- Thompson, Peter L. Hurd, and Bernard J. Crespi, "Genes Underlying Altruism," *Biology Letters* 9, no. 6 (2013): 1–6.
- 98 The Christian tradition asserts that Jesus of Nazareth responded fully to the Sacred Insistence and so was recognized by his community as the Christ. See Paul Tillich's discussion of this Christology in his *Systematic Theology*, vol. 2, and Mesle, *Process Theology*, 104–9. To the extent that religious traditions support and encourage the ideals and practices of love, care, inclusion, diversity, beauty, goodness, and justice, they are worthy of our engagement. To the extent that they do not, they invite our resistance.
- 99 Pastoral theologian and Jungian scholar Margaret Kornfeld suggests that wholeness (her word, which I take to mean well-being) entails acknowledging and even embracing one's limits and that by so doing one feels a sense of freedom and acceptance. See Margaret Kornfeld, Cultivating Wholeness: A Guide to Care and Counseling in Faith Communities (2000; repr., New York: Continuum, 2012), 8.
- 100 "Morality" is defined as valuing what is rightly valued. Bloomfield, Virtues of Happiness, 125. This includes valuing ourselves as well as others, the earth, and "God." Pastoral theologian James Lapsley argues that participation in the life of God is a hallmark of flourishing and is something of a developmental achievement. See James Lapsley, Salvation and Health: Interlocking Processes of Life (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox, 1972). Pastoral theologian Rodney Hunter added nuance to the ability to participate in the Life of God, saying it involves active engagement but is also available for those who cannot actively participate: those who "suffer the limitation or destruction of their vital capacities" participate by offering themselves, their presence, and their ability to receive love as a mark of their participation in the Life of God, rather than a particular creation or achievement. Rodney J. Hunter, "Participation in the Life of God: Revisioning Lapsley's Salvation-Health Model," in The Treasure of Earthen Vessels: Explorations in Theological Anthropology in Honor of James N. Lapsley, ed. Brian H. Childs and David W. Waanders (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox, 1994), 13. See also McClure, Moving beyond Individualism, for my proposal of a synergistic anthropology that privileges participation in valuable, liberative activities rather than insight as the ultimate goal of psychotherapeutic practices.
- 101 Caputo, Hope against Hope, 79.
- 102 Sometimes flourishing of all means I must sacrifice my immediate happiness or contentment for that of another. But in order to flourish, I cannot do this continuously, only periodically and temporarily.
- 103 "Practical rationality" or *phronesis*—practical wisdom to Aristotle.
- 104 Bloomfield, Virtues of Happiness, 134. The authors of Christian Practical Wisdom: What It Is, Why It Matters argue that practical wisdom, the kind Aristotle thought was indispensable for eudaimonia, is the least understood and the most difficult to learn. See Dorothy C. Bass et al., Christian Practical Wisdom: What It Is, Why It Matters (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2016).
- 105 Phronesis is a virtue insofar as acting rationally in practical contexts can be a well-developed character trait that aids and partly constitutes a well-lived life. Bloomfield, Virtues of Happiness, 224 and 134. See also the exploration of phronesis in the Christian life in Bass et al., Christian Practical Wisdom, 1.
- 106 Bloomfield, *Virtues of Happiness*, 225. Wisdom includes the recognition that complexity is at the heart of life and allows one to manage paradox. The wise know that "sometimes rules must be broken." Bloomfield, *Virtues of Happiness*, 229. For example, sometimes

justice errs on the side of mercy, and the guilty receive forgiveness. Courage might mean quitting, and sometimes the better thing is to break commitment to a commitment in the service of something richer or deeper—something that may lead to a more flourishing life for oneself and others too, if they follow the urgings of the Sacred Insistence. And, despite the fact that all one can really do is try, often and regularly, to do what is moral and virtuous in the moment, the wise rest in the knowledge that they could not have tried harder, could not have discerned more carefully in the moment, and could not have done better, given who they were at the time and the challenges they faced. See a discussion of this in Bloomfield, *Virtues of Happiness*, 230.

