed that God cannot be the direct and determining cause of human wickedness. It is agreed that God knows in eternity that wickedness will appear in history beginning with Adam's fall. God knows that monstrously evil persons will go through life unhindered by the forces of righteousness and go down with worldly honors to quiet graves.³ So why? For the sake of a greater good, that is, greater than would otherwise have been attainable.

In the consensus, tension builds up along the line of "greater good." It is agreed that the benefits God in Jesus Christ secures to humankind are incalculably rich. But is the awful history of "man's inhumanity to man" thereby justified? That depends largely on what reality and reach human freedom has. Origen and Irenaeus held that human sin is the price paid for the freedom essential for the fulfillment of the divine plan for creation, that is, the emergence in history of the divine-human community. In Western Christianity much more emphasis is placed on juristic concepts and images. Human beings can be held fully responsible, that is, truly culpable, for their horrid condition, their sin and guilt. God did not *make* Adam fall, but God made the Adam who fell of his own weight. There are

2. It has been argued that the Thomist-Aristotelian view is the natural and indispensable foundation of modern science. See Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1953), p. 14.

3. A set of persistent problems circles around the doctrinal formulations of the eternal God's knowledge of historical-temporal events. High doctrine denies that God's self-being is in any sense temporal and yet insists that the divine knowledge necessarily embraces every event in cosmic and human history. The reason for this latter claim runs through the consensus. It is rendered systematic by Aquinas: that by which God knows the world is the same as that by which God creates the world.

indeed important differences in the West between, say, Aquinas and Calvin. Aquinas holds out for a semiautonomy in human beings that persists through and beyond the fall. Calvin finds no trace of that degree of independence in scripture. But they agree that human freedom is nothing for which a price is exacted from God's own being; we must not suppose that God's perfect righteousness compelled God to choose, from among possible worlds, the one which offered the greatest good.

6. One way or another, evil is part of providence. For humankind, pain has an ordained educative function. In Jesus Christ and through the tutelage of the Holy Spirit, suffering is salvific as well. History proves that sin has terrible consequences. Monstrous wickedness is perceived in its true colors in the magnitude of the suffering it inflicts on the human community. Thus we learn that in good and evil humanity is an inclusive community. Thus we discover that its essential being and value are preserved by God throughout the vicissitudes of history.

7. Miracles are the extraordinary things God does to preserve and enrich the life of humanity. Some miracles involve a local and temporary suspension of the laws of nature, such as the miracles of healing. In others God intervenes in the play of historical events, such as the deliverance of Jerusalem from the Assyrians. The resurrection of Jesus Christ is the absolutely crucial miracle. It embraces the natural forces of life and death, on the one hand, and such historical realities as the demonic pride of Israel's messianism and the imperial might of Rome, on the other. In the resurrection of Jesus Christ the ultimate salvation of the people of God is guaranteed. The life everlasting of traditional doctrine presupposes the miracle in which soul and body are reunited.

We must note in passing that the miracle of liberation from human oppressors plays a comparatively small role in the New Testament even though it is expressly stated in the inaugural sermon of Jesus, "to set at liberty those who are oppressed" (Luke 4:18). This providential activity plays an even smaller role in the consensus. It makes a great deal of salvation from supernaturally potent "principalities and powers," disguising themselves in earthly empire. But the ultimate transhistorical destiny of the soul dominates, though it certainly does not extinguish, concern for earthly freedom and happiness. The consensus supplies little inspiration or justification for social revolution,

no matter how massive the spiritual corruption produced by systematic physical deprivation and psychological terror.

8. The divine purpose in creating and sustaining the world and in preserving the community of the faithful includes a full termination of the world and its history. It is sometimes conceded, for instance by Aquinas, that time might consistently be thought to have no end, but revelation grounds and sustains the Christian confidence that it does in fact end at God's command. Then God creates "a new heaven and a new earth." In that realm of perfect peace the blessed of human-kind shall know God and enjoy forever the fullness of that life. Thus God is Alpha and Omega. From God the world springs. In God's good pleasure the world exists for its full course, thus realizing every potentiality with which divinity has endowed it. At God's signal the world gives up the ghost. God creates in its place an everlasting duality: a blessed realm, paradise; an accursed one, hell.

Persistent Tensions in the Consensus

The consensus intends to eliminate anything that would compromise the perfect freedom of God in creating and disposing of the world. Nonetheless, the existence of the world follows in some sense from the timeless perfection and absolute self-existence of God. It is philosophically conceivable (whether or not it is religiously intolerable) that such a God might have gotten along eternally without a world, but this eternally and essentially self-complete being chooses to have a world after all. The consensus insists that the divine motive in this choice is entirely beyond human comprehension. They say also that it is unimpeachable.