- 107 "Interpathy" is defined as "when empathy crosses cultural boundaries." See Emmanuel Y. Lartey, In Living Color: An Intercultural Approach to Pastoral Care and Counseling (Philadelphia: Jessica Kingsley, 2003), 93–94.
- 108 Of course, no one is infallible or perfect in practical reasoning; being practically wise, like all virtues, is an ideal that we may only approach with greater or lesser success.
- 109 Pastoral theologian Carrie Doehring suggests that emotions are a significant part of growing spiritually because they are "what connect our physical and embodied selves with our beliefs, values, and ways of coping," 585. See Carrie Doehring, "Emotions and Change in Spiritual Care," Pastoral Psychology 63, no. 5 (2014): 583-96. In this essay Doehring offers a useful pair of diagrams depicting the differences between life-limiting and life-giving interrelationships among emotions, values, beliefs, and practices, especially in relation to healing trauma. There are other examinations of emotions in relation to well-being in development and in spirituality. For example, for a helpful treatment of the emotion of shame among black men, see Jay-Paul Hinds, "Shame and Its Sons: Black Men, Fatherhood, and Filicide," Pastoral Psychology 63, no. 5 (2014): 641-58. In this essay Hinds explores the intergenerational phenomenon of shame among black men, reimagining it not as an "albatross" but as a "source of innovation that inspires new ways of enunciating and understanding [black men's] manhood." Hinds, "Shame and Its Sons," 644. Pastoral theologian Bonnie Miller-McLemore would likely applaud this idea; in what is now an almost classic essay, she has worried that part of the devaluation of religion and religious institutions is related to the "devaluation" of the feminine, which is often associated with emotion, care, nurture, and devotion. Bonnie Miller-McLemore, "The Living Human Web: Pastoral Theology at the Turn of the Century," in Through the Eyes of Women: Insights for Pastoral Care, ed. Jeanne Stevenson-Moessner (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996), 28. On the problem of individualism in contemporary life, see also Pamela D. Couture, "Weaving the Web: Pastoral Care in an Individualistic Society," in Through the Eyes of Women: Insights for Pastoral Care, ed. Jeanne Stevenson-Moessner (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996), 94-106.
- 110 This differs, of course, from the Stoic sage who is able to rid himself of all passions. See chapter 1 for more on this.
- 111 Theologian Wendy Farley argues that, echoing Augustine, we know the Good because it is an ontological part of who we are as human beings: it is our deepest desire. This deep desire, Farley asserts, tells us something about ourselves as human beings: that we long for the "great emptiness, which is beauty and love without limitation." Farley, *The Wounding and Healing of Desire*, 13. Desire for the "great emptiness" testifies to humans' need for the divine, and the great and precious beauty in each of us that is the root of that desire that "cannot be blotted out" (19). Farley asserts that we all have a deep desire for the sacred, for community, and love, something that religious systems—at their

best—provide some account of: their message is that we are, "deep, deep down," all knit together, and we cannot go so far astray that this solidarity is completely broken (3). Farley writes, "However far beneath our conscious experience, awareness of the preciousness of *home* remains alive because we are connected to others" (4, emphasis added). Farley, *The Wounding and Healing of Desire.* 

I argue that we recognize virtues such as love, justice, and care because no human experience is monolithic; that is, because there are "gaps" and differences in and between all experience, there is leverage for agency. See McClure, *Moving beyond Individualism*, 243–54. Indeed, these are ideally experienced in one's earliest years and the sense of them is carried throughout our lives.

- 112 These are basic assumptions of developmental theorists such as Erik Erikson. There are credible critiques of classical developmental theory, often that developmental theories do not account adequately for the cultural and social environments in which people grow. See, for example, Erica Burman, Deconstructing Developmental Psychology, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2008), and Barbara Rogoff, The Cultural Nature of Human Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). However, it is clear that humans are not born fully formed as human beings and the mere passage of time is insufficient in itself to ensure the development of full human personhood. Thus, while newborns should be deeply valued members of their communities, they do not possess qualities of ideal maturity such as the capacity for non-possessive love, nor are they already grounded in a reasonably understood, shared sense reality. Infants cannot have a clearly articulated set of values they can pursue that make life meaningful, nor can they exercise the fullest measure of their freedom of choice and creativity, deeply understand and respect others, have the capacity for reflection on their experience (and others'), or identify with all humans. Human beings differ in capacities such as cognition, moral reasoning, and emotional functioning. They differ in terms of the maturity of their ego development, the breadth and openness of their worldviews, their capacities for love, and their abilities to understand perspectives other than their own. Underlying all of these capacities are fundamental differences in the development of consciousness itself—the great evolving "ocean of awareness" on which all phenomena and experiences arise. (One psychologist suggests that everything that exists "floats on a stream that flows toward transcendence [or the Unconditional]." Benner, Human Being and Becoming, xii). Developmental psychologist Erik Erikson related wisdom to the last stage of his eight-stage theory of psychosocial development. Erik Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis (New York: W.W. Norton, 1968), 140-41. The Sacred Urge of Goodness Beyond Being presupposes growth and persistent change at the heart of the lifespan. What is distinctive about human beings is not that people are part of this flow but that they possess the possibility of consciously participating in it or ignoring it. And so often individuals resist it altogether. This developmental view of mature wisdom and other virtues should not lead to our devaluing children, the differently abled, etc. Rather, as Aristotle argued, each should be judged by his/her own capacities. On respecting children's agency, see, for example, pastoral theologians Bonnie Miller-McLemore, Let the Children Come: Reimagining Childhood from a Christian Perspective (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2003), and Joyce A. Mercer, Welcoming Children: A Practical Theology of Childhood (St. Louis: Chalice Press, 2005).
- 113 Pastoral theologian James Lapsley argued this in his classic text *Salvation and Health*. As noted in note 105 of this chapter there are various levels and ways of "participating." Pastoral theologian Rodney Hunter argues that Lapsley focuses too heavily on the "giving"

- kinds of participation and says that participation can include both activities of giving and also practices of receiving—for example, being "with" the other, "essentially, to suffer with and for the other." Hunter, "Participation in the Life of God," 22.
- 114 Caputo argues that the rose is as the rose is (and it is beautiful and right as it is), but a rose cannot participate in the same way to bring into existence justice and cannot love as a fully mature person can. Part of what differentiates us from a rock or a rose is the gift of consciousness. Like everything that is, the rose has both gifts and limits (for example, it is—as far as anyone knows—without consciousness.) Roses, then, are evidence of the Unconditional. Caputo, Hope against Hope, 106-14. Psychologist David Benner would likely agree. He writes, "Without consciousness we could never reflect on our lives, be absorbed by something that caught our attention or be fully present to others or ourselves. Without consciousness, we would be like rocks and trees—we would simply be what we do and do what we are." Benner, Human Being and Becoming, 2. Without consciousness we could not make sense of the experiences of our lives and could not respond as meaningfully to the Sacred Insistence toward love and justice; without consciousness we would be "destined to simply live in reaction to the events that happen to us. Without consciousness we would not have meaningfully organized perceptions, only scattered sensations. Without consciousness we would drift through life awash in stimulation and bereft of the most distinctive human resources for rising above the instinctual programming that was bequeathed to us by our evolutionary past." Benner, Human Being and Becoming, 2.
- 115 For good discussions on the developmental qualities of values, see Milton Rokeach, Understanding Human Values: Individual and Societal (New York: Free Press/Simon & Schuster, 1979), and Brian Hall, Values Shift.
- 116 As noted previously, while there are salient critiques of developmental theories, it is reasonable to present generally accepted stages or phases in the development of the ego as moving from a focus on survival (and physiological needs including food, warmth, shelter, comfort), in which one is interested primarily in the self and the ability to survive. Ideally, this individual eventually will develop into one who is interested in and capable of increasingly mutual relationship that considers the safety needs of self and those in close relationship (family, kin, tribe), to a capacity to hold one's own needs, goals, and values in interdependent relationship with all others' needs, goals, and values. If physiological and social needs are sufficiently met and skills for pursuing one's goals are well developed, developmental theories propose, people will likely have the self-esteem, confidence, competence, sense of belonging, trust, faith, and internal cohesion to live in a self-chosen but virtuous collaboration with others. Their desire to make a valuable difference and their capacities for doing so will be developed to the point that they will be able to engage the world meaningfully. On this, see, for example, Benner, Human Being and Becoming; Hall, Values Shift; Richard Barrett, The New Leadership Paradigm: Leading Self, Leading Others, Leading an Organization, Leading in Society (Lexington, Ky.: Barrett Values Centre, 2016); and Robert Kegan and Lisa Lahey, An Everyone Culture: Becoming a Deliberately Developmental Organization (Boston: Harvard Business Review Press, 2016), for accessible summaries of this argument.
- 117 See pastoral theologian Joretta Marshall's work on conditions for forgiveness and limits to as a practice. Marshall, *How Can I Forgive?*
- 118 Seligman argues that these strengths have been shown empirically to support and develop the virtues that describe and allow for the flourishing life. Seligman refers to his formula