Abolish
Gods intention w/o creation

The picture is even more complicated. Early in its career the consensus worked out a philosophical distinction between necessary and contingent being. Necessary being is that which cannot conceivably fail to exist. It is rational to conceive of a contingent being as not existing, though in a given case such a being might in fact exist. Now God alone is necessary; the world is contingent in whole and in every part or member. Thus the world depends absolutely upon God. That is the religious conviction at the heart of the traditional view.⁴ It is closely tied to belief in God as Lord in and over history. But a

4. Anselm builds his famous ontological argument on and around this distinction. The same distinction is used systematically by Aquinas (see his third proof for God's existence), though he rejects Anselm's argument.

lord must have a people; one cannot be a ruler without a kingdom. Should we say, then, that God did not need to be Lord, but having decided to be Lord, God had to have a people? Such questions were felt to be vexatious long before the dawn of the modern age.

In scripture the word *cosmos* has many meanings. For our purposes the two most important ones are "earth" and "world," this planet and the entire created order. The consensus is faithful to scripture in teaching that God is sole creator of the world and of the planet earth. It also teaches that God has a special relation to earth. Is this because sin has not corrupted any other part of creation? There are ambiguities in the consensus. Did one or more angels fall before humankind was created? If so, sin and retribution and salvation are played out on a cosmic stage. There are strong hints of this in the New Testament, but not many of them are largely featured in the Western consensus. This inspires a narrow and provincial reading of God's interest in humanity and a correlative downgrading of the value of other creatures. Doctrine and liturgy in the East preserved the cosmic scale of creation, fall, and redemption.⁵

How and why is evil incorporated in the divine purpose? The consensus does not deny that there is evil on earth; its denial would reduce the work of Jesus Christ to providing assurance that evil is an illusion. On the other hand, the consensus will not say that God was powerless to create a world free from evil start to finish. God was not bound to create this world, but the world God created was bound to have evil in its life history. The presence of evil, however, does not flaw the perfection of the divine creative and sustaining activity. All things work for good; ultimately only goodness endures. The truth of this grand affirmation is available only to faith. Faith itself is God's free gift.

Is this faith prevented from seeking empirical attestations? Does either nature or history bear such witness to God that even the most stubborn disbelief is compelled to testify against itself and confess that it cannot give even a dubiously intelligible reading of experience in the round?

5. Perhaps the persistent and pervasive interest of college students and seminarians in C. S. Lewis is due in part to his portrayal of the engagement of cosmic powers in confining the depredations of wickedness to planet Earth, and also to his anticipation of scientific efforts to colonize beyond this planet. On the other hand, his *Problem of Pain* shows a thoroughly Western side.

fact does not
deserve to
be called
a miracle
or a
revelation

On such questions the consensus lived in tension with itself and with the convictional/imaginal levels of Christian existence. Even Calvin insists that the experiential sense of a creator God was inextinguishable in the human spirit. But are there evidences of providence in human history? Specifically, what is there to show that the risen Christ is now and forever the Lord of history? The consensus holds that grace alone avails to convert disbelief on this all-important point.

How is divine causality related to what appears to be causal efficacy in finite beings? Here part of the problem for the consensus is to keep belief in God as the absolute cause of the being and behavior of all things from erasing in principle the distinction between God and the world. If no creature is endowed with causal efficacy, it would seem to follow that the world is a passive if not lifeless medium in which deity expresses itself. That would reduce human beings to the order of curiously lifelike puppets. But on the other hand, can the consensus say that God shares creativity with any other being? Genesis could be read as a warning against any such concession. In 3:22-24, God is represented as acting to prevent forever any human incursion on divine prerogatives. In a latter-day idiom, a caretaker had better not aspire to become a policy maker.

The internal tensions of the consensus are exposed and exploited by the modern age. This does not mean, however, that incoherence is the most formidable threat the traditional faith has had to face in the modern world.

CHALLENGES AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF MODERN CONSCIOUSNESS

The consensus doctrines of creation and providence constitute a systematic teleological explanation of reality. God's will is the ultimate explanation of all existents and all events. To know a thing's purpose is to know its essential reality. So to know what a thing is good for and why events occur is at once the loftiest and most practical of human cognitive activity. All things exist in such articulation that the lower orders of being serve the interests of the higher, and the activities of the higher conform to laws that transcend the laws of the lower. As Paul says, "the glory of the celestial is one, and the glory of the terrestrial is another" (1 Cor. 15:40). So it is clearly

absurd, if not blasphemous, to try to subsume the spiritual under the laws of matter; heavenly bodies—stars, planets, the moon, and the sun—cannot be subject to laws governing earth.

The modern scientific age can fairly be said to have begun with a direct challenge to the teleological explanation of nature, and with a stunningly successful generalization of the laws of motion to include celestial bodies as well as earthly. Thus religious and antique scientific lore about the heavens begins to lose its persuasiveness. Before long it will seek asylum in poetry and vulgar superstition.

These victories are commonly attributed to the seventeenth-century astronomer Galileo. He did not venture to banish teleology from the explanation of human being, but it is nonproductive, otiose, in the explanation of nature. Thus the way is opened to a clean if not fatal division between objective reality, describable and explicable in exact mathematical laws, and the ineffabilities of subjective consciousness. When this view triumphs, humankind has either to be assimilated without significant remainder into nature or appear as the eternal outsider, an alien dubiously present anywhere anytime.⁶

Rationalism and Idealism

What the church did to defend the geocentric and anthropocentric consensus against this powerful assault is an often told story. The defense very early gave off symptoms of radical deficiency. René Descartes's rescue operations were not received with enthusiasm by church authorities. They may have sensed that his protestations of orthodoxy concealed a readiness to revise consensus doctrines in order to enhance their plausibility for an age in which radical doubt seemed more rational than traditional faith.

Descartes, a younger contemporary of Galileo, provided systematic ratification of the distinction the latter drew between objective (scientifically manageable) sense qualities and subjective ones. But it was no part of Descartes's intention to downgrade the reality of the mental world. Quite to the contrary, the mind behaves much more as *substance* (self-subsistent activity) ought to, whereas physical entities can

6. The alien ought not to be confused with the biblical image of the pilgrim. Pilgrim is a blessed creature, having a real and beautiful home in a native country; and God guarantees a safe arrival after ordained test by earthly vicissitude. But the alien has a homeland only in fantasy. Persistent effort to live in it is bound to make this forlorn creature an unsuccessful animal.

boast only geometrical properties. Nevertheless, endowed with those properties and those alone, nature emerges as a great and sublimely articulated machine to which God originally imparted its motion—for how can geometrical properties generate motion?

So Descartes's God is quite literally a *deus ex machina*. As Creator, God's prime function seems to be to set the cosmic machine in motion. But Descartes's view of providence has astonishing echoes of Augustinianism. He holds that the world depends for its existence at every moment upon God. So there is no real distinction between creation and providence; it is as though the world were re-created in every successive moment. In Descartes's view time is a succession of point-instants rather than a "flow" or a continuum upon which the mind imposes abstract divisions. Thus the dependence of all that exists upon the Creator-Preserver is absolute. The will of God answers only to itself, not to any nondivine power or to any creaturely criterion of rationality and goodness.

Descartes's views had little effect upon the course of science already slated for triumph after triumph in the empirical world. And no one knew this any better in the seventeenth century than Gottfried ~~Leibniz~~. Committed as he was to the consensus ("God is the creator of essence and existence alike"), Leibniz nonetheless ventured where the tradition had feared to tread; he specified the motive of the Creator. Being perfectly good, God cannot do other than create the best of all possible worlds. The world of God's creation operates, moreover, as a perfectly designed and constructed machine, every part acting with every other in a harmony that reflects the wisdom and benevolence of the Creator. Furthermore, the laws of nature are precisely formulable.

These efforts to preserve if not to improve upon consensus doctrines proved to be an ambiguous legacy. For one thing, Leibniz's program involved a metaphysical idealism. In his view the space-time world is a complex though benign illusion. Can this be reconciled with scriptural conviction about the material basis of human existence? Furthermore, Leibniz's account of the perfection of order of nature gives strong support to deistic views. There had been many arguments in the consensus about the relative perfection of the created order. But there was very large agreement that the God of creation and providence is hardly a remote deity content to con-

template the mechanical perfection of divine craftsmanship, unperturbed eternally by any need or desire to adjust it or to fiddle with it.

In the Leibnizian view, the moral world manifests a perfection analogous to the order of nature. That does not mean evil is an illusion. It means that evil serves a divine purpose; it provides for a greater good than would otherwise have been possible. It is rational to believe, thus, that all things work together for good, for this is the best of all possible worlds. So the door is opened to an unqualified humanistic optimism about the true course and ultimate outcome of history.

creation
in
process

The Leibnizian affirmations of the consensus merit close attention not simply because Leibniz is one of the seminal religious thinkers in the modern world. What we have here is a system profoundly sympathetic to the consensus but worked out in ways quite as profoundly congenial to the spirit of the Enlightenment. Other currents move powerfully against the rationalistic theism of the Leibnizian school and finally against any philosophically serious form or fragment of the consensus doctrines of creation and providence.