- as "PERMA": positive emotions, engagement, positive and deep relationships, complex meaning making, and accomplishments. Seligman, *Flourish*, 16 and 243. This is fundamentally a developmental argument, although adapting, learning, bonding, and cooperation, like all developmental processes, are tied less to age than to ability to handle complexity. Psychological maturity depends on our ability to individuate, self-actualize, and handle complexity, all of which "depends on our level of exposure to experience" and the ability to reflect on it with increasing wisdom. Benner, *Human Being and Becoming*, 89. Jewish and Christian theologians argue that human wisdom is different from godly wisdom. The goal is to align our wisdom with that of the wisdom of the Holy Other. Confucius said that wisdom can be learned through three methods: reflection (the most noble), imitation (the easiest), and experience (the bitterest).
- 119 Children need to be taught explicitly to experience, identify, and explore for understanding their own emotions and those of others and to develop their moral imaginations in light of the flourishing of all. Adults often need to be taught remedially, which is part of what I understand the role of psychodynamic psychotherapy to be.
- 120 As it turns out, people prefer being in an emotional state over not being in one. Keith Oatley and Jennifer M. Jenkins, "Psychotherapy, Consciousness, and Narrative," in Oatley and Jenkins, *Understanding Emotions*, 385–411.
- 121 There are, of course, situations when people are "not in their right minds." The opioid epidemic, for example, has made clear the deleterious effects certain substances can have on people's capacities to relate well, work, or otherwise engage themselves and the world. Traumatic experiences cloud people's judgment and their capacities to reason and relate. These examples clarify what is important for flourishing. However, Seligman's research with PTSD sufferers shows that difficult or unpleasant emotions tend not to last long in typically functioning people if those emotions are examined within a program of awareness, acceptance, understanding, and care. Seligman, Flourish, 143.
- 122 This extends even to the importance of understanding how our brains work. Pastoral theologian David Hogue argues the importance of this for developing good practices of care. See his essay "How the Brain Matters," in Ramsay, *Pastoral Theology and Care*, 31–53.
- 123 This is not to resort to a structural model. Rather, these emotions are, from a theological perspective, the result of something inborn in humans (e.g., the imago dei), as Wendy Farley argues. From a social constructive view, they are the result of being taught that one has value, is to be respected, and deserves dignity, and psychologist Christopher Bollas asserts they are developed in our earliest life experiences.
- 124 See chapter 6 for more on how categories relate to the generation of emotions.
- 125 For example, anger is typically a socially discouraged emotion for women in Western cultures, while love and tenderness are "prohibited" among "real" men. See, for example, Kay Deaux, "From Individual Differences to Social Categories: Analysis of a Decade's Research on Gender," American Psychologist 39, no. 2 (1984): 105–16. See also, for example, Ashley Montagu, ed., The Learning of Nonaggression (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), and Leslie R. Brody and Judith A. Hall, "Gender and Emotion in Context," in Lewis, Haviland-Jones, and Barrett, 3rd ed., Handbook of Emotion, 395–408.
- 126 The righteous anger of Black Lives Matter activists has been deemed "excessive," "inappropriate," "unnecessary," "irresponsible," and more. See, for example, Kimberly Seals Allers, "Black Women Have Never Had the Privilege of Rage," *HuffPost*, October 14, 2008, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/opinion-angry-black-women\_us\_5bbf7652e4b040bb4e800249.