Pantheism, Deism, Skepticism

The Cartesian rescue of creationism tended strongly to translate God's motive in creation as benevolence with a low interference factor. Thanks to the genius of a man who rescued himself from Cartesianism, a persistently attractive alternative to traditional Christian views was developed in the seventeenth century. The man was Spinoza, and the system was pantheistic naturalism. In that view there is no substantial difference between God and the cosmos. There is only one substance. It is infinite and eternal. It lacks no ontological perfection (*moral* attributes all express human biases). It is deficient in no power of being. Everything that exists is an expression of this being. Viewed one way, it is a geometrically perfect order of things; viewed another, it is an inexhaustibly creative being from which an infinite number of things necessarily follows. There may be a *religious* reason for calling this being God. Philosophically it may properly be called nature.

Thus there is no place for talk, either religious or philosophical, about God's freedom in creation. There are no rational appeals to the sovereign will of a transcendent Creator. There is no teleology built

into the nature of all things. There is no appeal to a might-have-been except as a human-all-too-human excuse for acting from mental confusion and unruly passion. That person is truly blessed who achieves rational understanding and acceptance of his or her place in the perfectly determined order of things. Then and there religious wisdom and rational truth are mutually supportive.

In this view the world runs absolutely unerringly on its rails. The true and ultimate order of things has all the perfections the consensus had ascribed to God alone. So "providence" is only a religious word for the necessity linking every entity and every event with every other. Right perception of this necessity and assent to it is freedom.

Despite the widely felt influence of Spinoza's thought, the most successful alternative to the consensus outlook in the eighteenth century was deism. Its success was guaranteed by Newtonian science. There, for the time being, a place was preserved for the Creator, the divine mind that made a perfect or nearly perfect machine—nature functioning according to unerringly precise laws. Miracle, the providential suspension of the laws of nature, was squeezed out of the world. Isaac Newton himself thought that God's wisdom and power were needed occasionally to correct cosmic slippages. Newtonians proved him wrong—mathematically, of course.

This attenuated teleological scheme, designed to make a nice philosophical fit with a natural religion delivered once and for all from bondage to supernatural revelation, was subjected to a severely punishing attack by David Hume. Even if the order of nature were in fact like a perfectly constructed and flawlessly functioning machine (why, he asks, a machine rather than an organism?), it is still a finite order, and only in the eyes of faith is it full of positive value. How then can it supply unequivocal evidence for the existence of an infinitely perfect Creator? But are we so sure, is our confidence really rational, that the world is a perfect order of any kind? What of the prodigious spread of pain in nature? What is the experiential or rational basis for believing that moral evil is a transitory phenomenon?

What makes the evocation of such ancient metaphysical and religious quandaries so effective is Hume's systematic and subtle skepticism. Within the terms thus established, neither the consensus nor deistic thinkers had much success in arguing their cases. Thereafter, "Enlightenment" comes largely to mean skepticism about traditional

beliefs and values, and a marked cynicism about the origin and necessity of religion.

The Contributions of Historical Consciousness

Help for the doctrines of creation and providence came from the emergence and flowering of the historical consciousness in the last half of the eighteenth century. There it appears that humankind is essentially historical. From Johann Herder on, it is made clear that humanity makes its own history. Human beings are the real subjects-agents of the historical process. The "divinity that shapes our ends" is inherent and immanent in the life story of humankind. God is not an eternally (timelessly) self-complete being who manipulates the human community like a puppet master. So creation and providence are in a fair way to become symbols expressing the mysterious unity of spirit and nature and the ultimate union of divinity and humanity as the inclusive goal of history.

What keeps theologians imbued with historical consciousness from the embrace of pantheism? Friedrich Schleiermacher certainly did not intend to bend the Christian faith toward a vulgar pantheism, the view that God is in all things. He meant to preserve a distinction between God and the world. This is a cardinal principle of the consensus. But is the distinction between God and world one of substance, as the consensus had insisted? Hardly. Schleiermacher rejected the dualism inherent in the consensus view in favor of monism, which is a powerful if not dominant tendency in romantic religious outlooks. Schleiermacher's rejection of the consensus distinction between creation and providence, however, was partly inspired by other things. As the supreme architect of the theology of religious experience, Schleiermacher found little warrant in the historically conditioned Christian consciousness for that classic distinction, and in fact none at all in the generic religious reality, the feeling of absolute dependence.

G. W. F. Hegel and his followers did nothing to slow down or redirect the theological drive toward philosophical-religious monism. This view provides no place for traditional distinctions between God and world or between God and human being. Nature is spirit not yet aware of itself and thus for the moment alienated from itself. That is one illustration of the way in which the all-absorbing categories for

the interpretation of reality are those appropriate for a historical being altogether engaged in self-discovery and self-expression, and thus to the perfection of self-consciousness.

The cardinal concepts of Christianity are preserved in Hegelian systematics as perennially valid symbols in which the divine reality, absolute Spirit, is expressed. So creation and providence survive, only now they have nothing to do with a God who plans out and governs a cosmic reality from a situation beyond the historical world. Here we are close to collapsing religious truth-claims into myths. The question whether the myths are benign or not is left open for the time being.

The theologians imbued with historical consciousness created still another problem for defenders of the consensus: historical relativism. According to this view, the great matter in the interpretation of history is to make the meaning of the past intelligible for life and thought as they are now constituted. Yet since every epoch has its own unique parameters that make existence meaningful for it, we have no way of grasping the reality of any thought world except our own.

These theories of historical knowledge and historical reality have formidable consequences for the Christian faith. They are especially vexatious for theologians who adduce scriptural testimony in support of creation as absolute origination. For example, grant that scripture represents God as creating the world in time. How can the meaning of that be shown to be timelessly true without by that very stroke showing it to be altogether unhistorical? The historical consciousness offers a way out. Creation and providence alike symbolize the dependence of the finite upon the infinite. Above all, they symbolize the dependence of any particular history, that is, the career of a given community, upon an overarching and universal meaning—the career in time and space of the all-inclusive divine-human community.

Liberal Reconstructions of the Doctrines

The philosophy of Immanuel Kant, coming at the close of the eighteenth century, offers little comfort or assistance to consensus sentiment. Some of the central elements of his philosophy became part of the fabric of liberal reconstruction. This is particularly true of the theological program built upon Kantian agnosticism both about

nature in itself and deity in itself. The pure essence of true religion is revealed in the ethical realm. The consensus carried far too much speculative baggage. Creation is a case in point; it was made into a philosophical, scientific absurdity. It makes as much sense (which is to say none) to deny that the world had a beginning in time as to assert it. Gone also is the consensus doctrine of special providence, or miracle. God does not need to tinker with nature. Authentic deity would not impose arbitrary rules upon the moral self. God cannot make a human being moral. God would not treat an immoral person as though that person were virtuous. Nonetheless, some of the prime insights of Christian faith go to render intelligible the constitutive tensions of the moral consciousness. They offer a transcendent hope for the resolution of the most fundamental of those tensions beyond history—the everlasting conflict between obligation and happiness. So it is not unreasonable to look forward in good faith to a realm where the righteous under God shall be made perfectly happy. To bring that to pass is God's business. On Kantian grounds it is exceedingly hard to show that God has any other.

The Kantian liquidation of the consensus investment in metaphysics did not capture the entire liberal movement. After the middle of the nineteenth century, liberalism was in considerable part a tug of war between monistic idealism (inspired by Hegel) and personalistic idealism (inspired by Kant). Each party claimed to be the legitimate beneficiary and faithful defender of everything salvable in the collision of the consensus with modern consciousness. The monists collapsed any substantial distinction between God and the world. For them, history is the irresistible unfolding of a purely immanent divine Spirit; such Christian concepts as creation symbolize this all-inclusive process, which can be said to be personal only in its effects. Personalists contended that there is a divine purpose which could be fairly made out. That purpose is well expressed in the words of a great nineteenth-century poet: the world is a vale of soul-making. For the personalists, creation has very little to do with cosmic origins. The true import of the doctrine bears on the divine value-creating and value-preserving process immanent in the world. God is not a being self-defined, self-contained, and infinitely valuable apart from the world and history. God is the supremely personal being who provides the conditions for the emergence of finite and free persons. So conceived, God is the perfect master of the arts of moral suasion.

Creation thus moves inexorably to merge again with providence. Enlightened persons do not look to God for what they themselves alone can and must do, that is, in the proper exercise of freedom to make virtue the goal of life for self and society. The forces of history are not supernaturally orchestrated for the realization of this goal. Nevertheless, the liberal thinkers believed that an ultimate frustration of the ethical aim of reality was unthinkable. The moral flow of the world may suffer momentary checks, but it is irresistible. That is the manifest and ultimate will of God.

The liberal theologians were already partly prepared for the irresistible progress of Darwinian evolution in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. They believed that theological competition with science was as unnecessary as it was unproductive. Moreover, evolution did not really eliminate in principle rational appeal to a mind of transcendent wisdom and creativity. Denial of this appeal was a philosophical issue, not a scientific one. The activity of the Creator could as easily be conceived to cover millions of years as the biblical six days. The hand of providence could as fairly be discerned in the evolution of moral sensibility as in the destruction of Sennacherib or the fall of pagan Rome. Liberal theologians wanted nothing to do with efforts to convert scripture into a manual of science-before-science. The truly inspired minds in biblical history are those grasped by the vision of ethical monotheism. The alpha and the omega of the cosmic-historical process is the realm of ends, the enduring community of persons united in the bonds of love, the kingdom of God realized in the time and space of this world.