- 127 Recall that Aristotle viewed people who never feel anger as "fools."
- 128 Civil rights attorney and activist Michelle Alexander suggests that our activities—even those that would purportedly support human flourishing—are for naught if they are not grounded in "revolutionary love." Michelle Alexander, presentation at the American Academy of Religion, November 20, 2016. See also Michelle Alexander, *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness* (New York: The New Press, 2012). There are other accounts of the challenges of living in a systemically racist society in the United States. See, for example, the work of Greg Ellison, *Cut Dead but Still Alive: Caring for African American Young Men* (Nashville: Abingdon, 2013); Lee Butler, *Liberating Our Dignity, Saving Our Souls* (St. Louis: Chalice Press, 2006); and Sandra L. Barnes and Anne S. Wimberly, *Empowering Black Youth of Promise: Education and Socialization in the Village-Minded Black Church* (New York: Routledge, 2016).
- 129 Remember, "negative" or unpleasant emotions are constructed in the moment when one's core affect is negative (e.g., unpleasant/high arousal) and when one interprets one's context as negative. If the memories of and beliefs that developed in the experience of similar core affect experiences are negative, then one's experiences in the moment are typically negative too. For example, a person often experiences impatience and frustration when he does not get what he wants when he wants it and expresses anger when such situations persist. Object-relations theorist D. W. Winnicott asserts, however, that we do not need (and in fact will never receive) "perfect" attention, but only "good enough" care, in order to develop well and to flourish. See Donald W. Winnicott, *Playing and Reality* (1971; repr., New York: Routledge Classics, 2005).
- 130 While one's core affect is not always pleasant (and can be very unpleasant), rather than using language of "positive" or "negative" emotions or adaptive or maladaptive emotions, it is more useful to use the language of "life-giving" versus "life-limiting." For example, while Martha Nussbaum accepts some of the early philosophical positions about the passions, such as the passions' tendencies to be unruly and disruptive, she does not go so far as to conflate "unpredictable" with "negative." She writes, "I proceed on the assumption that at least some things and people outside one's own control have real worth." Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought*, 11–12. Despite the fact that certain emotions are often referred to as adaptive or maladaptive evolutionarily speaking, sometimes what is most adaptive is most life-limiting, and vice versa, as Miguel De La Torre's work on hopelessness shows (see note 58, this chapter).
- 131 This implies, of course, that people's stories are significant entry points for understanding their emotions and feelings: stories are epistemological tools. It also implies that each of us needs "story companions" who can listen for ways our feelings are related to our developmental processes, memories of our past experiences, contextual challenges, needs, goals, values, and so on. For a good discussion of this, see Karen D. Scheib, *Pastoral Care: Telling the Stories of Our Lives* (Nashville: Abingdon, 2016), and David A. Hogue, *Remembering the Future, Imagining the Past: Story, Ritual, and the Human Brain* (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 2003). Australian pastoral theologian Neil Pembroke, too, writes about the exploration of emotions—particularly shame—in pastoral care. See Neil Pembroke, *The Art of Listening: Dialogue, Shame, and Pastoral Care* (New York: T&T Clark/Handsel, 2002). Accompanying one another in this work engenders hope, it has been argued, which emerges in relationship as we explore these things together. See Joretta L. Marshall, "Collaborating Hope: Joining the In-Between Spaces," *Journal of Pastoral Theology* 26, no. 2 (2016): 77–90.

- 132 There are, of course, other treatments that can be effective, such as EMDR (Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing) and medications.
- 133 Trauma specialist Christy Sim suggests that certain practices can free survivors of the memories and trauma they wish not to relive. Sim, Survivor Care. The question of how completely one can be free of past trauma is a salient one, but out of the scope of this project.
- 134 While we will never have full control over our emotions, we can engage them in more informed, more intentional, more insightful, and wiser ways.
- 135 Peter Salovey, Brian T. Bedell, Jerusha B. Detweiler, and John D. Mayer, "Current Directions in Emotional Intelligence Research," in Lewis and Haviland-Jones, *Handbook of Emotions*, 2nd ed., 504–20.