The development of physics in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has brought to rich fulfillment an important part of the seventeenth-century dream of nature. This is a science liberated from the long domination of the concepts of substance and eminent cause. These concepts are linchpins of the consensus. As substance, God is timelessly perfect, beyond any change, and totally insusceptible to being affected or influenced by any other being. So understood, God is the real and true cause of every change in every being.

After science disposed of substance and eminent cause, it was only a matter of time before philosophy would follow suit. So inevitably the question was put to theologians: Can the concepts of creation and providence be at last liberated from ancient and blind allegiance to substance and eminent cause?

Liberal theologians of idealist persuasion responded with subject as the replacement for substance and with immanent moral teleology in the place of the theological determinism of the consensus. An alternative has opened up in more recent times: process theology, in which God is the supreme instance of creativity. Creativity itself is an all-pervasive factor in reality. So what God supplies to the world is not energy or being, but aim and relative order. And God participates in the life of every being, great and small. God's caring is inexhaustibly resourceful as well as infinitely tender. The Creator is not a world starter. God savors the achievements of every entity. The divine enjoyment preserves every value-creation no matter how trivial human self-absorption might think it to be. Thus the consensus doctrines of the transcendence and timeless perfection of the Creator and Preserver drop out of liberal response to revolutionary novelties in the modern world.

Attempts to Revive the Consensus

This does not mean that the consensus has had no strong voices raised in its behalf or, more accurately, raised in behalf of traditional convictions no longer adequately served by consensus strategies or liberal reconstructions. World wars and the Holocaust effectively terminated the dominance of liberalism in the Protestant world. We shall not attempt a general characterization of postliberal thought. Rather, we shall briefly consider several efforts to reinterpret creation and providence. These may be viewed as so many theological efforts to make productive contact with the convictional depth and experiential vividness of Christian tradition.

Karl Barth reinstated the distinction between creation and providence. Creation is God's singular act by which the world—all that is not triune God—comes to be. The reality of God's action is set forth in *saga*, Barth's term for the foundational narrative of scripture. Barth admits that there are mythical and legendary elements in the Bible, but he insists that *saga* is neither myth nor legend. Scriptural *saga* reveals Jesus Christ as the creative and redemptive Word of God. Scripture everywhere and always manifests God in Christ, creating, preserving, and perfecting personal relationships with humankind, God's covenant-partner. God is indeed the Creator of heaven and earth; essentially, God is Lord of history. The Creator and Preserver

is Reconciler. Everything else known about God is derived from Jesus Christ. In him divine and human history are perfectly copresent.

More than a slender residue of the consensus persists in Barth's theology. Granted that the definiteness and inclusiveness of the traditional hierarchy has disappeared, a superordination/subordination scheme nonetheless persists. It is there in Barth's view of the relationships of man and woman. It is there also, though less obvious and less distressing, in Barth's distinction between what science says about humankind and the real and ultimate truth. Science is unable to grasp the essential nature of this creature; science cannot penetrate the phenomenal order of existence and history. Normative humanity is disclosed only in Jesus Christ, true divinity and true human being. There alone God's design for our history is manifested and achieved.

Rudolf Bultmann's readiness to embrace an existentialist philosophy for his theological work stands in sharp contrast to Barth's refusal to accept assistance from any systematic philosophy. In fact, both Bultmann and Barth accept some kind of philosophical distinction between appearance and reality. Bultmann makes a great deal of the triumph of the scientific world view; it is an indissoluble fact of our historical situation, and, even though it is not the last word on the human situation, it is a very important word. So belief in God the Creator, the unconditioned cause of the world, can claim no warrants from the empirical order. Nor can history as it is prosecuted by modern methodologies render traditional doctrines of providence plausible. Nevertheless, the right interpretation of the fundamental and universal problematic of human existence brings to light a relationality in which transcendence is implicated. Not that God thus becomes an object of knowledge; the revelation of Jesus Christ does not bring God transcendent into the orbit of human cognition. Jesus Christ confronts us with an unconditional command and an unqualified summons to assume the burden of authentic existence. So just as faith in the Creator cannot be supported by an appeal to modern science and scientific world views, so also the unique human possibility for the individual is not ascertained or actualized by any humanistic science. Faith as decision-to-be for God and other persons springs from an inwardness, a unique subjectivity of personal existence.

Paul Tillich's response to the challenges of modernity differs in fundamental ways from Barth's and Bultmann's. He agrees with them

that the knowledge claims of the consensus must be systematically revalued. No perusal of nature, scientific or otherwise, can yield knowledge of the Creator. No objective investigation of history can render persuasive the Christian conviction that God acts redemptively in history. But Barth believes that scriptural teachings about creation, providence, and reconciliation are true, once and for all. And Bultmann believes that a nonmythical gospel of Jesus Christ can be made out in the New Testament. Against both of them Tillich holds that all religious language is symbolic. So the real and valid intent of the doctrines of creation and providence is to give symbolic expression to the heights and depths and the continuities and discontinuities of experience. It is still possible and important to raise the question of the truth. Symbols are true, accordingly, insofar as what they symbolize shines through them and generates appropriate responses to the realities. So "creator" does not name or conceptualize a specific being that acts upon other beings. Rather, it is a historically conditioned symbol of creativity as a root power of being as such: the one who is God beyond the gods of theism and atheism.

Today many people express sadness over the passing from the scene of all the commanding theological figures of Protestantism. No giants, it is acknowledged, have appeared to take their places. Yet we are not as likely to acknowledge another fact, namely, that a shift is occurring in the theological agenda itself. In the concluding section we shall consider some of the large questions concerning the doctrines of creation and providence affected by this shift.

ISSUES AND PROPOSALS

1. Can Christian thought about creation take seriously the notion of a world-originating divine act? For many centuries now, scientific and philosophical difficulties have been building up around this notion. In recent years big-bang scientific theories have stirred hopes for the successful revival—perhaps we ought to say resurrection—of the consensus view. But even if "big-bang" blew all opposition off the astrophysical board, there would still be ample room to doubt that such a theory affords substantial solace to the consensus mind. Scientific theories about cosmic beginnings have little to do with the place of human beings in the vast time-space spread of the universe. The

consensus has been fundamentally concerned all along with the question about the place of humankind in the divine creative activity, as Barth in our time and Aquinas in his epoch testify.

Contrasting views of language permeate such discussions in our time. "Origin" in science means something very different from what it means in Christian discourse. Religious language is much closer to the full round and texture of existence than the language of science or of systematic philosophy. So Christian employment of "creation" begins on the experiential and convictional levels, where it gives expression to the sense of radical contingency and absolute dependence upon God. Accordingly, modern theological treatments of creation run strongly toward the relationship in which creaturely existence and divine power and righteousness are interlocked. What does it mean to be rooted and grounded in finiteness and yet to have the "sense and taste of the infinite" (as Schleiermacher expressed it) ineradicably present? Perhaps this duality of experience is the generic religious sense to which historical religions in splendid variety of liturgical and doctrinal accouterment give particular expression.

2. So today there are thinkers who believe that systematic theology must employ a set of concepts valid for dealing with the full spread of reality; it must sweep up God and everything else that exists. In this view creativity is a fundamental category for the all-inclusive continuum of being from the lowest life-pulse of infinitesimal physical particles to God, and back. On the other side are those who hold that theological categories cannot rise above the human situation. In this view, creativity has no valid cosmological application unless it is in the mode of poetic-mythological celebration of life. Within the compass of humanity, creativity is the mark or perhaps the essence of the realized ethical person.

3. Thinking and rethinking the doctrines of creation and providence must go on today in a situation in which the open universe overshadows the closed universe of traditional world views, religious and scientific. The consensus was wedded to the closed universe; God had so created it. Newtonian science seemed to confirm this religious bias toward a closed, bound, and determined nature. But already in the seventeenth century the universe of scientific and philosophic imagination began to show signs of opening up and expanding to infinity. The visionaries of the Enlightenment could see

no limit to the development of human potentialities once humankind was liberated from political tyranny and religious superstition. Then Darwinism revealed nature as committed to inexhaustible novelty. Thus nature slipped the leash of ancient preconceptions of order and rationality bound into finite and everlastingly insurmountable limits.

What then of nature's God? Is God another infinite alongside infinite nature? What does God create? What in fact needs God's preserving power and wisdom? Theologians early in modern times were constrained to ponder the question whether God's omniscience would be intolerably strained by a cosmic-temporal spread actually (rather than analytically) infinite. Now the problem moves into the constitution and behavior—the life story, so to speak—of any and every entity. Is it simply an effect of antecedent causes? Or is every entity self-caused, self-generated, self-projected across its environment? Is freedom thus coupled with causal efficacy throughout the cosmos? If so, what is God's role in such a world? Is God the one who orchestrates an innate, underived, and unpredictable spontaneity in all things in order to produce at any given moment the richest possible effect compatible with coherence? On this front the conviction that all things are God's because of the eminence of the Creator and Preserver seems to have been blunted.

4. Christian theology has generally evinced much livelier interest in the human dimension of perennial philosophical questions than in the universal ones: human nature rather than nature, history rather than cosmos. So even if self-causation (freedom) is distributed throughout the universe, what is to be made of *human* freedom? But in the dominant scientific world view, nature is an unbroken causal continuum, a realm of pure necessity.

Ever since Kant, a considerable body of Protestant theologians have persisted in setting humankind over against nature, but not in the manner of the consensus. That nature is the realm of causal necessity is a principle rather than a discovery of modern science. On the other hand, the moral consciousness has its own structure, its own laws *sui generis*. As participant in spiritual reality, humanity is geared into the transcendental order of being. In that order ethical imperatives carry their own authority; they are neither legislated nor enforced by God, but they do manifest the true and everlasting divine purpose to realize a pure ethical community.

5. Liberal theology here seems to have doubled back to pick up an important theme in the consensus, namely, that the communication of goodness is God's purpose in creating the world and sustaining it unto its perfection. That God is good and cannot do evil is a religious sentiment powerfully expressed in Plato's dialogues. Plato hints that the more goodness a being has the stronger is the inclination of that goodness to communicate itself without stint. We have seen that Spinoza drew the conclusion that the world, the all-inclusive cosmic system, necessarily exists and is necessarily perfect. That conclusion is totally unacceptable to the consensus.

But it is not just the consensus that finds such a conclusion unacceptable, perhaps even abhorrent. Total war obliges us to be acutely aware of the magnitude of historical evil. What is to be made of a providence that allows the Holocaust to happen—not only allows it but also incorporates it in the original and comprehensive plan of creation?

Here the great theological task seems to be to render something very like a cost-benefit analysis of the contractual grant of freedom in which humankind is inextricably situated by God's will. Not that the Holocaust can be deduced from the terms of the contract (or covenant). The scheme—should we now say scenario—of freedom-in-creation does not allow for the deductive method in the interpretation of history. So the Holocaust, for our time the paradigm case of historical evil, could have been avoided; it need not have happened. Does this mean that if it was foreseen and not prevented, the advance knower must have been deficient either in goodness or in power? The question contains a famous theological dilemma. We have a question about the dilemma: Is it *real*? Should God have *made* Britain's prime minister take a firm stand against Hitler's bluff in remilitarizing the Rhineland in 1936? The appearance of the Holocaust rode on the outcome of that bluff. Should God have *made* the average American citizen aware of the magnitude and virulence of evil in fascism before 1940? The creation of the Holocaust rode on that indifference, that passivity, that willful ignorance. It is difficult to give such notions of divine coercive action any content that is both Christian and intelligible. That all things work for the good is at least as much an eschatological vision as it is an empirical-descriptive principle. But it must retain something of the latter.

The Christian faith is intelligible insofar as it provides a comparatively clear purchase on the actualities of nature, history, society, and personal existence—which is to say that the core empirical element in providence is awareness of how the process of good-coming-out-of-evil can be infused into any historical situation for its creative transformation. But this process is anything but a mechanical one. There are no guarantees that such a process once begun will be sustained unto its envisaged consummation. Human envisagements are incurably fragmentary. They are also prone to corruption. But the truly immense, the all but wholly imponderable complications in the process of creativity—here understood as making good to come from evil—come from the side of God. “God’s ways are not your ways nor God’s thoughts your thoughts.” Only God is able to endure the full spread of the consequences of human folly and wickedness, and to make it as telling a part of the cosmic weave as the evolution of the galaxies.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

- Aquinas, Thomas. *Summa Theologica*. Part 1a, questions 22–23, 44–49, 65–74, 103–19.
- Augustine. *City of God*. Books 11–12.
- Barth, Karl. *Church Dogmatics*. Vols. 3/1, 3/3.
- Bultmann, Rudolf. *Existence and Faith*. New York: Meridian Books, 1960. Pp. 23–34, 171–82, 206–25.
- Calvin, John. *Institutes of the Christian Religion*. Book 1, chap. 3.
- Descartes, René. *Meditations*, in *Discourse on Method and Other Writings*. New York: Penguin Books, 1970.
- Hegel, G. W. F. *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*. Vols. 1, 3.
- Kant, Immanuel. *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*. New York: Harper & Row, 1960.
- Leibniz, G. W. *Monadology*, in *Discourse on Metaphysics/Correspondence with Arnauld/Monadology*. La Salle: Open Court Publishing Co., 1979.
- Neville, Robert C. *Creativity and God: A Challenge to Process Theology*. New York: Seabury Press, 1980.
- Origen. *On First Principles*. Book 2.
- Schleiermacher, Friedrich. *The Christian Faith*. Pp. 142–93, 233–56.
- Spinoza, Benedict de. *Ethics*, in *The Rationalists*. New York: Anchor Books, 1974. Part 1, including Appendix.
- Tanner, Kathryn E. *God and Creation: Tyranny or Empowerment?* New York: B. Blackwell, 1988.
- Whitehead, Alfred North. *Process and Reality*. New York: Free Press, 1929.